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INTRODUCTION

Antitrust scholars portray early antitrust decisionmaking as an intellectual realm in which serious policy errors were committed because
populist approaches were allowed free rein in the absence of guidance
from general economic theory. Yet, in striking respects, the history of
early antitrust jurisprudence remains unexplored. Much of the relevant
case law barely has been addressed, while the remainder has been pictured in a way that deemphasizes the variety of influences apparently
shaping its development. This Article examines aspects of judicial analysis prior to the close of World War I that have received comparatively
little attention from antitrust scholars and historians and seeks to suggest both the need for further study in these areas and its potential
rewards. The Article's immediate focus is on the judicial treatment of
constitutional challenges to state antitrust enforcement; its larger concern is with the diversity of factors affecting early antitrust jurisprudence. Within the broader social and constitutional context of state antitrust activity, the Article focuses particularly on the way in which
economic theory influenced early antitrust reasoning. While important
recent antitrust scholarship asserts that general economic theory played
no significant role in shaping judicial analysis in the "formative" years
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of antitrust development,1 this Article finds that opinions addressing
early constitutional challenges to state enforcement suggest a very different conclusion. Discovering strong indications of the shaping power
of contemporary economic philosophy in early antitrust approaches
previously dismissed as standardless, subjective populism, the Article
goes on to consider the reasons why leading antitrust historians may
have unduly minimized the early impact of general theory.
The first section of this Article details the nature and significance
of state statutory and common law responses to late nineteenth and
early twentieth century economic concentration and collusion. It argues
that scholarly neglect of these responses rests on, and has helped to
perpetuate, an erroneous assessment of their practical and symbolic importance. The second section addresses congressional and judicial delineation of the permissible scope of early state antitrust activity. It
notes the apparent congressional intent to supplement but not limit
state efforts and then goes on to describe in detail both the variety of
constitutional challenges made to such early state initiatives and their
judicial resolution. The Article relates how contemporary jurists repeatedly reaffirmed considerable state power over corporate charters and
business privileges and indicates how that power gave states a flexible
means to achieve not only corporate ouster but also the more certain
payment of antitrust fines, even for activities that the states constitutionally could not have regulated directly. Following a review of the
mixed success of commerce clause and territorial due process challenges
to state legislation, the Article then describes how, in contemporary
equal protection analysis, initial judicial hostility came to be replaced
by substantial support for selective state attacks on anticompetitive behavior. After summarizing the judicial treatment of freedom of contract
challenges and charges that various state penalties and procedures violated constitutional due process requirements, the Article then examines
state and federal decisions addressing void-for-vagueness challenges to
state antitrust legislation, the group of opinions that most strikingly
suggests the power of contemporary economic theory and of competing
visions of economic reality.
I.

THE OTHER HALF OF ANTITRUST: STATE STATUTORY AND

COMMON LAW,

1880-1918

Antitrust scholars and historians have examined in detail a great
many aspects of federal antitrust development in the "formative era" of
1 See infra notes 287-330 and accompanying text.
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the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 But the other half of
antitrust activity during that period, the state complement to federal
policy and practice, has received considerably less attention. While such
relative deemphasis reflects the comparative importance of federal and
state antitrust law during most of the last half century,3 it does not
parallel the comparative social and economic importance of the two
fields in the early formative period itself.
In 1961, a leading commentator could declare enforcement of state
antitrust laws "virtually dead" and openly wonder "whether it would
have been unethical in recent years for lawyers in most states to tell
their clients to ignore them."'4 In 1900 or 1910, businesses and business
lawyers in several states could overlook the possibilities of state-level
challenge to anticompetitive activity only at substantially greater risk.
Defensive challenge to private enforcement of contracts and combinations in restraint of trade was permitted in English and American
common law long before the late nineteenth century.' Moreover, beginning early in that century, American jurisdictions undertook common
law and statutory' prosecutions for conspiracies in restraint of trade,
with early labor unions a frequent target.7 State statutory and common
' Important treatments include R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY
wrrH ITsELF (1978); D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW
(1959); R. HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1965); J. HURST, LAW
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 245-66 (1977); W. LETWIN, LAW AND
AT WAR

ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST
Acr (1965); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLicY: ORIGINATION OF AN

AMERICAN TRADITION (1955); J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900-1918, at 62-91 (1968); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original

and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34

HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). Scholars frequently have referred to this period as the
"formative era" of modern antitrust law. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra, at 17; Rahl, To-

ward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEx. L. REV. 753, 753 (1961).
S

See, e.g., Project, Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement: The Problems with

PuttingNew Wines in Old Wine Skins, 4 J. CORP. L. 547, 555 (1979). In recent years
state-level legislative activity and litigation have increased, sparking renewed interest in
legal and practical issues raised by dual federal and state antitrust efforts. See id.; see
also Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the FederalScheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 377-78 &
n.10 (1983).
" Rahl, supra note 2, at 753.
5 See W. LETWIN, supra note 2, at 18-52; H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 9-53.
' New York, for example, as early as 1828, enacted legislation declaring: "If two
or more persons shall conspire . . .[t]o commit any act injurious to . . . trade or
commerce ... [t]hey shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." Act of Dec. 10, 1828,
§ 8(6), 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. 689, 691-92; see NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NEW YORK ANTIrRUST LAWS

2a (1957).

7 See J. RAYBACK,A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 56-60, 81-82 (1959); Morris, New Preface to 3 & 4 J. COMMONS & E. GILMORE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY at i-xii (1958).
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law activity increased greatly, however, in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries as new collective business arrangements proliferated
by the thousands and economic concentration increased substantially.8
At least fourteen states inserted antimonopoly provisions into their state
constitutions prior to July 2, 1890," the date of passage of the federal
Sherman Act, 10 and at least thirteen states enacted their own antitrust
legislation prior to that date."" By 1900, the number of states and territories adopting such statutes rose to twenty-seven,, 2 reaching a total of
at least thirty-five states by 1915.' s
State antitrust measures took many forms and frequently established more detailed prohibitions than did contemporary federal legislation. Numerous state provisions variously attacked monopoly,"' restraint of trade,' 5 restraint of competition,' pooling,17 price fixing,' 8
output limitations,' " territorial divisions,20 resale restraints, 2 1 exclusive
dealing, "2 refusals to deal,2 8 local price discrimination, 2 and predatory
pricing. "5 Remedial provisions were similarly diverse. Statutes in at
8 See H.

THORRLIJ, supra note 2, at 63-96, 254-308.
9 See H. SEAGER & C. GULICK, TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS 341
(1929). A number of provisions prior to 1887, however, apparently were directed more
at publicly granted than privately established monopolies. See Legislation, A Collection
and Survey of State Antitrust Laws, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 347 n.2 (1932).
10 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
11 See H. SEAGER & C. GULICK, supra note 9, at 341. Six of these states were
among the fourteen that adopted antimonopoly provisions in their constitutions. See id.
at 342.
11 See id. at 343.
" See J. DAVIES, TRUST LAWS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 212 (1916). Although published in 1916, the date of this report by Joseph E. Davies, the Commissioner of Corporations, United States Department of Commerce, was March 15, 1915.
By 1929, only eight states had adopted neither a constitutional nor a statutory antitrust
provision. See H. SEAGER & C. GULICK, supra note 9, at 343.
14 See J. DAVIES, supra note 13, at 144-50.
15 See id. at 150-59.
16 See id. at 159-64.
17 See id. at 164-68.
15 See id. at 168-78.
'9 See id. at 179-82.
20 See id. at 182.
21 See id. at 183.
22 See id. at 184-85.
23 See id. at 185-86.
24 See id. at 187-91.
'5 See id. at 192-95. For still other areas of pre-World War I state antitrust legislation, including particular provisions relating to farming interests, labor, and holding
companies, as well as sections reaffirming common law principles and addressing procedural and administrative matters, see id. at 196-211. See generally C. BEACH, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MONOPOLIES AND INDUSTRIAL TRUSTS AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1898); J. JOYCE, A
TREATISE ON MONOPOLIES AND UNLAWFUL COMBINATIONS OR RESTRAINTS (1911).
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least thirty-five states authorized fines, imprisonment, or both2 8 and
often provided penalties significantly more severe than the one year,
$5000 limits established in the Sherman Act as passed by Congress in
1890.217 Statutes in North Carolina,2" South Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas29 authorized the longest prison terms for antitrust
violations, each allowing a maximum sentence of ten years.3 0 Authorized fines ranged up to $25,000, and at least ten states declared each
day of violation a separate offense."' Iowa provided that corporate violators could be fined in an amount equal to twenty percent of the violator's capital stock.3 2 Nine states expressly allowed private parties injured by antitrust violations to recover actual damages,"3 two others
authorized double damages," and another nine permitted treble damage recovery.3 5 In addition, at least thirty states provided that corporate
charters and intrastate business privileges could be revoked in response
to violations of state antitrust laws," and at least four states declared
that anyone purchasing from a seller doing business in violation of antitrust law would be freed from any obligation to pay for the purchased
goods. 1
Even before enactment of the Sherman Act, six states brought actions to challenge the continued intrastate activity of particular major
"trusts." The states won all six, leading to annulment of defendants'
franchise or business privileges in some cases and the forced severance
of corporate "trust" connections in others.3 Between 1890 and 1902,
supra note 13, at 212.
Oh. 647, §§ 1-3, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3

:' See J. DAVIES,
S7

(1982)).

" See H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 155. The North Carolina provision was
contained in an 1889 statute. See id. at 155 n.197. As noted below, see infra note 30, a
1913 North Carolina law set no maximum limit.
", See J. DAVIES, supra note 13, at 213 & n.1.
SO A 1911 Wyoming law and a 1913 North Carolina law, however, set no maximum limits on prison terms. See id. at 213 n.3.
31 See id. at 213. Montana authorized the $25,000 penalty. A 1911 Wyoming law
and a 1913 North Carolina law established no upper limit on fines. See id. at 213 nn.
2-3.

" See H.
3

34
35

THORELLI, supra note 2, at 155.
See J. DAVIES, supra note 13, at 216.

See id.
See id.

6 See id. at 213.
See id. at 214; see also infra note 140 and accompanying text.
Us See California ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 7 Ry. &
CoRP. L.J. 83 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1890) (ordering forfeiture of franchise); People ex rel.
Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 22 N.E. 798 (1889) (enjoining corporation from holding or selling stock of other gas companies); State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 46 N.W. 155 (1890) (annulment of franchise); People v. North
River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890) (ordering forfeiture of
37

1987]

ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

twelve states brought a total of twenty-eight antitrust actions,39 while in
the same period the United States Department of Justice instituted a
total of nineteen antitrust suits.40 Although federal activity increased
dramatically in subsequent years,' 1 at least certain states simultaneously continued active enforcement efforts of their own for another decade or more.
State enforcement actions prior to the 1920's were not confined to
minor traders or to purely local concerns. Combinations of multistate
scope often were targeted,'4 and a number of state cases challenged the
local implementation of interstate arrangements that also were attacked
by federal antitrust authorities. Thus, ten states and the Oklahoma
Territory brought twenty-four cases against members of the Standard
Oil Trust between 1890 and 1906,' and other state suits challenged
activities of the sugar,44 beef,' 5 and tobacco46 combinations.
The level of contemporary state activity also is reflected in the pattern of aggregate penalties imposed in federal and state antitrust cases.
Through 1914, the Department of Justice brought 69 criminal and 83
civil antitrust cases; through 1919, the Department brought 94 criminal
and 101 civil antitrust actions. 47 The aggregate amount of fines imposed in all federal criminal antitrust cases since passage of the Sherfranchises and dissolution of corporation); State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Standard Oil
Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892) (case filed May 8, 1890, prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act) (ordering severance of connections to the Standard Oil
'Trust). In addition to the actions addressed in these cases, Louisiana sought and obtained, in an unreported decision, an injunction banning intrastate business operations
on the part of the Cotton Oil Trust. See H. THORETLI, supra note 2, at 79 & nn. 8789, 615. For an earlier phase of that litigation, see Louisiana v. American Cotton Oil
Trust, 1 RY. & CoRP. L.J. 509 (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. 1887) (overruling defendant's exception and finding that the state had stated a cause of action sufficient to allow the
matter to proceed to trial).
39 See H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 595. Defendants lost the great majority of
these cases. See id. at 259-65.
40 See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON.
365, 366 (1970).
41 See id.
42 See NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at 7a; H. THORELLI,
supra note 2, at 79-82, 259-66, 596; Project, supra note 3, at 553-54 & n.66.
'" See B. BRINGHURST, ANTITRUST AND THE OIL MONOPOLY: THE STANDARD
OIL CASES, 1890-1911, at 204 (1979); Project, supra note 3, at 553.
" See California ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 7 RY. &
CORP. L.J. 83 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1890); People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y.
582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890). For the federal suit, see United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,
156 U.S. 1 (1895).
41 See, e.g., State ex rel. Barker v. Armour Packing Co., 265 Mo. 121, 176 S.W.
382 (1915); State ex rel. Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 73 S.W. 645
(1903). For the federal suit, see United States v. Swift & Co., 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
46 See, e.g., People v. Duke, 19 Misc. 292, 44 N.Y.S. 336 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1897).
For the federal suit, see United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
47 See Posner, supra note 40, at 385.
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man Act amounted to $219,875 by the end of 1909, $619,965 by the
close of 1914, and $765,822 by the end of 1919.48 The average fine per
case, in federal suits where fines actually were imposed, amounted to a
little over $21,000 in the years between 1905 and 1914 and a little over
$11,000 between 1915 and 1919.4 9 Yet, in a single pre-war case against
the local Standard Oil affiliate, Texas collected over $1.6 million in
fines.5" Moreover, in the combined years 1912 through 1918 and 1922
through 1924, Texas courts reportedly imposed an additional $1.5 million in total fines in other state antitrust cases,5 1 and, by the end of
1915, courts in Missouri levied unsuspended fines of $678,000 against
defendants in five actions charging violations of that state's antitrust
52
standards.
Nonetheless, historians often have downplayed the practical significance of early state antitrust activity, noting that a great many states
did little or nothing to enforce antitrust standards5" and declaring that
court decisions in state public litigation did not effectively reverse economic concentration or restructure markets affected by antitrust violations." Scholars have particularly stressed the increasing reluctance of
state prosecutors and judges to revoke the charters or business privileges
of corporate violators, a reluctance stemming in large part from a recognition of the potentially high cost of such relief, particularly if it
might cause a violator's instate factories to close, unemployment to rise,
and the number of local competitors actually to decline.55
But the relative infrequency of judicial decrees effectively compel48

See id. at 392.

See id. An unsuspended prison sentence was imposed in only one federal case
through 1914, this single instance being a sentence of four hours in a labor case. See id.
at 391. Only three more jail terms were imposed in federal cases through 1919. See id.
50 See infra text accompanying note 199.
51 See Legislation, supra note 9, at 366 n.150.
5 See State ex reL Barker v. Armour Packing Co., 265 Mo. 121, 176 S.W. 382
(1915) (five defendants each fined $25,000); State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Arkansas
Lumber Co. (the Yellow Pine Mfrs. Ass'n case), 260 Mo. 212, 169 S.W. 145 (1913)
(four defendants fined $50,000 each; one fined $30,000; one fined $25,000; one fined
$20,000; two fined $10,000 each; one fined $8000; nine fined $5,000 each; two fined
$3,000 each; and four fined $1,000 each); State ex rel. Major v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 237 Mo. 369, 141 S.W. 672 (1911) (defendant fined $25,000); State
ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902 (1908) (three defendants
each fined $50,000); State ex rel. Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 73 S.W.
645 (1903) (four defendants each fined $5000).
58 See H. SEGaa & C. GuucK, supra note 9, at 365; H. THORELI, supra note
2, at 265, 595.
' See B. BRINGHURST, supra note 43, at 7, 8; Legislation, supra note 9, at 364.
55 See B. BRINGHURST, supra note 43,. at 7, 67, 88; H. SEAGER & C. GuLcK,
supra note 9, at 365-66; McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869-1903, 53 Bus. HIST. Rav. 304, 317,
339-41 (1979); Legislation, supra note 9, at 360.
49
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ling ouster or restructuring markets does not necessarily demonstrate
the insignificance of state antitrust efforts. Early federal enforcement
itself sometimes has been criticized on somewhat similar grounds, " ' and
even scholars generally critical of early state efforts note some striking
successes. 57 Moreover, intensive recent reexamination of some previously criticized areas of early state antitrust enforcement has led at least
one scholar to reach a dramatically more favorable assessment of the
impact of regional antitrust enforcement, concluding that "anti-trust
and the fear of anti-trust had a pervasive and far-reaching effect on the
rise of oligopoly in oil." 58
In these same early years of antitrust development, private common law and statutory challenges to anticompetitive activity greatly increased, 9 vastly outnurpbering state enforcement actions6 ° and quite
likely modifying economic behavior much more pervasively than did
state government litigation."' The importance of these state law private
cases has not gone unnoted. Hans Thorelli, for example, has declared
that the repeated legal frustration of efforts to enforce anticompetitive
agreements in these cases "was one of the prime factors preventing the
lapse of American industry into general cartelization of . . . the con'62
temporary German type."
Contemporary Americans themselves typically considered state
statutory and common law to be quite important responses to the
66 See, e.g., B. BRINGHURST, supra note 43, at 180 (describing the "startling
weakness" of the dissolution decreed in the federal antitrust suit against Standard Oil).
WSee, e.g., H. THORELLM, supra note 2, at 263 (declaring a New York case
against a "milk exchange" as important as many contemporary federal cases); Legislation, supra note 9, at 366 (noting the "considerable success" achieved in a few states).
" Pratt, The Petroleum Industry in Transition:Anti-Trust and the Decline of
Monopoly Control in Oil, 40 J. ECON. HIsT. 815, 831 (1980).
"' See NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at 4a.
6o See H. THOREI , supra note 2, at 265, 596.
61 A general indication of the growth of private litigation can be obtained, for
example, by examining the cases reported in key sections of the American Digest and
the First and Second Decennial Digests under the "Contracts" chapter subsection entitled "Restraint of Trade or Competition in Trade." See 11 AMERICAN DIGEST
§§ 542-569 (Century Ed. 1899); 5 AMERICAN DIGEST §§ 115-120, 130, 132 (Decennial Ed. 1908); 5 AMERICAN DIGEST §§ 115-120, 130, 132 (2d Decennial Ed. 1919).
These works collect cases in all American jurisdictions through 1916.
Although these sections do not note all cases in which arguably anticompetitive
behavior or arrangements were challenged, their examination does suggest the overall
direction and magnitude of the changes occurring in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The digests list less than 25 private cases decided in all jurisdictions
before 1850, just over 20 for the period between 1850 and 1859, and not quite 30
decisions in all of the 1860's. For succeeding decades, the numbers increase dramatically: over 50 in the 1870's, over 70 in the 1880's, almost 150 in the 1890's, nearly 200
in the first decade of the twentieth century, and 100 between 1910 and 1914.
" H. THoRELI, supra note 2, at 266.
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threatening economic changes of the time. Congressional representatives
repeatedly expressed this view in the legislative debates prior to the
passage of the Sherman Act and made clear a pervasive congressional
desire only to supplement, and not to inhibit, state authority and activity.6 3 Leading legal treatises and surveys of the time focused prominently on state statutes and decisions, giving them at least equal,6 and
in some cases considerably more, 5 attention than federal developments.
The public followed particular state antitrust cases with great interest.6 Newspapers frequently featured coverage of important law enforcement and litigation developments,6 7 and a number of state court
decisions created substantial public excitement."'
Contemporaries perceived state judges to be crucial players and at
times expressed marked concern regarding judicial predispositions and
actions. Thus, Standard Oil attorney S.C.T. Dodd declared starkly: "If
some of the modem opinions of judges in trust cases are to be followed,
we are relegated at once. . . to the dark ages, when business was necessarily carried on in defiance of law."6 " The populist judges of the
Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, on the other hand, agreed that
state judges had tremendous power to affect the success of antitrust ef3 See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 378-79. Thus, the House Judiciary Committee Report expressed the general congressional sentiment when it explained that by the
proposed legislation

[n]o attempt is made to invade the legislative authority of the several
States or even to occupy doubtful grounds. No system of laws can be devised by Congress alone which would effectually protect the people of the
United States against the evils and oppression of trusts and monopolies.
Congress has no authority to deal, generally, with the subject within the
States, and the States have no authority to legislate in respect of commerce
between the several States or with foreign nations.
It follows, therefore, that the legislative authority of Congress and
that of the several States must be exerted to secure the suppression of
restraints upon trade and monopolies. Whatever legislation Congress may

enact on this subject, within the limits of its authority, will prove of little
value unless the States shall supplement it by such auxiliary and proper
legislation as may be within their legislative authority.
H.R. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1890) (emphasis added).
"See, e.g., J. DAVIES, supra note 13; J. JOYCE, supra note 25.
65 See, e.g., C. BEACH, supra note 25. This work is said to have been the most
complete and possibly most widely read work of its kind around 1900. See H.
THORELLI, supra note 2, at 327.
"See generally S. PIoTT, THE ANrI-MONOPOLY PERSUASION: POPULAR RasISTANCE TO THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS IN THE MIDWEST (1985) (examining public
response to monopolies and trusts during the period 1887-1913).
" See B. BRINGHURST, supra note 43, at 38, 48; S.PIoTT, supra note 66, at
120-24.
68 See H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 596.
'" Dodd, The Present Legal Status of Trusts, 7 HARV. L. REv. 157, 165 (1893).
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forts but feared a decidedly different judicial tendency:
Without intending in the least to be disrespectful to any
court, yet it is a fact well known to the legal profession and
to the country, that many of our appellate courts, both state
and federal, have in the past been largely dominated by men,
who, before their elevation to the bench and while they were
practicing lawyers, were more or less under monopolistic influences ...
It is no secret that corporations and monopolies are active and tireless in their efforts to secure control of the appellate courts of this country and thereby by judicial construction defeat the will of the people as expressed in legislation.
As these influences are powerful and well organized, they
often succeed in securing the election or appointment of
judges who are under obligations to them for past favors.
This evil has been carried to such an extent and has become
so open and notorious that many good people have almost
lost hope and have largely ceased to have confidence in the
fairness, impartiality, and integrity of the courts where corporations, trusts, and monopolies are concerned. This constitutes one of the most alarming conditions now existing in
America. A judge may desire to be entirely honest, yet if he
is under influences which are antagonistic to the rights of the
people, he will make an exceedingly dangerous judge.. . . It
may not be popular in some circles to say this, but we believe that it is the absolute truth and that this is the main
cause of the manifest bias of many of our courts against all
anti-trust legislation."
Yet, as previously noted, despite such indications of contemporary
practical and symbolic importance, scholars rarely have examined state
developments in much detail. Extended analyses of judicial reasoning in
late nineteenth and early twentieth century cases involving state common law or statutory responses to anticompetitive behavior have been
particularly scarce.7 1 Recently, however, some scholars have recognized
State v. Coyle, 8 Okla. Crim. 686, 687-88, 130 P. 316, 316-17 (1913).
Important historical treatments include J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE
ANTITRUST REGULATION (1964); H. SEAGER & C. GULICK, supra note 9; H.
THORE1, supra note 2. Seager and Gulick, however, devote less than 30 pages to
state antitrust enforcement and discuss court decisions in only Texas and Missouri.
Although Thorelli's 600-page work also contains a survey of earlier common law doctrine, it devotes less than 20 pages to late nineteenth and twentieth century state antitrust and common law developments, covers only the years through 1902, and generally
70
71
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the need for greater study of early state-level antitrust developments, 2
and several important new works have appeared.7 3 Such renewed examination is important in part because it provides a more complete picture of the nature, diversity, and historical importance of state antitrust
efforts themselves at a time when late nineteenth and early twentieth
century economic regulation, and judicial responses to it, have become
the subject of renewed scholarly attention and reevaluation. 4 Such reexamination of state developments also is important, however, because
it furnishes substantial additional insight and illumination with respect
to both contemporary judicial reasoning in general and the early development of federal antitrust jurisprudence in particular.
Judges considering early federal antitrust issues did not operate in
an intellectual environment divorced from state-related legal and economic concerns. Many of the Justices on the United States Supreme
Court during antitrust's formative years had served as judges in the
state courts before joining the Supreme Court bench. 75 The Justices not
only were aware of state developments but also invoked recent antitrust-related state decisions as important supporting authority on a
number of occasions in early federal antitrust cases."6 Moreover, the
omits consideration of state "[c]ases against labor unions or public utilities and suits
involving unfair competition or 'covenants in restraint of trade.'" Id. at 265 n.106.
Leading studies of nineteenth century English and American common law have been
concerned primarily with establishing the background to the enactment in 1890 of the
Sherman Act and, thus, discuss only very few state cases after that date. See, e.g., D.
DEWEY, supra note 2, at 109-38; W. LETwIN, supra note 2, at 18-52, 77-95 (discussing the foundations and passage of the Sherman Act).
712 See, e.g., S. PIoTT, supra note 66, at 4 (noting that prior studies focusing
on
the federal level have "missed the point" that contemporary antitrust activity primarily
originated at the state and local level).
71 See, e.g., B. BRINGHURST, supra note 43 (investigating the state and federal
effort to control the Standard Oil combination); S. PIoTT, supra note 66 (exploring
popular reaction to corporate consolidation in the Midwest between the years 18871913); McCurdy, supra note 55 (discussing the Knight sugar decision of 1895 in the
context of contemporary conceptions of state power over business corporations); Pratt,
supra note 58 (analyzing the impact of Texas law enforcement efforts on the early
twentieth century structure of the oil industry).
71 See, e.g., Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty. A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-FaireConstitutionaism, 3 LAw & Hisr. REv. 293 (1985);
Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation during the Progressive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIsT. 63 (1985).
11 Of the 25 United States Supreme Court Justices who served any part of their
term between 1890 and 1920, at least 11 had previously served as state court judges,
the great majority on their state's highest court. See generally 2 & 3 THE JUSTICES OF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds.
1969) (biographies of, among others, Justices John Marshall Harlan, Horace Gray,
David Brewer, Henry Billings Brown, Edward Douglass White, Rufus Peckham, Oliver Wendell Holmes, William R. Day, Horace H. Lurton, Joseph Rucker Lamar, and
Mahlon Pitney).
76 See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 405,
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Justices developing early federal antitrust jurisprudence frequently
were forced to consider the limits of permissible and appropriate government control of anticompetitive activity not only in connection with
such federal litigation but also in a second context as well: in the course
of numerous Supreme Court cases in which litigants raised constitutional challenges to the application of state antitrust law. In this second
context, the Justices provided striking additional indications of their
general views of not only the limits of government power but also of
economic reality itself.
This Article seeks to contribute to a fuller understanding of antitrust in its formative era by examining the way in which both state and
federal judges treated such constitutional challenges to state antitrust
law. The next section of this Article reviews the overall picture of federal and state court litigation and places these developments within the
broader framework of contemporary constitutional adjudication. The
succeeding section then examines one particularly revealing area of
contemporary constitutional analysis in greater detail and suggests how
its close examination in light of contemporary economic thinking not
only contributes to a broader understanding of the period's constitutional theory, but also it calls into question important aspects of leading
recent interpretations of the intellectual origins of early antitrust
jurisprudence."
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND THE PRACTICAL AND
POTENTIAL SCOPE OF STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

The innovative expansion of varied forms of state and federal regulatory activity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
sparked persistent opposition. Like other forms of business regulation,7 8
state remedial responses to disturbing contracts, combinations, and con408 (Hughes, J., for the Court), 413 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (1911); Northern Sec.
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 339-41 (1904) (Harlan, J., for the Court); United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 333-34 (Peckham, J., for the
Court), 348-50 & n.1 (White, J., dissenting) (1897); United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,
156 U.S. 1, 18-33 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7 The specific ways in which state court judges developed and applied restraint of
trade doctrine itself within the boundaries established by Congress and the courts will
be more fully addressed in a forthcoming article by the author.
"' See, e.g., A. KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BELz, THE AMEicAN CONsTrruTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEvELOPMENT 399-444 (6th ed. 1983); J. SEMONCHE,
CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING Soci-

gr, 1890-1920 (1978); Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 324 (1985) [hereinafter
Currie, Supreme Court: 1889-1910]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
1910-1921, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1111 [hereinafter Currie, Supreme Court: 1910-19211.
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spiracies in restraint of trade repeatedly were attacked as violative of
the United States Constitution, chiefly on commerce clause,79 equal
protection,8" and due process"' grounds." As will be discussed below,
7
80

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV,

81

Id.

§ 1.

82 See generally J. FLYNN, supra note 71, at 24-108 (discussing constitutional
limits on state antitrust regulations); H. SEAGER & C. GuLICK, supra note 9, at 33966 (noting state antitrust provisions and related litigation); Hovenkamp, supra note 3,
at 385-90 (discussing commerce clause limitations on state antitrust regulation); Legislation, supra note 9, at 354-56, 363-64 (reporting on equal protection, commerce
clause, and due process restrictions on state enforcement); Project, supra note 3, at 554
(commenting on results of state antitrust legislation); Note, The Commerce Clause and
State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1469, 1478-81, 1483-85, 1488 (1961)
(discussing judicial treatment of early commerce clause challenges to enforcement of
state antitrust laws).
The general grounds noted, while the most important, were by no means the only
federal and state constitutional bases on which state efforts were attacked. Both the
United States Supreme Court and numerous state courts rejected claims that state antitrust laws operated to impair the obligation of contracts in violation of article I, § 10 of
the United States Constitution or analogous state constitutional provisions. See, e.g.,
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 43-47 (1900); Ford v. Chicago Milk
Shippers' Ass'n, 155 Ill. 166, 180-81, 39 N.E. 651, 656 (1895); Louisville & N.R.R.
Co. v. Commonwealth, 97 Ky. 675, 696-97, 31 S.W. 476, 479-80 (1895), affid, 161
U.S. 677 (1896); State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 378, 116 S.W.
902, 1018 (1909), affd, 224 U.S. 270 (1912); State v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co.,
71 S.C. 544, 559-60, 51 S.E. 455, 461 (1905). Courts similarly rejected contentions
that state antitrust statutes amounted to unconstitutional "ex post facto" legislation, see,
e.g., Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 107-08 (1909); State ex rel. Jones v.
Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 249 Mo. 702, 729-31, 156 S.W. 967, 975-76 (1913),
affd, 238 U.S. 41 (1915); violated privileges and immunities protections, see, e.g.,
Owen Co. Burley Tobacco Soc. v. Brumback, 128 Ky. 137, 148-49, 107 S.W. 710, 713
(1908); Attorney Gen. ex rel. Wolverine Fish Co. v. A. Booth & Co., 143 Mich. 89,
102, 106 N.W. 868, 872-73 (1906); State v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 71 S.C. 544,
559, 51 S.E. 455, 460 (1905); or threatened unconstitutional "double jeopardy" because
they condemned activity also unlawful under federal antitrust legislation, see, e.g., Territory v. Long Bell Lumber Co., 22 Okla. 890, 894-99, 99 P. 911, 914-916 (1908).
Moreover, courts repeatedly upheld the application of state antitrust discovery procedures in the face of objections that they violated constitutional protections against selfincrimination despite grants of immunity from state prosecution. See, e.g., Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 379-82 (1905), affig State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 P. 911 (1904);
People ex rel. Akin v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill. 236, 250-54, 66 N.E.
349, 353-55 (1903); In re Bell, 69 Kan. 855, 856, 76 P. 1129, 1129 (1904) (per
curiam); State ex rel. Jones, 249 Mo. at 735-39, 156 S.W. at 977-78; State ex rel.
Hadley, 218 Mo. at 375, 116 S.W. at 1017-18; cf Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
State, 98 Miss. 159, 168-69, 53 So. 489, 490 (1910) (corporation not a "person" within
meaning of constitutional provision protecting persons against self-incrimination in
criminal cases); Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. News Publishing Co., 174 Wis. 107,
113-17, 182 N.W. 919, 921-22 (1921) (same). But see State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v.
Simmons Hardware Co., 109 Mo. 118, 128-30, 18 S.W. 1125, 1127 (1892) (state provision requiring corporate officers to declare under oath whether the company had become involved in anticompetitive activity declared to be in violation of state constitution;
no immunity grant indicated in the opinion); see also Ex parte Andrews, 51 Tex.
Crim. 79, 85-86, 100 S.W. 376, 378-79 (1907) (witness not guilty of contempt for
refusing to answer questions which might implicate him in violations of the antitrust
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such attacks achieved some significant victories, prompting legislative
and judicial alteration of some state antitrust provisions. But in the antitrust area as elsewhere,"3 federal and state courts generally upheld
state efforts in the face of constitutional challenges; and later decisions
in this period, at least in the equal protection area, significantly cut
back on the impact of early adverse precedent. While some serious restrictions on permissible state activity remained, the states nevertheless
were left with considerable room for variation and experimentation.
A.

The TerritorialScope of State Antitrust Activity

The potential constitutional limitations on state enforcement most
directly addressed in the congressional debates preceding passage of the
Sherman Act in 1890 were those pertaining to state power over activities and arrangements occurring or having effects at least partly beyond
the state's own borders. While a broad congressional consensus prevailed as to the desirability of preserving extant state antitrust authority, despite the adoption of new federal legislation in the field,"4 congressional representatives differed significantly in their assessments of
the existing constitutional limits on the geographic and commercial
scope of state power.85 Such differences of perspective persisted in sublaws). Various additional, special state constitutional provisions also proved unavailing
as grounds to invalidate statutes, for example, constitutional requirements that statutes
not address more than one subject and that the subject be clearly indicated by the title.
See, e.g., In re Pinkney, 47 Kan. 89, 94-96, 27 P. 179, 180-81 (1891); State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 294-95, 169 S.W. 145, 171
(1913); Oklahoma Light & Power Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 96 Okla. 19, 21, 220
P. 54, 55 (1923).
83 See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 360-63 (2d ed. 1985);
J. SEMONCHE, supra note 78, at 424-34; Urofsky, supra note 74 (discussing hours,
wage, and other legislation designed to protect workers).
" See supra text accompanying note 63.
85 See McCurdy, supra note 55, at 323-28. Senator Sherman, for example, the
preeminent proponent of federal antitrust legislation, embraced a comparatively quite
expansive view of federal power. He believed existing state power to be more limited
than various other members of Congress believed it to be. See id.; Hovenkamp, supra
note 3, at 383. Sherman's views have received particular attention not only because of
Sherman's general importance in the congressional proceedings but also because they
have been deemed an accurate description of the respective limits of state and federal
power in 1890. See id. at 379. Unfortunately, Sherman's often dramatic speech was, at
times, less than precise and suggested more severe limitations on state power than either existed at the time or than he himself actually envisioned. In frequently quoted
language, Sherman declared, "If the combination is confined to a State, the State should
apply the remedy; if it is interstate and controls any production in many States, Congress must apply the remedy." 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890). Such language, taken
literally, might suggest that in Sherman's view an individual State was powerless to
seek any remedy against even the local operation of an industrial combination, if it was
interstate in scope. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 379, 431. Yet, it seems
instead that Sherman simply believed that individual state remedies would be too lim-
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sequent state antitrust litigation as the limits of state power repeatedly
were debated both in cases addressing state power over corporate charters and privileges and, more frequently, in actions involving various
other forms of state regulation.
1. State Control Over Corporate Power and Privileges
Late nineteenth century case law gave the states considerable authority to cancel corporate charters or revoke intrastate 8 business privileges in response to ultra vires corporate misconduct and provided a
particularly powerful basis for attacking corporate concentration, collusion, and predation.87 In 1869, in the leading case of Paul v. Virited in such a situation and that an effective remedy, to eliminate the problem completely, would have to come from federal action. Thus, in discussing the recent case of
People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 7 N.Y.S. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1889), aft'd, 121 N.Y.
582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890), in which the New York Supreme Court had affirmed an
order vacating and annulling a New York corporation's charter because of its participation in the sugar trust, Sherman related that, because the defendant was a New York
corporation, the state court "could deal with that corporation alone, but the combination was between that company and sixteen others . . . . In the courts of the United
States all of them might have been parties, but as a matter of course the Supreme Court
of New York could not extend its jurisdiction beyond the limits of its own territory." 21
CONG. REC. 2459 (1890) (emphasis added).
" It was firmly established that states could not prevent corporations from engaging in commerce of an "interstate" nature within their borders. See, e.g., Waters-Pierce

Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 41-42 (1900); G.

HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF

112-31 (1918).
Many activities engaged in by companies operating in more than one state, however,
were not considered to be part of interstate commerce, one of the most important such
activities being local manufacturing. See infra text accompanying note 95.
87 Government power to cancel corporate privileges had been established early in
English law, and English procedures quickly were adapted to American circumstances.
In England, by the twelfth century, a claimant's right to hold a franchise could be
challenged by the special common law writ of quo warranto,summoning the claimant
to indicate "by what authority" he claimed or exercised the franchise. Subsequently,
during the reign of Henry VIII, this original procedure was replaced by the use of a
simpler "information in the nature of a quo warranto." See J.H. BAKER,AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 125 (2d ed. 1979); see also Ames v. Kansas ex
rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1884) (discussing writ of quo warranto at common law). Although this newer procedure was initially a criminal action, it had evolved
into a civil one in all but form in England prior to the American Revolution. See
Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 282 (1912); Ames, 111 U.S. at 460-61.
After the Revolution, the procedure was widely adopted by American states, although a few states replaced it with other special forms of action. Such a new form of
action was adopted, for example, by Kansas and considered by the United States Supreme Court in Ames, 111 U.S. at 460. In some states, antitrust legislation made available new procedures by which corporate forfeiture could be pursued, even while general quo warranto procedures remained available as well. See, e.g., State ex rel. Jones
v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 249 Mo. 702, 731-32, 156 S.W. 967, 976 (1913), affld,
238 U.S. 41 (1915). By the early twentieth century, the widely adopted English procedure, often referred to simply, if imprecisely, as a "quo warranto" proceeding, was
considered a civil action in most states, although at least a few jurisdictions still deemed
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN
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ginia,88 the Supreme Court declared that a corporation was not a citizen for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause89 of the United
States Constitution and upheld a Virginia statute requiring "foreign"
(out-of-state) but not domestic insurance companies to deposit specified
bonds with the state treasurer as a precondition to obtaining a license,
which was needed to do business in the state. The defendant had proceeded to operate within the state as an agent for insurance companies
that had not deposited the required bonds or obtained the requisite license; and, as a result, the defendant was indicted, convicted, and fined.
Justice Field, writing for the Court, sweepingly reaffirmed both
the existence and appropriateness of state power, particularly with regard to foreign corporations seeking to do intrastate business. He
reasoned:
The corporation being the mere creation of local law, can
have no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty
where created. .

.

. The recognition of its existence even by

other States, and the enforcement of its contracts made
therein, depend purely upon the comity of those States-a
comity which is never extended where the existence of the
corporation or the exercise of its powers are prejudicial to
their interests or repugnant to their policy. Having no absolute right of recognition in other States, but depending for
such recognition and the enforcement of its contracts upon
their assent, it follows, as a matter of course, that such assent
may be granted upon such terms and conditions as those
States may think proper to impose. They may exclude the
foreign corporation entirely; they may restrict its business to
particular localities, or they may exact such security for the
performance of its contracts with their citizens as in their
it a criminal one for purposes of both procedure and relief. See Standard Oil, 224 U.S.
at 283.
Determination of the civil or criminal status of such proceedings had important
practical consequences. Based on a characterization as civil rather than criminal, state
courts in antitrust cases held defendants not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.
See State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 275-77, 169
S.W. 145, 165 (1914). Further, the state courts declared that a reasonable doubt standard need not be applied. See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 147,
186, 106 S.W. 918, 929 (1907), affld on other grounds, 212 U.S. 86 (1909); WatersPierce Oil Co. v. State, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 21, 44 S.W. 936, 946 (1898), affld on
other grounds, 177 U.S. 28 (1900). In addition, because of such characterization, the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that no statute of limitations applied against the
state. See Waters-Pierce, 48 Tex. Civ. App. at 185, 106 S.W. at 929.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
sD See id. at 177 (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2). The case arose prior to
ratification of the fourteenth amendment.
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judgment will best promote the public interest. The whole
matter is in their discretion.9"
In the decades both immediately before and after passage of the
Sherman Act, the Supreme Court continued to support strongly this
aspect of state authority. As Charles McCurdy has noted, such corporate law doctrine potentially gave the states tremendous power to reverse contemporary corporate consolidations, at least if sustained and
united action on the part of the states could be achieved. 91 If enough
states acted to revoke the domestic corporation charters and intrastate
business privileges of the companies joining in a particular consolidation, on the ground that the stock or asset transfers effecting the consolidation violated the conditions under which the charter or privileges
were granted,92 the combination could be forced to restrict its manufacturing activity to so few states that its viability could be seriously
threatened.93 Indeed, as Professor McCurdy has argued, the Supreme
Court's 1895 opinion in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., which denied federal authority to challenge a monopolistic consolidation of sugar
manufacturing," may well have been not so much a laissez-faire defense of corporate wealth as an effort to buttress state authority over
the intrastate operations of interstate combinations. By maintaining a
sharp doctrinal distinction between manufacturing and commerce, Professor McCurdy suggests, the Court ensured continued freedom from
commerce clause inhibitions that otherwise might have impeded state
action barring local manufacturing on the part of companies violating
state corporate policy. 95
Such state action in response to the formation of disquieting combinations had the advantage of making judicial analyses of potentially
debatable and troublesome issues of economic theory or trade restraint
doctrine unnecessary. 8 Charter revocation or license forfeiture could be
predicated simply on the fact of an ultra vires transfer of stock or assets. But the significance of state authority in this area went beyond its
potential to deter corporate transfers per se. State legislators frequently
made adherence to more general substantive antitrust standards a con90
91

Id. at 181.

See McCurdy, supra note 55, at 332, 338-40.
See, e.g., People v. Ballard, 134 N.Y. 269, 294-97, 32 N.E. 54, 59-60 (1892);
People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 623-26, 24 N.E. 834, 839-41
(1890).
13 See McCurdy, supra note 55, at 338.
156 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1895).
" See McCurdy, supra note 55, at 335-36.
"See, e.g., People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 626, 24 N.E.
834, 841 (1890).
9
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dition for acquiring or retaining a charter or business privileges.9 7 And
contemporary state and federal judges repeatedly allowed states to annul charters or revoke privileges in situations where the imposition of
other remedies for the same conduct would have been deemed
unconstitutional."
The lengths to which state power over foreign corporations would
be allowed to go were indicated as early as 1877 in Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co.99 As a condition of doing business, Wisconsin had
required the plaintiff, a Connecticut insurance company, to agree not to
remove into federal court actions brought against it in state courts.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff so removed a suit brought against it under
one of its policies. As a result, the defendant Wisconsin Secretary of
State threatened to revoke plaintiff's license to do business, and the
plaintiff sought and obtained an injunction against such revocation. On
appeal, the Supreme Court, per Justice Hunt, held that while a state
could not constitutionally bar an individual or corporation from removing cases to federal court, the state constitutionally could revoke a corporation's license for breach of an agreement not to do so.100 The Court
denied that by so holding it was permitting the state to evade constitutional prohibitions and explained that its decision merely allowed the
state to
compel the foreign company to abstain from the Federal
courts, or to cease to do business in the State. It gives the
company the option. This is justifiable, because the complainant has no constitutional right to do business in that
State; that State has authority at any time to declare that it
shall not transact business there. This is the whole point of
the case, and, without reference to the injustice, the
prejudice, or the wrong that is alleged to exist, must determine the question. No right of the complainant under the
laws or Constitution of the United States, by its exclusion
from the State, is infringed; and this is what the State now
accomplishes. There is nothing, therefore, that will justify
the interference of this court.10 1
See supra text accompanying note 36.
" See infra notes 104-115 and accompanying text.
" 94 U.S. 535 (1877), overruled, Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529
(1922).
100See id. at 542.
101Id. at 542. Justice Bradley dissented, in an opinion in which Justices Swayne
and Miller joined. Justice Bradley rejected as fallacious the majority's reasoning that
"the greater always includes the less, and, therefore, if the State may exclude the appellees without any cause, it may exclude them for a bad cause." Id. at 543. But behind
97
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Between the time the Supreme Court's decision in Doyle was announced in 1877 and the time it was expressly overruled in 1922,"02 a
less sweeping view of state power to cancel charters and revoke privileges slowly gained acceptance, much of this doctrinal change occurring
in the second decade of the new century. Increasingly, the Court declared certain grounds for state action constitutionally impermissible,
despite the state's broad authority in the area. 0 3 But such a changing
view was not evident in antitrust cases in either the Supreme Court or
state courts prior to the 1920's, and both state power in general and
some rather far-reaching applications of it were approved.
In 1900, in Waters-PierceOil Co. v. Texas,"' the Supreme Court
affirmed a revocation of intrastate business privileges in response to a
violation of Texas antitrust statutes. Although retention of a permit to
do business had been made conditional on compliance with such state
laws, the defendant argued that revocation was improper because the
Texas antitrust statutes limited the right to make contracts, took away
property, and established invidious classifications among persons, all in
the dissenting Justice's approach lay also a different vision of the role of foreign corporations in the economic life of the states than had been reflected in Justice Field's
earlier opinion in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). Justice Field's "intruding corporations," needing to be "repelled" in 1869, see id. at 182, had become
Justice Bradley's beneficent visitors of 1877 in the latter's dissent in Doyle:
The conditions of society and the modes of doing business in this
country are such that a large part of its transactions is conducted through
the agency of corporations. This is especially true with regard to the business of banking, insurance, and transportation. Individuals cannot safely
engage in enterprises of this sort, requiring large capital. They can only be
successfully carried out by corporations, in which individuals may safely
join their small contributions without endangering their entire fortunes.
To shut these institutions out of neighboring States would not only cripple
their energies, but would deprive the people of those States of the benefits
of their enterprise. The business of insurance, particularly, can only be
carried on with entire safety by scattering the risks over large areas of
territory, so as to secure the benefits of the most extended average. The
needs of the country require that corporations-at least those of a commercial or financial character-should be able to transact business in differint States. If these States can, at will, deprive them of the right to resort
to the courts of the United States, then, in large portions of the country,
the government and laws of the United States may be nullified and rendered inoperative with regard to a large class of transactions constitutionally belonging to their jurisdiction.
94 U.S. at 544 (Bradley, J., dissenting). On changing perceptions of corporations, see
generally McCurdy, supra note 55.
102 See Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
10s See G. HENDERSON, supra note 86, at 111, 132-47 (1918); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321, 329, 341-45
(1935); Merrill, UnconstitutionalConditions, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 879, 888-92 (1929);
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595, 1606-09 (1960).
1- 177 U.S. 28 (1900).
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contravention of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Strongly reaffirming the broad principles previously announced
in such cases as Paul v. Virginia, Justice McKenna, for the majority,
upheld the state's action and declared irrelevant the corporate defendant's attacks on the constitutionality of the Texas antitrust statutes
themselves. The Court stressed that corporations, unlike individuals,
were only creatures of the legal authority prescribing their permitted
purposes and means; the state had no obligation to permit them to do
any intrastate business in the first place.1"'
The Supreme Court's most striking defense of state power over
corporations, however, came nine years later, in the case of Hammond
Packing Co. v. Arkansas.06 State authorities had sought both forfeiture of the defendant's permit to do intrastate business and $30,000 in
civil penalties on the basis of the defendant's purported participation in
a price-fixing conspiracy not alleged to have been formed, to have operated, or to have had any effect within Arkansas itself. After counsel
subsequently had stipulated that any awarded relief would be limited to
a money recovery of not more than $10,000, the defendant demurred to
the complaint and declined to cooperate with requested discovery.
Thereupon the trial court granted the state a default judgment for
$10,000, which the Arkansas Supreme Court later affirmed."" 7
In the United States Supreme Court, the defendant challenged the
Arkansas action as an unconstitutional attempt to assert extraterritorial
power over activity in other states in violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice
White, for the majority, rejected the defendant's characterization of the
Arkansas action, relying upon the state court's interpretation that the
relevant antitrust statute did not purport to forbid or penalize acts done
outside the state, but merely
forbade a corporation from continuing to do business within
the State after it had done, either within or outside of the
State, the enumerated acts. If the premise of the asserted
proposition be that even although the statute addressed itself
105 See id. at 43, 45. Thus, the Court found it unnecessary to consider or resolve
the constitutional legitimacy of the state antitrust statutes as they might be applied in
other contexts. Justice Harlan dissented without a written opinion. In National Cotton
Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115 (1905), the Court, again per Justice McKenna, left
unresolved the question of whether Waters-Pierce foreclosed the equal protection and
due process challenges of another corporation whose business license was revoked for
violation of Texas antitrust law, declaring such challenges groundless on their merits.
See id at 130-33.
10- 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
107 See id. at 330.
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exclusively to the doing of business within the State under
the circumstances stated, it nevertheless exerted an extraterritorial power, because it restrained the continuance of the
business within the State by a corporation which had done
the designated acts outside of the State, we think the proposition without merit. As the State possessed the plenary power
to exclude a foreign corporation from doing business within
its borders, it follows that if the State exerted such unquestioned power from a consideration of acts done in another
jurisdiction, the motive for the exertion of the lawful power
did not operate to destroy the right to call the power into
play.
. .ITihe
[
power, and not the motive, is the test to be
resorted to for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of the legislative action. 0 8
The defendant had been fined, the Court held, not for price fixing in
another state, but only for the intrastate act of doing local business in
violation of a state condition limiting eligibility to engage in such intrastate activity, a condition that just happened to be nonparticipation in a
price-fixing conspiracy anywhere in the country.' 0 9
State courts proved to be similarly supportive and repeatedly reaffirmed state quo warranton ° authority to revoke corporate privileges
for antitrust violations, even where other remedies might not be constitutionally available.111 Indeed, some courts approached the issue of quo
108 Id. at 342-43. Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Peckham dissented without
written opinions. In the formative period of federal antitrust jurisprudence, Justice
Peckham and Justice White are well known as the chief proponents, respectively, of
two differing approaches to developing Sherman Act interpretation, with Justice
Peckham supporting the broader reading of the federal act's scope. See, e.g., R. BORK,
supra note 2, at 22-28; W. LETWIN, supra note 2, at 167-72. Thus, while Justice
White took a comparatively less sympathetic view of sweeping federal antitrust power,
he apparently embraced a comparatively more sympathetic view of sweeping state antitrust power, at least in the Hammond context, although, admittedly, the reasons for
Justice Peckham's dissent in that case remain conjectural.
109 See Hammond, 212 U.S. at 342-44.
"0 See supra note 87.
"I See, e:g., Attorney Gen. ex rel. Wolverine Fish Co. v. A. Booth & Co., 143
Mich. 89, 102, 106 N.W. 868, 872 (1906) (citations omitted) (rejecting an out-of-state
corporation's claim that ouster from the state would, inter alia, violate the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, the court broadly declaring: "The
authority of a State to impose conditions upon the privilege of doing business by foreign
corporations is well established, and is not affected by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution"); State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 37879, 116 S.W. 902, 1018-19 (1908), afl'd, 224 U.S. 270 (1912); Pierce Oil Corp. v.
Weinert, 106 Tex. 435, 439, 167 S.W. 808, 809-10 (1914) (citing Hammond, 212 U.S.
at 342-43, to the effect that "since the state has the right to entirely withhold its per-
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warranto relief rather flexibly in antitrust cases and approved not only
the imposition of a fine along with ouster 112 but also went on to declare
that a substantial fine could be imposed with ouster suspended on condition of payment.11 In this way, quo warrantobecame available as an
enforcement mechanism that would allow a state to collect a financial
penalty for conduct that the state constitutionally could not seek to fine
in other contexts. Seeking exclusively a financial sanction proved alluring as time went on, for as previously noted, 1 state judges and officials
became increasingly reluctant to lose the economic benefits of even an
antitrust violator's continued intrastate presence.115
Although contemporary corporate law doctrine thus provided a
particularly strong basis for state antitrust enforcement, much state antitrust activity was premised on other grounds, grounds offering potentially greater opportunities for litigants seeking to challenge state control of anticompetitive activity.
2.

State Regulation in Other Areas

The scope of state authority where quo warranto power was not
controlling was tested often during the formative years of antitrust jurisprudence. The permissible out-of-state impact of state activity
quickly became the most frequently recurring subject of such constitutional debate in state antitrust litigation. Interested parties repeatedly
contested the meaning and possible restrictive implications of both the
commerce and due process clauses of the United States Constitution.""
mission for a foreign corporation to transact business within its limits it is within its
power to provide that such permission shall be denied for such cause as it may prescribe, whether based upon acts within the state or out of it"); State ex rel. Attorney
Gen. v. Shippers' Compress & Warehouse Co., 95 Tex. 603, 611-12, 69 S.W. 58, 6061 (1902) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 173-74).
112 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912) (discussed infra
notes 201-08 and accompanying text).
113 See, e.g., State ex rel. Major v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 237 Mo.
369, 400-02, 141 S.W. 672, 679 (1911), affd, 234 U.S. 199 (1914); State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 468-69, 116 S.W. 902, 1049 (1909), affid, 224
U.S. 270 (1912); State ex rel. Crow v.Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 393, 73
S.W. 645, 654 (1903).
114 See supra text accompanying note 55.
115 See, e.g., International Harvester, 237 Mo. at 400-02, 141 S.W. at 679.
Moreover, at least some state judges were willing to employ suspended ouster to ensure
attainment of still other forms of antitrust relief, including the disclosure of desired
corporate information and the severance of particular corporate affiliations. See, e.g.,
id. at 417, 141 S.W. at 684 (Graves, J., concurring in part) (suggesting various requirements for defendant as a condition of suspension of judgment of ouster).
O This area of litigation also is the area of contemporary constitutional challenge
to state antitrust enforcement that has been most fully described and analyzed elsewhere. See J. FLYNN, supra note 71, at 48-53, 56-108; Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at
375; Legislation, supra note 9, at 354-64; Note, supra note 82, at 1478-88; Annota-
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Federal and state jurists often declared that the states could not
constitutionally regulate anticompetitive activity within interstate commerce,1 17 and some significant limitations on the scope of state antitrust
provisions were established on this basis. In a number of cases, local
purchasers sought to invoke state antitrust laws as a defense when outof-state sellers sought payment for goods sold, hoping to avoid liability
on the ground that the seller had participated in a conspiracy among
out-of-state vendors in violation of state law. Contemporary courts consistently dismissed such defenses on the ground that any such application of state law would constitute impermissible state regulation of
purchase and sale contracts that were part of interstate commerce."'
For the same reason, courts found state law powerless to aid defaulting
purchasers who alleged a violation of local antitrust standards based not
on a distant sellers' conspiracy but on an out-of-state seller's agreement
to deal exclusively with the defendant buyer itself within a particular
territory.

1 9
2

The reach of state statutes was limited not only by commerce
clause doctrine but also by due process theory, although territorial due
process issues were squarely addressed on only few occasions. In a dramatic 1897 opinion subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court on jurisdictional grounds, the Federal Circuit Court for the Northern District of Texas condemned as constitutionally "absurd" a jurisdictional
provision of the Texas antitrust statute that declared:
Persons out of the state may commit and be liable to indictment and conviction for committing any of the offenses enumerated in this act, which do not in their commission, necessarily require a personal presence in this state, the object
being to reach and punish all persons offending against its
tion, Applicability of State Anti-trust Act to Interstate Transaction, 24 A.L.R. 787
(1923).
17
See, e.g., Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F. 242,
244 (8th Cir. 1906); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Miami S.S. Co., 86 F. 407, 420 (5th Cir.
1898); Frank A. Menne Factory v. Harback Bros., 85 Ark. 278, 283-84, 107 S.W. 991,
992-93 (1908); First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri Glass Co., 169 Mo. App. 374, 387-89,
152 S.W. 378, 381-82 (1912); State v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 71 S.C. 544, 56061, 51 S.E. 455, 461 (1905); J.R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Johnson, 162 S.W. 394, 396
(Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis.
604, 615-16, 147 N.W. 1058, 1062 (1914).
118 See, e.g., Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co., 143 F. at 244; Frank A. Menne
Factory, 85 Ark. at 282-84, 107 S.W. at 992-93; First Nat'l Bank, 169 Mo. App. at
387-89, 152 S.W. at 381-82; Moroney Hardware Co. v. Goodwin Pottery Co., 120
S.W. 1088, 1091-92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
119 See, e.g., Albertype Co. v. Gust Feist Co., 102 Tex. 219, 222, 114 S.W. 791,
792 (1909); Eclipse Paint & Mfg. Co. v. New Process Roofing & Supply Co., 55 Tex.
Civ. App. 553, 553-55, 120 S.W. 532, 533-34 (1909).

1987]

ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

519

120
provisions, whether within or without the state.

Six years later, the Supreme Court of Illinois asserted that the sweeping language of its state's antitrust statute had no extraterritorial effect,
declaring that, despite broad terminology, the court was obligated to
confine the measure to only "those matters upon which the General
Assembly have power to act, viz., trusts, pools, combinations, etc.,
formed within the State of Illinois. 1 2 1
But while some important limits were recognized, the scope of
state antitrust activity by no means was confined to what today would
be deemed purely local concerns. While the states could not "regulate"
interstate commerce, for example, they nevertheless were allowed considerable freedom to affect it indirectly as a consequence of efforts categorized as mere intrastate regulation. Thus, in 1910, in Standard Oil
Co. of Kentucky v. Tennessee,12' a unanimous United States Supreme
Court upheld a state court order ousting a corporation from the state,
despite the defendant's objection that it was being penalized for harming interstate competition and that state action therefore constituted an
impermissible effort to regulate interstate commerce. The defendant
had induced merchants in Gallatin, Tennessee to cancel purchase orders from a rival out-of-state oil company that was to ship oil to them
from Pennsylvania. Such activity was found to have led to higher oil
prices in Tennessee. The Court, per Justice Holmes, affirmed the state
court's order, finding no constitutional difficulty raised by that order's
incidental impact on interstate commerce: "The mere fact that it may
happen to remove an interference with commerce among the States as
'
well [as] with the rest does not invalidate it."123
Justice Holmes
continued:
It hardly would be an answer to an indictment for forgery
that the instrument forged was a foreign bill of lading, or for
assault and battery that the person assaulted was engaged in
110 In re Grice, 79 F. 627, 638 (C.C.N.D. Tex. 1897), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 294 (1898) (finding insufficient ground for the
exercise of the lower court's jurisdiction and declaring the whole case "clearly nothing
but an attempt to obtain the interference of a court of the United States when no
extraordinary or peculiar circumstances exist in favor of such interference"). For background on the case, see B. BRINGHURST, supra note 43, at 46-47.
121 People ex rel. Akin v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill. 236, 249, 66
N.E. 349, 353 (1903); accord Chicago Wall Paper Mills v. General Paper Co., 147 F.
491, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1906). For a similar limiting construction of other state legislation, see State v. Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 66 Ark. 466, 472-73, 51 S.W. 633, 635
(1899).
122 217 U.S. 413 (1910).
112 Id. at 422.
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peddling goods from another State. How far Congress could
deal with such cases we need not consider, but certainly
there is nothing in the present state of the law at least that
excludes the States from a familiar exercise of their
1 24
power.
Application of state antitrust law to activities and arrangements
similar to the exclusive dealing inducement involved in Standard Oil
had indeed become familiar by 1910. Both before and after that date,
courts repeatedly allowed purchasers to escape contract liability when
sued by out-of-state sellers if the sales contract forbade the defendant to
carry the goods of the seller's competitors12 5 or contained other vertical
restrictions on the defendant's activity, such as territorial restraints1 2
or resale price maintenance provisions. 127 Although the sale and shipment themselves were deemed to be part of interstate commerce, the
appended local restrictions were not, and their invalidity under local
antitrust law was held to render the entire contract void and unenforceable. For the same reason, an agent for an out-of-state company constitutionally could be prosecuted under state criminal law for selling merchandise on the condition that the buyer not purchase or deal in
competing sellers' goods. 2
Commerce clause objections were overcome in situations involving
other forms of anticompetitive behavior as well. Thus, in Standard Oil
Co. of Kentucky v. State ex rel. Attorney General, 29 the mere fact that
a foreign corporation manufactured its product out of state and shipped
that product into Mississippi did not shield it from the imposition of
penalties for predatory geographic price discrimination within the state.
The Court stressed that the foreign company was involved in a conspir224

Id. (citation omitted).

"' See, e.g., Fuqua v. Pabst Brewing Co., 90 Tex. 298, 301-03, 38 S.W. 29, 3031 (1897); W.T. Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 184 S.W. 549, 550 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1916); J.R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Johnson, 162 S.W. 394, 395-97 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1913).
I" See Pasteur Vaccine Co. v. Burkey, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 232, 232-34, 54 S.W.
804, 805-06 (1899).
117 See, e.g., Segal v. McCall Co., 108 Tex. 55, 59-60, 184 S.W. 188, 189-90
(1916); Pictorial Review Co. v. Pate Bros., 185 S.W. 309, 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
But see McCall Co. v. J.D. Stiff Dry Goods Co., 142 S.W. 659, 660-61 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1911) (State legislation was not allowed to invalidate a contract with an out-ofstate seller containing a vertical restriction where the contract was deemed to be a
consignment, rather than a sales, arrangement.). See Cole Motor Car Co. v. Hurst, 228
F. 280, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 511 (1917) (territorial
restriction).
118 See Commonwealth v. Strauss, 191 Mass. 545, 548, 78 N.E. 136, 136 (1906).
129 107 Miss. 377, 65 So. 468 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Mladinich v.
Kohn, 250 Miss. 138, 164 So. 2d 785 (1964).
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acy seeking at least partly to monopolize intrastate commerce and noted
that its challenged sales were made after the goods were received by it
in the state and "had become incorporated into the general mass of
property therein." 1 0
Federal and state decisions affirming state power over charters and
business privileges and defining the commerce clause and extraterritorial limits on state antitrust application thus left the states substantial
room to challenge objectionable consolidation, collusion, and predation.
But while quite important, such doctrinal areas did not, of course, comprise the only potential sources of constitutional impediment to regional
antitrust enforcement. Early Supreme Court precedent in other areas
proved less than entirely encouraging.
B.

Equal Protection of the Laws and the Balance of Economic
Power

Populist and Progressive Era state legislators and their constituents did not view all restraints of competition with equal alarm. Indeed,
anticompetitive cooperation among certain groups was seen as not only
tolerable but also a highly appropriate and desirable response to the
economic power and believed manipulations of other actors. Thus,
many state constitutional provisions and statutes attacking trade restraints expressly exempted from their operation the activities of agricultural producers""1 or laborers." 2 Other states focused their attacks
ISO Id. at 383, 65 So. at 470. Because states were left substantial room within
which to regulate despite an effect on interstate commerce, "intrastate" and "interstate'
aspects of the same overall conduct or arrangement could be subjected simultaneously to
state and federal antitrust legislation respectively. Indeed, before new federal legislation
made it clear that federal courts were to have exclusive jurisdiction over federal antitrust matters, see Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 4, 15, 16, 38 Stat. 730, 731, 736-37 (1914)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 25, 26 (1982)); see also General Investment Co. v.
Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 286-88 (1922) (noting that federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction under the Clayton Act), federal antitrust claims sometimes
were raised along with state claims in state court litigation. See, e.g., Straus & Straus v.
American Publishers' Ass'n, 231 U.S. 222, 225 (1913); First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri
Glass Co., 169 Mo. App. 374, 389-92, 152 S.W. 378, 382-83 (1912). Finally, it should
be noted that, under contemporary doctrine, certain types of interstate business were
held not to be a part of commerce at all so that commerce clause inhibitions were not
implicated when states sought to regulate in the area. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168, 183-84 (1869) (issuance of an insurance policy not a transaction in commerce); State v. Phipps, 50 Kan. 609, 615, 31 P. 1097, 1098-(1893) (same). In 1944,
the United States Supreme Court departed from such commerce clause analysis in the
field of insurance, declaring that insurance companies conducting activities across state
lines were subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause. See United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 543-53 (1944).
131 See J. DAviEs, supra note 13, at 195-97.
131 See id. at 197-99.
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solely on producers and dealers of manufactured goods, thereby excluding providers of services and farm products."' 3 Still other states chose to
target or exempt on grounds reflecting other particular local concerns
and interests. 3' Those adversely affected by the operation of state antitrust laws attacked such selective inclusion and exclusion as pernicious
discrimination condemned by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and the federal
and state courts' response to such challenges formed an important part
of the larger pattern of constitutional litigation in the years between
1880 and 1920. In those years, state and federal courts consistently rejected the overwhelming majority of equal protection challenges when
issues of racial classification were not involved." 5 Ultimately, this pattern prevailed as strongly in the antitrust field as elsewhere. But the
Supreme Court's first resolution of an equal protection attack on state
antitrust legislation constituted one of its most important and striking
exceptions to these long-run trends and left the permissible boundaries
of state antitrust innovation initially in substantial doubt.
This first analysis came in the case of Connolly v. Union Sewer
Pipe Co."" The Union Sewer Pipe Company brought suit on two negotiable promissory notes that the defendant had given in payment for
materials purchased. 3 ' The defendant denied liability, asserting that
the plaintiff, prior to making its contract with him, had entered into a
combination in restraint of trade that was unlawful at common law and
illegal under both the Sherman Act and the Illinois "trust statute" of
1893. The Court, per Justice Harlan, had little difficulty disposing of
the defendant's common law and Sherman Act claims on nonconstitutional grounds.'" But the Illinois statute 3 " expressly declared that any
183

See International Harvester Co. of America v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 208-15

(1914).
114 See generally Legislation, supra note 9 (setting out in detail the targeted and
exempted activities within each of the various states).
133 See J. SEMONCHE, supra note 78, at 115-16, 144-46; Currie, Supreme Court:
1889-1910, supra note 78, at 382 n.343; Currie, Supreme Court: 1910-1921, supra
note 78, at 1131 n.103; Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court
1873-1903, 29 BuFrFAo L. REv. 667 (1980).
136 184 U.S. 540 (1902). The case ultimately was overruled in Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1940) (noting that "the differences between agriculture and
industry call for differentiation in the formulation of public policy.").
187 The company's action against Connolly had been consolidated with a second,
parallel action by the company against another individual; the Court's equal protection
analysis applied equally to each of the two actions. See Connolly, 184 U.S. at 544.
18 The Court noted that the invalidity at common law of the plaintiff's participation in an anticompetitive combination provided no defense to the plaintiff's recovery on
a sales contract that had "no necessary or direct connection with the alleged illegal
combination." Connolly, 184 U.S. at 549. Similarly, the Court declared that a contract
unconnected with the other party's alleged anticompetitive behavior could not be the
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purchaser of any article from a corporation transacting business contrary to the statute's prohibitions on anticompetitive conduct was relieved from liability for the price and could plead the act as a defense in
any suit for payment.140 The Union Sewer Pipe Company asserted that
the Illinois act could not aid the defendant, despite this clear provision,
on the ground that another section of the statute provided that the act
did not apply to "agricultural products or livestock while in the hands
of the producer or raiser."141 This provision, the plaintiff asserted, was
in violation of the fourteenth amendment and, as such, rendered the
entire Illinois statute invalid, because the provision was interwoven
with and inseparable from the rest of the act.
Justice Harlan declared that, contrary to the Illinois classification
scheme, "persons engaged in trade or in the sale of merchandise and
commodities. . . and agriculturalists and raisers of live stock, are all in
the same general class, that is, they are all alike engaged in domestic
trade."' 4 2 He added that, if anticompetitive "combinations of capital,
skill, or acts, in respect of the sale or purchase of goods, merchandise,
or commodities . . . are hurtful to the public interests and should be
suppressed, it is impossible to perceive why like combinations in respect
of agricultural products and livestock are not also hurtful." 4" Sustaining the plaintiff's challenge and invalidating the 1893 Illinois antitrust statute in its entirety, Justice Harlan summarily proclaimed such
a disparate system of criminal punishment to be "so manifestly a denial
of the equal protection of the laws that further or extended. argument to
establish that position would seem to be unnecessary.' 4 4
grounds for a recovery or defense under the Sherman Act. See id. at 550-52. In stating
the former proposition, the Court relied in part on two earlier cases announcing the
same principle. See id. at 546-48 (citing with approval Dennehy v. McNulta, 86 F.
825, 827, 829 (7th Cir. 1898); National Distilling Co. v. Cream City Importing Co.,
86 Wis. 352, 355, 56 N.W. 864, 865 (1893)).
1s3 1893 ILL. LAWS 182. The statute prohibited price fixing, output limitations,
and other collective restrictions in trade or competition. The act declared business violators punishable by forfeiture of corporate charter or revocation of privileges to do intrastate business and individuals punishable by fines of not less than $2000 or more than
$5000. The statute further declared that any contract or agreement in violation of the
act was "absolutely void and not enforceable either in law or equity." See 1893 ILI.
LAws 182, 184; see also 184 U.S. at 552-55 (setting out statute in full).
140 See 1893 ILL. LAWS 182; see also Connolly, 184 U.S. at 555-56 (quoting the
statute). This provision did not require the purchaser's own contract with the seller to
be anticompetitive or unlawful or to be directly connected to any such misconduct; and
Connolly's contract with the plaintiff was not. See supra note 138.
141 Connolly, 184 U.S. at 554, 556 (referring to § 9 of the Act).
242 Id. at 560.
14S Id. at 563-64.
144 Id.
at 564. In so deciding, the Court held contrary to state court precedent
upholding almost identical provisions of other state antitrust statutes. For example, in
State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 715, 59 S.W. 1033 (1900), the
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Thus, in its first major opinion addressing the constitutional legitimacy of a state policy penalizing some but not all occurrences of particular types of anticompetitive behavior, the Court held that a state statute, largely designed to provide regional agricultural interests with a
weapon with which to redress an acutely perceived imbalance of economic power,"" could not be used at all unless it was simultaneously
aimed at those same agricultural producers themselves. While willing
to support vigorously an across-the-board policy to promote competition
in all fields,1 4 6 Justice Harlan was not prepared to support a regional
antitrust policy more selectively shaped to redistribute economic wealth
147
or power among economic interests.

Tennessee Supreme Court had considered a provision that declared that the state antitrust act did not apply to "agricultural products or livestock while in the possession of
the producer or raiser." Acts of 1897, ch. 94, § 4, reprinted in id. at 724, 59 S.W. at
1034. The Tennessee court declared that this classification was "not arbitrary and capricious, but natural and reasonable," id. at 734, 59 S.W. at 1037, noting that
"[o]bviously those transactions that are excepted from the penalties of this Act, rarely, if
ever result in evil to the public, while those upon which the penalties are imposed are
believed to have that effect generally." Id. at 735, 59 S.W. at 1037. The court explained that "farmers and stock raisers in this State, when acting within their limited
sphere of immunity from those penalties, have, at most, but few opportunities and
slight facilities for impairing competition and controlling prices, while those of many of
the other pursuits have such opportunities and facilities almost without limit." Id. Five
years earlier, the Supreme Court of Texas had rejected an equal protection-based attack on the almost identical exemption for agricultural products and livestock that was
contained in the Texas antitrust act. See Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Houck, 88
Tex. 184, 185, 30 S.W. 869, 870 (1895), affg 27 S.W. 692, 696-97 (Tex. Civ. App.
1894).
The few lower federal courts that had addressed similar issues had been less sympathetic. See, e.g., In re Grice, 79 F. 627 (C.C.N.D. Tex. 1897), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898) (declaring the Texas antitrust
act's agricultural exemption violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment); cf Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 110 F. 816 (C.C.D. Neb. 1901)
(declaring a Nebraska antitrust statute unconstitutional because of its exemption in
favor of laborers). The lower federal court in Connolly, like the United States Supreme
Court, summarily sustained the constitutional challenges. See Union Sewer-Pipe Co. v.
Connolly, 99 F. 354, 355 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1900), aft'd, 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
'" The Court in Connolly concluded, for example, that the Illinois legislature
"would not have entered upon or continued the policy indicated by the statute unless
agriculturalists and livestock dealers were excluded from its operation, and thereby protected from prosecution." Connolly, 184 U.S. at 565.
146 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 18-46 (1895) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
47 Such a view of the statute's purpose was indeed urged upon the Connolly
Court by the defendants, who vigorously defended the Illinois classification as a reasonable means to further a legitimate state policy of opposition to accelerating inequality of
wealth and growing impoverishment of both the agricultural sector and the middle
class. See Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 86, Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184
U.S. 540 (1902). In part, the defendants argued that the Illinois provision was valid
because it really did not discriminate as to persons but only as to "things." See id. at
84. Thus, if the Union Sewer Pipe Company went into agricultural pursuits, it would
be safe from Illinois antitrust prosecution for such efforts, and if farmers pursued the
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Today, the decision in Connolly is usually dismissed as a rather
unreasoned, indeed capricious, departure from the general pattern of
Supreme Court equal protection decisions rendered both before and after it. It is explained chiefly as indicative of a judicial reluctance to
allow the defendants in the case the windfall that they appear to have
been seeking. 148 Its significance as seen by contemporaries, however,
sewer pipe business, they would become potentially liable for anticompetitive activity.
See id. But the defendants also stressed "the resistless drift . . . toward combinations
and centralization of money . . . driving the great middle class. . . into positions of
dependency upon such billionaires." Id. at 86 (emphasis removed). Because of such
trends, they declared,
[P]roducers of agricultural products and raisers of livestock are being
pushed more and more toward positions of dependency, tenantry, and employees. To counteract this, so far as can be done reasonably, is clearly the
duty af [sic] every legislature; one method of counteracting it is to permit
cooperation, and, if need be, combinations, by everybody in the protection
of agriculturists and stock-raisers, while their products remain in their
hands.
Id. at 86-87.
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, found such asserted justifications worthy of
neither mention nor rebuttal and simply condemned the Illinois classification as patently specious on its face. A restraint of trade was a restraint of trade, and, if worthy
of criminal punishment when devised by manufacturers, it must similarly be against
the public interest when pursued by farmers. No constitutionally permissible state interest conceivably could be served by punishing only restraints occurring in the nonagricultural sector. See Connolly, 184 U.S. at 556-65.
Only Justice McKenna dissented from the majority's opinion. See, id. at 565-71
(McKenna, J., dissenting). Justice Gray did not participate. See id. at 571. Justice
McKenna stressed that the very notion of classification implied the permissibility of
something short of absolute universality of operation and that state legislatures "must
be allowed a wide latitude of discretion and judgment." Id. at 567, 570 (McKenna, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). In his mind, the Illinois statute was essentially analogous to a previously upheld state law exempting planters and farmers from a license
tax imposed upon persons carrying on the business of refining sugar and molasses, see
id. at 567-68 (citing American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900)), an
analogy that the majority pointedly denied. See Connolly, 184 U.S. at 561-63. Most
fundamentally, Justice McKenna declared that the Illinois measure necessarily rested
upon a knowledge of local conditions that the Court did not possess and an analysis of
economic issues that legitimately was for the state and not the Court to make. See id. at
571 (McKenna, J., dissenting). Moreover, he noted that differences existed "in opportunities and powers between the classes in regard to the prohibited acts" and that the
state legislature "had a right to consider" these differences in formulating its antitrust
policy. See id. at 571 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
145 See J. FLYNN, supra note 71, at 31; J. SEMONCHE, supra note 78, at 145
(discussing the Court's atypical approach in Connolly); Currie, Supreme Court: 18891910, supra note 78, at 382 n.343; Kay, supra note 135, at 716, 722 (noting the
Court's "failure to articulate any reasoned basis" for its decision, and describing the
opinion as a "generalized harangue" on the unfairness of the Illinois antitrust statute).
As noted, Connolly had sought to escape liability entirely on his promissory notes on
the basis of alleged antitrust violations not necessarily or directly connected to his own
purchase contract with the plaintiff. See supra note 138. He also had demanded his
own set-off recovery from the plaintiff, requesting $56,970.44 in treble damages under
the Sherman Act, $17,323.48 in actual damages under the Illinois statute, and
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was by no means so distinctly limited. Reactions to the opinion varied,
of course, affected at least in part by differing political sympathies and
economic concerns. Expressions of conservative support and appreciation, however, were declared almost immediately. The day after the
opinion was announced, the Chicago Tribune heralded the demise of
the Illinois antitrust act, openly wishing its eradication had come earlier, before it assertedly scared so many firms away from the state.14
Most immediately, the paper reported, the consequence of the case was
to settle in one stroke state "litigation involving at least $10,000,000,"
the amount reportedly withheld by purchasers of "trust made goods"
who had refused payment on the authority of the invalidated Illinois
statute.1 50 Levy Mayer, attorney for the Illinois Manufacturers Association, found the opinion "legally invigorating" and proclaimed the
stricken provisions "bigoted, dishonest, unprogressive, uncommercial,
and against the spirit of free and untrammeled business intercourse."1 5
Harry Rubens, a prominent Chicago corporation attorney, declared:
The law went the way that it should go. . . . You cannot
prevent trade combinations. They are a growth of new conditions which demand new business methods. I believe there
will be no rigid anti-combination law. You might as well try
to pass laws forbidding the use of steam power. 5 '
Observers in other parts of the country also reacted quickly to the
decision. Within a week of its announcement the New York Times, for
example, reported: "There probably has never been anything of public
importance that has aroused such great interest and received such uni$17,323.48 for "money had and received by plaintiff of defendant contrary to law." See

Connolly, 184 U.S. at 543.
'" See Chicago Tribune, Mar. 11, 1902, at 4, col. 1 The paper noted concern
over the stricken statute's long-term effects: "Whether or not it is too late to undo any
of the harm done and regain the big plants and corporations lost to the state is a matter
of grave doubt, according to well posted men." One such "well posted man," an official
of one of the city's largest banks, reportedly feared that such was indeed the case: "[I1t
is too late to remedy matters. Legislation has run the large companies out of the State,
and new laws probably will be framed to meet the objections found in the old one, so
that the harm will not be mended." Id.
1'0 See id. The magnitude of the aggregate amount reportedly withheld and the
fact that many of those withholding payment may not themselves have been the victims
of anticompetitive conduct by the "trust" sellers, as indeed Connolly himself apparently
was not, see supra note 138, arguably may have affected the Court's reaction to the
Illinois statute, whether or not reluctance to allow Connolly himself a "windfall" may
have been a major factor. No direct indication of either concern, however, is evident in
the Court's opinion.
' ' Chicago Tribune, Mar. 11, 1902, at 4, col. 1; Chicago Daily News, Mar. 10,
1902, at 1, col. 2.
182 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 11, 1902, at 4, cols. 1, 2.

19871

ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

versal approval on the part of the business and industrial element of
Texas as the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
anti-trust case from Illinois . . . . 15 The report noted speculation in
Texas that the effect of Connolly would be to invalidate all three of the
interrelated Texas antitrust statutes because two of the three contained
agricultural exemptions.'" "If this is true," said the Times, "Texas is
now without an anti-trust law. This is why there is rejoicing among the
business and industrial element of Texas. 1 55 The Times prophesied "a
desperate effort . . . on the part of the Democratic politicians to reenact an anti-trust law which will be constitutional, but this will be
combatted by every conservative business man and manufacturer of the
State" and further predicted that any new legislation applicable across
the board would be objected to by "[t]he labor vote

. . .

and this ele-

ment has a big influence on the politics of this State." 1 56
The Connolly decision's sweeping declaration that all those engaged in either agricultural or nonagricultural domestic trade were to
be deemed in the same class for equal protection analysis potentially
called into question any more selectively focused, and comparatively
more politically popular, approach to contemporary state antitrust enforcement. Because the decision directly blocked new legislative efforts
to allow farmers and cattle raisers the favored leeway provided by the
Illinois statute and made at least somewhat more problematic the pursuit of other selectively-based approaches to contemporary problems of
collusion and monopoly, it initially may have had some dampening effect on regional antitrust activity. In general, however, the holding was
not embraced enthusiastically in subsequent federal and state cases reN.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1902, at 13, col. 3.
See id. Others in Texas soon took issue with that analysis, however, including
the editors of the Houston Post, who believed Texas legislation would remain operative
even though the agricultural exemption would fall. See Houston Post, Mar. 11, 1902,
at 1, col. 1; id., Mar. 12, 1902, at 4, col. 1.
155 N.Y. Times, supra note 153, at 13, col. 3.
15" Id. Some other observers had less strong reactions to Connolly. Some, indeed,
merely declared it the inevitable judicial reaction to precipitous and sloppy legislative
drafting. See, e.g., Chicago Record Herald, Mar. 12, 1902, at 12, col. 2. Thus, the
253
154

Kansas City Star explained:
Stringent enactments are frequently passed with a great hullabaloo to impress the voters, without regard to constitutional restrictions. At times such
legislation is encouraged by trust agents as the best way to meet attacks
against them. If trusts are to be restricted and regulated-and the great
majority of people believe regulation necessary-legislators must go about
their work carefully and calmly. They must pay attention to court decisions and to the probable attitude of judges. The slap dash methods of the
political canvass are useless. This is the lesson of the decision of the Supreme Court on the Illinois law.
Kansas City Star, Mar. 11, 1902, at 6, cols. 1, 2.
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viewing other grounds of selectivity, and its restrictive impact was considerably eroded by the time the United States entered the First World
War.
Three years after its decision in Connolly, the Supreme Court, per
Justice Holmes, upheld an Iowa statute that prohibited anticompetitive
collusion among fire insurance companies.157 The Court refused to second-guess the state legislature's determination that the activities of such
companies presented an unusually severe threat to competition justifying special treatment. Five years later, in Standard Oil Co. of Ken8 the Court, again per Justice Holmes, upheld a
tucky v. Tennessee,"'
Tennessee antitrust statute providing a dual penalty system under
which natural persons were subject exclusively to fine or imprisonment
while corporations were subject to ouster from the state. The statute
further required alleged violations by natural persons to be adjudicated
using different procedures than those used to try violations by corporations. " Then, in 1912, in Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota,'60 the
Court, once again per Justice Holmes, rejected a challenge to a South
Dakota "predatory geographic price discrimination" statute,'"' despite
1M7 See Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905). In so holding, the
Court affirmed that "if an evil is specially experienced in a particular branch of business, the Constitution embodies no prohibition of laws confined to the evil, or doctrinaire requirement that they should be couched in all-embracing terms." Id. at 411.
Justice Harlan concurred, viewing the state act as a permissible effort to provide bargaining equality for consumers dealing with fire insurance companies. See id. at 414
(Harlan, J., concurring).
15 217 U.S. 413 (1910).
',
Natural persons could only be tried through preliminary investigation by a
grand jury, indictment or presentment, and jury trial. Moreover, natural persons had
the benefits of the reasonable doubt standard and a one year statute of limitations.
Corporations, on the other hand, were proceeded against by bill in equity on relation of
the state attorney general. See id. at 420. Rejecting the defendant's claim that these
differences denied it the equal protection of the laws, Justice Holmes characterized the
defendant's argument, in frequently quoted language, as "one of the many attempts to
construe the Fourteenth Amendment as introducing a factitious equality without regard
to practical differences that are best met by corresponding differences of treatment." Id.
at 420.
o 226 U.S. 157 (1912).
181 Such statutes more frequently have been labeled "local price discrimination"
acts. The act subjected to a fine anyone
[e]ngaged in the production, manufacture, or distribution of any commodity in general use, that intentionally, for the purpose of destroying the
competition of any regular, established dealer in such commodity, or to
prevent the competition of any person who in good faith intends and attempts to become such dealer, shall discriminate between different sections, communities, or cities of this state, by selling such commodity at a
lower rate in one section . . . than such person . . . charges for such
commodity in another section, .
after equalizing the distance from the
point of production . ...
Id. at 159 (quoting 1907 S.D. LAWS ch. 131); cf. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
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the defendant's objection that the act effectively imposed a special liability on dealers having two or more places of business.' 62
Finally, in 1914, in International Harvester Co. of America v.
Missouri,16 3 the United States Supreme Court, per Justice McKenna,
the lone dissenter in Connolly, rejected an equal protection challenge to
a Missouri antitrust statute that targeted manufacturers and vendors of
articles but not purchasers, laborers, or other providers of services. The
Court readily conceded that combinations of laborers or of purchasers
might restrain competition but declared that it was for the legislature of
the state to determine whether local conditions called for repression of
such combinations.'" The Court expressly rejected the defendant's contentions that an appropriate" classification necessarily would "include[]
all the activities and occupations of life"'"" and that to be valid, any
state antitrust law would have to "apply to all restraints, whatever
§ 13a (1982) (This section, the criminal penalty section of the present federal "price
discrimination" statute, declares, in part, that it shall be unlawful "to sell. . . goods in
any part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a
competitor in such part of the United States.").
116 The defendant claimed that the statute
in real fact is a blow aimed at those who have several lumber yards along
a line of railroad, in the interest of independent dealers. All competition, it
is added, imports an attempt to destroy or prevent the competition of rivals, and there is no difference in principle between the prohibited act and
the ordinary efforts of traders at a single place.
Central Lumber, 226 U.S. at 160. In dismissing the relevance of the defendant's economic theory, Justice Holmes noted, in passing, the contemporary prevalence of the
"recoupment" theory of predation, as follows:
We must assume that the legislature of South Dakota considered that people selling in two places made the prohibited use of their opportunities
and that such use was harmful, although the usual efforts of competitors
were desired. It might have been argued to the legislature with more force
than it can be to us that recoupment in one place of losses in another is
merely an instance of financial ability to compete. If the legislature
thought that that particular manifestation of ability usually came from
great corporations whose power it deemed excessive and for that reason
did more harm than good in their State, and that there was no other case
of frequent occurrence where the same could be said, we cannot review
their economics or their facts. That the law embodies a widespread conviction appears from the decisions in other States.
Id. at 161 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the "recoupment" theory of predation, its impact during the Progressive Era, and its asserted factual inaccuracy, at least
as applied to the contemporary operations of the Standard Oil Company, see generally
McGee, PredatoryPrice Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137
(1958); see also H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
§ 6.12, at 187 (1985); E. SULLIVAN & H. HOvENKAMP, ANTrrRUST LAW POLICY
AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 504 (1984).
183 234 U.S. 199 (1914).
1" See id. at 210.
165 Id. at 212.
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their degree or effect or purpose." ' 6 In the Court's view, the classification made by the Missouri legislature could not be deemed "palpably
arbitrary.

167

Hence, the statute could not be held invalid as an exer-

cise of legislative power, however much the defendant might fault the
act on grounds of social policy. 6 8 Connolly itself received only the
briefest closing mention, in the last two sentences of the Court's opinion. There, the Court rejected the contention that the challenged statute
came within its earlier holding by declaring simply, "[W]e do not think
1 69
so. If it did we should, of course, apply that ruling here.
In general, state courts did not walt for the Supreme Court's
broadly sympathetic opinion in InternationalHarvester before adopting their own rather restrictive interpretations of Connolly. Following
that earlier 1902 decision, the state Supreme Courts of Georgia 70 and
Montana 7 1 did invalidate state antitrust statutes in their entirety because they contained agricultural exemptions. The Texas Supreme
Court, sitting in a state in which a federal circuit court estimated fourfifths of the state's population was "engaged in the- business of producing and raising agricultural products and live stock," 1 2 also followed
Connolly, but only grudgingly, and no further than it felt absolutely
I" Id. The Court went on to suggest more pointedly the unsoundness of the proposition that only all-inclusive bans on restraints of trade should be upheld:
In the enumeration of those who, it is contended, by combination are able
to restrain trade are included, among others, "persons engaged in domestic
service" and "nurses," and because these are not embraced in the law,
plaintiff in error, it is contended, although a combination of companies
uniting the power of $120,000,000 and able thereby to engross 85% or
90% of the trade in agricultural implements, is nevertheless beyond the
competency of the legislature to prohibit. As great as the contrast is, a
greater one may be made. Under the principle applied a combination of
all the great industrial enterprises (and why not railroads as well?) could
not be condemned unless the law applied as well to a combination of
maidservants or to infants' nurses, whose humble functions preclude effective combination.
Id. at 213.
167

Id. at 215.

See id. at 214.
Id. at 215.
See Brown v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902). The
court, nevertheless, still upheld the grant of an injunction against defendant retail druggists, who had sought to coerce manufacturers and wholesalers to refuse to sell to the
plaintiff on the grounds that plaintiff was an aggressive price cutter. The court concluded that the injunction was supported by settled common law principles. See id. at
433-54, 41 S.E. at 554-64.
17' See State v. Cudahy Packing Co., 33 Mont. 179, 82 P. 833 (1905). The exemption in question declared that the act did not apply to arrangements made by "persons engaged in horticulture or agriculture, with a view of enhancing the price of their
products." Id. at 182, 82 P. at 833.
172 In
re Grice, 79 F. 627, 647 (C.C.N.D. Tex. 1897), rev'd sub nom. Baker v.
168
169
170

Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 294 (1898).
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compelled to. 173 It declared that the state antitrust statute of 1895 still

could support a proceeding to forfeit the charter of a Texas corporation, despite the statute's agriculture exemption, even though it conceded that the statute no longer could support a penalty action or serve
as the basis of a defense in a civil suit. 174
The Supreme Court's initial equal protection analysis also led to
state court condemnation of nonagriculturally-based selectivity. Less
than a year after Connolly was announced, the Supreme Court of Illinois, relying on Connolly, summarily held unconstitutional an amendment to the 1891 state antitrust act that declared it not unlawful "in
the mining, manufacture or production of articles of merchandise, the
cost of which is mainly made up of wages" for persons and businesses
"to enter into joint arrangements of any sort, the principal object or
effect of which is to maintain or increase wages. ' 175 But others took a
very different view of Connolly's relevance to labor-related antitrust
legislation. Thus, a decade later, the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, 178 noting that the United States Supreme Court had never di-

rectly considered the status of labor exemptions to state antitrust
laws, 17 7 firmly upheld such an exemption1 7 8 to its own state's act.1 79 In
173 See State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Shippers' Compress & Warehouse Co., 95
Tex. 603, 611, 69 S.W. 58, 61 (1902) (referring to its earlier, pre-Connolly holding
rejecting an equal protection challenge to another state antitrust statute declared to be
without relevant difference from the statute involved in the case now before it and
reiterating, "We believe that our decision is correct; that the law is not in contravention
of the constitution . . . of the United States"; the court did, however, "recognize the
superior authority of the Supreme Court of the United States" on the point).
174 See id. at 611, 69 S.W. at 61 ("[T]o the extent that the statute of this state is
not embraced in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, we shall
adhere to our former decision that it is constitutional and valid, and therefore enforcible
[sic] by the State."). Three years later, the United States Supreme Court quoted the
Texas court's reasoning on this point without apparent disapproval. See National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 131-32 (1905). As noted infra notes 255-57 and
accompanying text, Connolly also prompted Kentucky jurists to adopt an interpretation
of state antitrust law making its agricultural cooperative marketing exemption more
generally available to those in all lines of commerce.
175 People ex tel. Akin v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill. 236, 258, 66
N.E. 349, 356 (1903). The court's entire analysis and rationale for this holding was set
out in a single sentence: "Under the decision in the Connolly case, it is clear that this
amendment is unconstitutional and void, as being an unlawful discrimination in favor
of the persons sought to be exempted by the amendment from the operation of the act
of 1891, as amended by the act of 1893." Id.
176 See State v. Coyle, 7 Okla. Crim. 50, 122 P. 243 (1912), reh'g denied, 8 Okla.
Crim. 686, 130 P. 316 (1913).
177 See id. at 79-80, 122 P. at 256.
175 The Oklahoma exemption provided:

[N]o agreement, combination, or contract by or between two or more persons to do or procure to be done, or not to do or procure to be done, any
act in contemplation or furtherance of any trade dispute between employers and employees in the state, shall be deemed as criminal, nor shall those
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so doing, that court projected a vision of contemporary economic reality
distinctly at odds with the conception underlying the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision a decade earlier, which, without discussion, seemingly
had declared it clear that labor and capital could not constitutionally be
classified separately for antitrust treatment. The Oklahoma court's
opinion expressed the pervasive antimonopoly sentiment of its region 18 0
and proclaimed a fundamental, naturally ordained dissimilarity of labor and capital.""'
engaged therein be indictable or otherwise punishable for the crime of
conspiracy, if such act committed by one person would not be punishable
as a crime, nor shall such agreement, combination, or contract be considered as in restraint of trade or commerce, nor shall any restraining order
or injunction be issued in relation thereto, provided that force or violence
are not used.
Coyle, 8 Okla. Crim. at 694-95, 130 P. at 319-20 (opinion denying motion for
rehearing).
117 In concluding its holding on this point in the first Coyle case, the court
dedared that its decision was by no means a reluctant one, proclaiming that, "until compelled by direct judicial decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to the
contrary, we shall esteem it a privilege and consider it a solemn obligation and duty to
uphold the validity of our antitrust laws." 7 Okla. Crim. at 93-94, 122 P. at 262. In
National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115 (1905), a defendant's equal protection
claim, involving, in part, a challenge to a labor exemption from Texas antitrust legislation, was not addressed because state court construction was held to have removed the
discriminatory features from the legislation. An equal protection challenge to a state
antitrust act's labor exemption also was raised, but neither addressed nor resolved, in
State v. Cudahy Packing Co., 33 Mont. 179, 82 P. 833 (1905).
18" For a thorough recent discussion of popular sentiment in Oklahoma in this
period, see G. BURBANK, WHEN FARMERS VOTED RED: THE GOSPEL OF SOCIALISM
IN THE OKLAHOMA COUNTRYSIDE, 1910-1924 (1976).
181 The court declared its view of economic relations as follows:
The assumption of counsel for appellees is that the rights of capital are
equal to the rights of labor. Good morals do not sustain this assumption.
While labor and capital are both entitled to the protection of the law, it is
not true that the abstract rights of capital are equal to those of labor, and
that they both stand upon an equal footing before the law. Labor is natural; capital is artificial. Labor was made by God; capital is made by man.
Labor is not only blood and bone, but it also has a mind and a soul, and is
animated by sympathy, hope, and love; capital is inanimate, soulless matter. Labor is the creator; capital is the creature. .

.

. The strength and

glory of this country lies, not in its vast accumulations of capital, but it
depends upon the arms that labor, the minds that think, and the hearts
that feel. Labor is always a matter of necessity. Capital is largely a matter
of luxury. Labor has been dignified by the example of God. The Saviour
of mankind was called the "carpenter's son." We are told in the Bible that
"the love of money is the root of all evil." This statement is confirmed by
the entire history of the human race. The love of money is the cause of the
organization of trusts and monopolies. With what show of reason and justice, therefore, can the advocates of monopoly be heard to say that capital
is the equal of labor? But if we concede that the assumption of counsel for
appellees is well founded, and if we arbitrarily and in disregard of good
morals place capital and labor upon an absolute equality before the law,
another difficulty confronts them. Capital organizes to accomplish its pur-
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The Oklahoma approach was far more typical of the work of contemporary state judges than was the action of the Illinois court. Although Connolly's prohibition of the type of broad-based agricultural
exemption found in the 1893 Illinois statute remained at least formally
in force for several decades, state courts rejected the great majority of
equal protection-based attacks made on state antitrust legislation prior
to the First World War. Thus, for example, the state courts upheld
legislation despite its limitation to dealers, mechanics, and artisans,"8 2
to activities in the production, manufacture, or distribution of petroleum or petroleum products, 83 or to corporations,'
and despite the
exemption of certain special status corporations.18

5

Furthermore, in the

years prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Central
8
Lumber,"'
state supreme courts repeatedly upheld state "predatory
discrimination" statutes, whether addressed to sales 8 7 or purchases,'
poses. Then, according to their own logic, it would be a denial of equal
rights to labor to deny to it the right to organize and act without a breach
of the peace to meet the aggression of capital.
Coyle, 8 Okla. Crim. at 695-96, 130 P. at 320 (opinion denying motion for rehearing).
In thus rejecting the defendants' assertion that the state's classification violated the
equal protection provision of the United States Constitution, the court also went on
more succinctly to "deny that trusts and monopolies are entitled to protection as citizens
of the United States," id. at 696, 130 P. at 320, without noting or discussing the United
States Supreme Court's position, stated in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R.
Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (preliminary remark by Waite, C.J.), that corporations
were included among the "persons" guaranteed equal protection of the laws under the
'fourteenth amendment.
1
See Knight & Jillson Co. v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N.E. 823 (1909).
13 See State ex rel. Young v. Standard Oil Co., 111 Minn. 85, 126 N.W. 527
(1910).
1" See People ex ret, Akin v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66
N.E. 349 (1903).
18s See id. at 256, 66 N.E. at 355 (noting that corporations "organized under the
building, loan and homestead association laws of [the] state," which the court declared
"differ essentially from corporations organized under the general statute for pecuniary
profit," were exempt from a provision requiring corporations to file an affidavit of
antitrust compliance); cf State ex rel. Crow v. Aetna Ins. Co., 150 Mo. 113, 134, 51
S.W. 413, 420 (1898) (antitrust legislation exempting collective insurance rate-setting
in cities with population of 100,000 or more held not in violation of state constitutional
provision banning local or special laws).
1s" Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912).
187 See, e.g., State ex rel. Young v. Standard Oil Co., 111 Minn. 85, 126 N.W.
527 (sustaining predatory geographic price discrimination statute applying only to those
engaged in the production, manufacture, or distribution of petroleum or petroleum
products); State v. Drayton, 82 Neb. 254, 265-66, 117 N.W. 768, 772 (1908) (upholding general predatory geographic price discrimination statute over assertion of bias
against those having two or more places of business; the court denied such limited scope
for the statute on the ground that large corporations selling in multiple locales were
within the act's coverage even where they maintained only a single "place of business");
State v. Central Lumber Co., 24 S.D. 136, 157-59, 123 N.W. 504, 511-12 (1909)
(citing Drayton approvingly and flatly declaring that the statute did not establish any
classification, because it applied to any persons, partnerships, or corporations engaged
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in spite of claims that the acts unconstitutionally discriminated against
those they targeted.
Although Connolly itself was not formally overruled by the Supreme Court until 1940,189 within a dozen years of its announcement
its scope of application thus had been reduced substantially by subsequent federal and state cases. Its weakening force, even as applied to
special agricultural legislation, soon became apparent in the efforts of
both Congress and numerous state legislatures to enact cooperative
marketing provisions to protect farmers, and frequently others as well,
from the full application of antitrust statutes.1 90
in the specified type of predatory conduct, a particular form of "malicious competition"
that the legislature legitimately could attack by way of separate legislation), affd, 226
U.S. 157 (1912).
18 In State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 153 Iowa 702, 133 N.W. 895 (1911), the
Iowa Supreme Court upheld special legislative regulation of price discrimination in
certain agricultural sectors, despite Connolly's 1902 condemnation of Illinois' exemption of farmers from the operation of a general antitrust statute. The legislation addressed in FairmontCreamery forbade predatory geographic discrimination in purchasing by those "engaged in the business of buying milk, cream or butter fat for the
purpose of manufacture, or of buying poultry, eggs or grain for the purpose of sale or
storage." Id. at 704-05, 133 N.W. at 897. Neither targeting such commodities alone
nor focusing solely on purchases made for those specified purposes was, in the court's
view, constitutionally suspect. The court declared, for example, that the "temporary
maintenance of artificial prices for the sole purpose of destroying a weaker competitor
and creating a monopoly" was a threat peculiarly posed by large, financially wellendowed corporations buying cream "for the purpose of manufacture" and not practicably possible for the "multitude who buy for immediate consumption." Id. at 710, 133
N.W. at 899. The court found Connolly less relevant than later United States Supreme
Court decisions, including Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905), which,
it concluded, supported the Iowa legislation.
Two months later, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a very similar Minnesota statute on similar reasoning, although without noting or discussing Connolly. See
State v. Bridgeman & Russell Co., 117 Minn. 186, 134 N.W. 496 (1912).
While the antidiscrimination acts involved in these two state cases specifically ineluded certain activities in the agricultural sector, while Connolly had condemned a
statute specifically exempting certain other activities in that same sector, it would appear that in all three cases, a major, if not sole, aim of the state legislature was to
provide special protection to state farmers. In Connolly, this was achieved by leaving
room for anticompetitive cooperation among farmers generally. In Fairmont Creamery
and Bridgeman & Russell, it was accomplished by giving dairy farmers special protection against the illegitimate establishment of monopsony power in the hands of those
buying their produce.
189 See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) (upholding a Texas antitrust statute
despite an exemption identical to that condemned in Connolly).
190 See, e.g., Capper-Volstead Act, 42 Stat. 388 (1922) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1982)); Clayton Act, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982)); see also Hanna, CooperativeAssociations and the
Public, 29 MicH. L. REv. 148, 163 (1930) (describing state legislative efforts); Miller,
Farmers' Cooperative Associations as Legal Combinations, 7 CORNELL L.Q. 293,
294-95, 304-06 (1922) (describing legislative efforts in New York). Such acts, however,
typically offered protection on a less sweeping basis than the Illinois provision struck
down by the Supreme Court in 1902. See, e.g., Hanna, supra, at 179; Miller, supra,
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Due Process of Law, Antitrust Innovation, and Visions of
Economic Life

As noted above, corporate law and commerce clause opinions
demonstrated judicial sympathy for substantial state regulatory authority, and equal protection challenges to legislative classifications reflected
the contours of an ongoing battle for relative economic power among
major elements of American society. The due process clause provided
yet another ground upon which to attack state antitrust efforts. The
resulting due process cases marked both the extent of contemporary judicial tolerance for innovative antitrust methodology and the nature and
power of contemporary visions of economic reality.
Charges that state antitrust efforts unconstitutionally deprived
particular persons or corporations of due process of law were raised
nearly as frequently as were equal protection challenges to the same
initiatives, yet fared only slightly better. Due process attacks on the
extraterritorial application of state power already have been noted.""1
In other areas, critics variously complained that statutory coverage was
so sweeping as to threaten freedom of contract or that state penalties
were excessive, procedures unfair, or standards unduly vague. While
some state legislation was struck down, the United States Supreme
Court and the state courts generally rejected efforts to void state antitrust legislation on due process grounds. Among the opinions in this
area the vagueness cases deserve the most extended attention. Those
opinions, while few in number, did not simply raise basic issues concerning the practicability of various antitrust standards as guides for
litigation and judicial elaboration; they also demonstrate unusually well
the power and diversity of contemporary visions of economic life influencing antitrust analysis in turn-of-the-century America.
at 299-300. Early judicial assessment of equal protection attacks on such state cooperative marketing acts was mixed. Compare Standard Engraving Co. v. Volz, 200 A.D.
758, 762-66, 193 N.Y.S. 831, 835-37 (1922) (dicta declaring a 1918 New York provision unconstitutional on the basis of Connolly) with Northern Wis. Coop. Tobacco Pool
v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 197 N.W. 936 (1923), reh'g denied, 182 Wis. 592, 197
N.W. 943 (1924) (upholding Wisconsin Co-operative Marketing Law and questioning
continued vitality of Connolly).
Connolly, however, was not wholly without residual force. See Commonwealth v.
Hatfield Coal Co., 186 Ky. 411, 417, 422, 426-28, 217 S.W. 125, 128, 130, 131-32
(1919) (striking down 1916 state antitrust legislation exempting all organizations or
associations not engaged "in the business of mining, manufacturing or transporting any
article or commodity," quoting Connolly at length and denouncing the measure as
"class legislation of the most pronounced and offensive type" in violation of both the
fourteenth amendment and the state constitution).
'' See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
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1. Freedom of Contract
In two early opinions unusually critical of state antitrust efforts,
federal circuit courts declined to adopt a "rule of reason" interpretation
of state legislation along the lines of the Supreme Court's eventual approach to Sherman Act analysis 19

2

and declared that broadly worded

state antitrust statutes, as thus literally construed, were unconstitutionally sweeping in their prohibition of contracts and combinations." 3 In
other cases, however, the Supreme Court and the state courts generally
had little, if any, difficulty rejecting the broad freedom of contract challenges mounted against various state antitrust legislation. Indeed, such
attacks often were not deemed to merit much more than a summary
reiteration of the general principle that freedom to contract was not an
absolute right but one subject to reasonable police power regulation,
which state antitrust legislation generally was held to be. 94 In one Supreme Court opinion, however, Justice Holmes did go somewhat further, indicating that totally uninhibited freedom to contract would itself
conflict with the economic justifications supporting freedom of contract
in general and, thus, that antitrust prohibitions were legitimate as a
matter of economic as well as constitutional theory. In Carroll v.
Greenwich Insurance Co.,1 95 Justice Holmes, for the Court, explained:
There is no greater sanctity in the right to combine than in
the right to make other contracts. Indeed, Mr. Dicey, in his
recent work on Law and Public Opinion in England during
the Nineteenth Century, indicates that it is out of the very
right to make what contracts one chooses, so strenuously ad192 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). On the evolution of
the "rule of reason" in early federal antitrust jurisprudence, see R. BORK, supra note
2, at 15-49; W. LETWIN, supra note 2, at 143-282.
"' See Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 110 F. 816 (C.C.D. Neb. 1901); In re
Grice, 79 F. 627 (C.C.N.D. Tex. 1897), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Baker v.
Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898) (for further discussion of this case, see supra note 120); cf.
State ex rel. Star Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 60 S.W. 91 (1900)
(rejecting newspaper's request, based in part on defendant's alleged state antitrust violations and purported status as a virtual monopoly, for mandamus to compel defendant
to furnish news reports to it and declaring that such state interference, inter alia, would
violate defendant's constitutionally protected liberty to enter or not enter into contracts
as it deemed appropriate).
1" See, e.g., Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912); Carroll
v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905); National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197
U.S. 115 (1905); Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1905); Knight & Jillson Co.
v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N.E. 823 (1909); In re Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass.
620, 99 N.E. 294 (1912); State ex rel. Monnett v. Buckeye Pipe-line Co., 61 Ohio St.
520, 56 N.E. 464 (1900); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 44 S.W.
936 (1898), affd, 177 U.S. 28 (1900).
195 199 U.S. 401 (1905).
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vocated by Bentham, that combinations have arisen which
restrict the very freedom that Bentham sought to attain, and
which even might menace the authority of the State. If then
the statute before us is to be overthrown more special reasons
must be assigned.1 6
With broad freedom of contract challenges generally unsuccessful, defendants seeking such "special reasons" focused in part on the particulars of state penalties and procedures.
2.

Penalties

As noted previously, state legislators provided a rather wide array
of antitrust remedies.197 Charges that some of these were unconstitutionally severe focused primarily on the imposition of monetary penalties. In Waters-PierceOil Co. v. Texas,198 a unanimous Supreme Court
firmly supported the application of substantial financial penalties for
antitrust violations. In that case, the Court sustained the assessment of
$1,623,500 in penalties against the Texas affiliate of the Standard Oil
Company over the company's objection that the fine was "so excessive
as to constitute taking of the defendant's property without due process
of law."1 99 The Court found such a claim particularly unconvincing in
light of the profitability of the defendant's Texas operations, which had
generated dividends "as high as 700 per cent per annum," and the
190 Id. at 410. For an extended state court analysis of a freedom of contract challenge to a state antitrust prohibition on exclusive dealing contracts, written shortly after
the Supreme Court seemed to revive such ground of constitutional challenge in Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), see Commonwealth v. Strauss, 191 Mass. 545, 55153, 78 N.E. 136, 138 (1906) (rejecting the challenge on the grounds that the statute
was a proper exercise of the police power, given the contemporary use of exclusive
dealing contracts "intended to drive ordinary competitors out of business" and the fact
that the limited group of contracts forbidden were "only those which, in ordinary competition among equals, no one would have any interest or desire to make"), appeal
dismissed, 207 U.S. 599 (1907).
1'7See supra text accompanying notes 26-37.
1,212 U.S. 86 (1909).
'"Id. at 111. The penalty was calculated according to the rates established in
two applicable state antitrust statutes. Under an act of 1899, the defendant, WatersPierce Company, was fined at a rate of $1500 per day for the period from May 31,
1900 to March 31, 1903, a total of 1033 days of violation. This statute provided for
penalties of not less than $200 or more than $5000 per day. See id. at 97, 100. Under
an act of 1903, the defendant was fined at a rate of $50 per day, the only daily rate
allowed under this act, for the period from April 1, 1903 to April 29, 1907, a total .of
1480 days of violation. See id. at 97, 100. Ultimately, the defendant paid 32% of the
penalties, and Standard Oil of New Jersey, not a defendant in the case, contributed the
remainder. See B. BRINGHURST, supra note 43, at 64. In the same suit, the jury also
found that the defendant's permit to do intrastate business should be cancelled, and the
trial court so ordered. See Waters-Pierce, 212 U.S. at 97.
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value of the defendant's property, estimated to be worth more than $40
million.20 0
20 1
Three years later, in Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Missour,
the Court upheld the assessment of $50,000 fines against each of three
corporate defendants, including, again, the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, imposed in quo warranto proceedings instituted in the Missouri
Supreme Court.2 0 2 In doing so, the United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected a long series of constitutional claims proffered by two
of the three defendants in the case.203 Contrary to the defendants' assertions, the Court found that the Missouri Supreme Court did have jurisdiction to impose fines in such a corporate ouster proceeding, even
though the state treated such litigation as a purely civil action.2 ' The
Court also rejected the defendants' contention that they had been deprived of due process because the state's prayer for relief never requested damages or fines. While the rules of practice might have required greater specificity in a civil proceeding, noted Justice Lamar for
the Court, such a prayer for relief was not part of the notice demanded
by the Constitution. Thus, the state court was entitled to grant relief in
addition to that requested in the pleadings, as long as the judgment did
not exceed the amount warranted by the plaintiff's original allegations.2" 5 Moreover, because earlier Missouri precedent dearly established the state court's jurisdiction to impose fines in ouster cases, the
defendants had sufficient opportunity to address questions of mitigation
or reduction of sentence.20 6 In the same vein, the Court went on to
declare that no constitutional difficulty was raised by the fact that no
state statute established any maximum limit for fines in an ouster proceeding or any rule for their computation.20 7 The Court rejected as well
the defendants' equal protection complaint that while they were fined
200

Waters-Pierce, 212 U.S. at 112.

201

224 U.S. 270 (1912).

Justice Lamar, writing for the United States Supreme Court, noted that some
members of the Missouri court thought the fine actually should have been $1,000,000.
See id. at 274, 282.
203 The case was appealed to the Supreme Court by the Standard Oil Company
and Republic Oil Company. Waters-Pierce paid the fine and complied with other conditions and, accordingly, was allowed to continue to do intrastate business in Missouri.
See id. at 274 (statement of the case by Lamar, J.).
202

204
205
200

See id. at 281.
See id. at 285.
See id. at 287-88.

207 The Court reasoned that fines in these circumstances were essentially punitive
damages against the corporation for willful and wanton violation of its implied contract
with the state. Such damages, said the Court, traditionally were not compensatory nor
measured by any rule. While such damages generally were allowed only in tort cases,
their extension to cases of this sort raised "no Federal question." See id. at 286.
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$50,000 in a quo warranto proceeding tried by the Missouri Supreme
Court, corporations prosecuted for identical conduct in lower state
courts under the state antitrust act were entitled to a trial by jury and,
upon conviction, were subject to fines limited to $100 per day during
the pendency of the violation, in addition to cancellation of their corporate franchise.2 08
Challenges to monetary penalties imposed in state enforcement
proceedings were treated with no greater sympathy by other courts.
State judges consistently rejected claims that authorized or imposed
penalties were so excessive as to be unconstitutional.2 0 9 Other fundamental challenges to state penalties similarly were dismissed. The
Texas Court of Civil Appeals, for example, rejected a defendant's contention that an antitrust statute establishing widely varying minimum
and maximum amounts for allowable fines was unconstitutionally
vague and indefinite.2 10 And the Indiana Supreme Court, in a case involving a specialized statute designed to prevent express companies
from discriminating unfairly against their competitors, rejected a claim
that the penalty provisions of the act violated a state constitutional provision requiring all penalties to be proportional to the offense. The
court reasoned that the statute merely established a civil penalty; the
constitutional section applied exclusively to criminal proceedings. 11
208 The Court noted that simultaneous civil and criminal liability for the same
'conduct in separate proceedings was not uncommon in other areas of law, noting, as an
example, the situation in which "an attorney is disbarred or ousted of his right to
practice in the court because of conduct for which he may likewise be prosecuted and
fined." Id. at 289. The defendants in Standard Oil Co. of Indiana did not specifically
challenge the fine as excessive in and of itself. See id. at 288. Seven years earlier, in
National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas 197 U.S. 115 (1905), defendants claimed, in part
because the penalties provided allegedly were excessive, that Texas legislation deprived
corporations of property without due process of lai,. See id. at 118 (statement of the
case by McKenna, J.). That specific issue, however, was not addressed by the Supreme

Court in National Cotton Oil.
20' See Knight & Jillson Co. v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N.E. 823 (1909); WatersPierce Oil Co. v. State, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 106 S.W. 918 (1907), affd, 212 U.S.
86 (1909); cf. Grenada Lumber Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen., 98 Miss. 536, 542,
54 So. 8, 10 (1911) (After the state sought imposition of a penalty against each defendant in the amount of $197,000, making a total for all defendants of $14,184,000 and
the defendants demurred, challenging, inter alia, the size of the penalties in question as
confiscatory in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
court declared that that issue could not be considered "on bill and demurrer, where
there is no allegation as-to the property owned by the appellants. The statute . . . is
valid on its face. Its enforcement might amount to confiscation in one case and not in
another. This question must await the case on proof.").
210 Waters-Pierce, 48 Tex. Civ. App. at 183-84, 106 S.W. at 928.
11Adams Express Co. v. State, 161 Ind. 328, 343-44, 67 N.E. 1033, 1038-39
(1903). The court went on to say that, in any case, a mere $500 penalty was not out of
proportion to the offense charged. See id. at 344, 67 N.E. at 1039. Where collection of
a penalty was sought not by the state but by a private party, in addition to the recovery
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Procedures

The intensity of regional antimonopoly sentiment prompted legislators in particular areas to adopt various special procedures to make
more effective their attack on anticompetitive arrangements and operations. Due process and other federal and state constitutional objections
to such innovations prompted a mixed judicial response before and immediately after World War I. The number of reported opinions dealing
with such issues is rather small, but the pattern that they suggest is
worth noting. For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio struck down on
due process grounds a section of state antitrust law that provided that,
in prosecutions attacking a combination as a prohibited type of trust or
combination, "[t]he character of the trust or combination alleged may
be established by proof of its general reputation as such.12 12 Other special state procedures, however, either were not challenged or were upheld by courts considering them. Although the Missouri Supreme
Court ultimately struck down a provision allowing the state attorney
general to retain one-fourth of the fines collected in antitrust prosecutions, the court did not do so until the mid-1920's and then only on the
basis of a state constitutional provision limiting increases in the salaries
of state officials.21 Other states214 invoked similar prosecutorial incenof actual damages, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals proved somewhat less sympathetic
to the claimant. In Mason v. Adoue, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 276, 70 S.W. 347 (1902), the
plaintiff sought to recover $12,500 paid for beer purchased from the defendant under a
statute authorizing such recovery from companies involved in unlawful, anticompetitive
activity. The court found that such recovery was a penalty and not compensation.
Thus, the plaintiff could not recover, because the right to recover a penalty did not
survive the demise of the corporation and because, in this case, since the time plaintiff
instituted suit, the defendant had been found guilty in other litigation of antitrust violations and had had its charter revoked.
"'a Hammond v. State, 78 Ohio St. 15, 19, 84 N.E. 416, 416 (1908). In addition,
in Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920), the United States Supreme
Court considered a specialized state statute that allowed the state Corporation Commission to regulate the rates and practices of any company found to be a public business
because of its near monopoly position, where such company was found not to have
rendered service on reasonable terms and without discrimination. In response to a challenge brought by a laundry company whose rates had been regulated under this provision since 1913, the United States Supreme Court held that the act's enforcement provisions violated the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee because Commissionmandated rates could be challenged and judicially reviewed only in contempt proceedings in which the noncomplying corporation was subject to penalties of $500 per day.
Such a public rate-setting case normally would not be considered an antitrust case, but
it seems relevant to note here as an outgrowth of an antimonopoly approach taken
toward companies, such as the plaintiff's laundry, not generally thought of as possessing the amount of economic dominance necessary to require public rate-setting.
"I3See State ex rel. Barrett v. Boeckler Lumber Co., 302 Mo. 187, 257 S.W. 453

(1924).
314

See J.

DAvIES,

supra note 13, at 212 n.1.
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tives without challenge. Indeed, Texas prosecuting attorneys reportedly
retained one quarter of the $1.6 million fine imposed against the Waters-Pierce Oil Company 215 under a Texas provision parallel to the invalidated Missouri section.2 16 In other instances, constitutional challenges to antitrust procedures were flatly rejected. Thus, for example,
in 1913 the Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a challenged evidentiary provision of a predatory geographic price discrimination statute.21' 7 That provision, attacked by defendants on federal constitutional
grounds not clearly specified in the court's opinion, declared a prima
facie violation established by proof that the defendant made a lower
offer or charge in one part of the state than it did in another. The
provision did not require direct evidence of the requisite predatory intent. The court found such evidentiary assistance untroubling, believing
that it would be easy for an innocent defendant to show legitimate reasons for any price differentials. 1 8
One area of due process challenge still remains to be examined.
That area generated a rather different, and ultimately much more revealing, pattern of judicial analysis, a pattern highly illuminating not
only of contemporary constitutional theory but also of the intellectual
origins of turn-of-the-century antitrust jurisprudence itself. It is to this
pattern that we now turn.
III.

VAGUENESS AND VISIONS OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN EARLY
ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE

Vagueness-based attacks on newly devised substantive standards
achieved somewhat more success than did the various other due process
challenges just noted. Such attacks also raised substantially more
profound questions of judicial role and economic analysis and accordingly require much more extended discussion.
The importance of the early antitrust vagueness cases has been
noted in recent historical writing on early antitrust development. For
example, in Chapter Three of The Antitrust Paradox, Judge (then
Professor) Robert H. Bork argues that the proper goal of antitrust policy is largely determined by conceptions of "legitimate judicial roles and
legitimate processes '21 9 and that the judicial "need for standards is
closely linked to the question of which organ of government shall make
115

See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.

216 See B. BRINGHURST, supra note 43, at 64.

7 See Standard Oil Co. v. State ex re. Attorney Gen., 104 Miss. 886, 61 So. 981
(1913).
1" See id. at 900, 61 So. at 982.
219 R. BoRK, supra note 2, at 72.
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essentially political choices." 2 2 Judge Bork contends that the United
States Supreme Court early and correctly addressed such fundamental
questions of judicial role and standards not only in cases rejecting a
"reasonable-price" defense for price fixing but also in an important series of opinions responding to vagueness-based challenges to both state
and federal antitrust legislation.22 '
These opinions clearly say much about contemporary judicial perceptions of the judicial function and of the adequacy of particular antitrust standards as guides for judges and juries. But the opinions also
appear to reflect a significant influence on early judicial antitrust thinking not noted in leading accounts of antitrust history, either in connection with the vagueness cases themselves or in connection with other
early opinions. In particular, the vagueness cases appear to reflect both
the diversity and the continuing power and influence of certain late
nineteenth century theoretical conceptions of the economy as a whole.
The lack of scholarly discussion of the effect of such inherited general
theories of economic reality on the predispositions and approaches of
state and federal judges analyzing early antitrust issues is unfortunate.
Because of it we have been left with an incomplete and, accordingly,
somewhat misleading picture, one underemphasizing the variety of influences significantly affecting the initial development of modern antitrust doctrine.
A.

The Supreme Court Vagueness Decisions

Since at least 1810, lower federal courts had considered claims that
the vagueness of particular state or federal statutes unconstitutionally
deprived affected parties of fair warning as to prohibited conduct or
impermissibly failed to establish a sufficient standard to guide courts in
applying the statutes' prohibitions.22 2 The United States Supreme
Court did not have occasion squarely to address such an argument,
however, until the early part of this century. 223 At that time, prior to
World War I, challenges to both federal and state antitrust legislation
generated some of the most important, and earliest, Supreme Court
analyses of statutory vagueness issues. At the same time, state courts
220

Id. at 74.

221

See id. at 73-74.

See The Enterprise, 8 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D.N.Y 1810) (No. 4499). For general
discussions of the development and application of the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine, see
Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MIcH. L. REv. 831 (1923); Note,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67
(1960).
222

228

See J.

FLYNN,

supra note 71, at 44 & n.134.
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also undertook their own consideration of vagueness-based assaults on
state economic legislation. The resulting federal and state opinions contributed substantially to the contemporary development of a significant
body of constitutional theory. But the opinions, and the challenged statutes themselves, also suggest a great deal about the economic thought of
lawyers and judges attempting to address contemporary problems of
competition and monopoly at a time when "Pareto optimality" and
other modern notions of allocative, as opposed to productive, efficiency,
so prevalent in current antitrust philosophy, were barely more than a
gleam in the eyes of academic economists, much less turn-of-the-cen224
tury lawyers and legislators.
The first time the Supreme Court evaluated an antitrust defendant's charge of undue statutory vagueness was in the 1909 WatersPierce Oil Co. v. Texas case,2 25 in which the Court also rejected the
defendant's constitutional challenge to the size of the penalty imposed
against it.2 26 The basis of the vagueness complaint was the somewhat
similar wording contained in two separate state statutes, the first barring contracts and agreements "reasonably calculated" to fix and regulate prices and the second banning acts that might "tend to create or
carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.1 2 7 The Court, per Justice
Day, distinguished these statutes from legislation condemned in prior
state and lower federal court cases, under which the jury was left free
to determine the content of a standard requiring rates to be "reasonable."2' 28 The Court found no such wide discretion left to the jury under
the Texas acts, and, therefore, no deprivation of due process of law,
noting that criminal statutes frequently punished not only a completed
act but also attempts to achieve the forbidden result. 2 9
,"See, e.g., Lande, supra note 2, at 88 n.97. The theory of "Pareto optimality,"
a major underpinning of modem notions of allocative efficiency, was not announced
until 1909. See V. PARETO, MANUAL D'ECONOMIE POLIQUE (1909). Thorough academic exploration of allocative efficiency came only decades later and then initially
without regard to its potential significance in antitrust contexts. See generally Lande,
supra note 2, a superb study of these and other aspects of early antitrust thinking,
particularly in Congress.
125 212 U.S. 86 (1909); see supra text accompanying notes 198-200.
226 Vagueness challenges were made but never directly addressed in National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 118 (1905) (statement of the case by McKenna,
J.), and in Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1905).
17 Waters-Pierce, 212 U.S. at 98-99, 108-09.
Il See id. at 109. Specifically, the Court cited Tozer v. United States, 52 F. 917
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1892); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 35 F. 866 (C.C.S.D. Iowa
1888); Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 132, 35 S.W. 129 (1896).
"' See Waters-Pierce, 212 U.S. at 109. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals similarly had rejected the defendant's vagueness challenge, reasoning that the federal Sherman Act was no more definite than the state statute and yet had been invoked without
condemnation on vagueness grounds in eight cited United States Supreme Court cases,
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Four years later, the Court, per Justice Holmes, rejected a vagueness challenge to the Sherman Act itself in the well-known case of
Nash v. United States.230 The defendant in that case did not object to
the federal act's language prohibiting "[e]very contract, combination
• . .or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce. "231 Rather, the
defendant complained that the Act had been rendered unconstitutionally indefinite, at least as a criminal statute, by the Supreme Court's
1911 opinions in Standard Oil Co. v. United States2s2 and United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 233 which established the "rule of reason" standard for Sherman Act application and interpretation. Justice
Holmes noted that those cases had limited the act's prohibitions to
"only such contracts and combinations . . . as, by reason of intent or
the inherent nature of the contemplated acts, prejudice the public interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the course
of trade."' ' He conceded that, under such a standard, a jury might
condemn actions taken by a businessman who had honestly believed his
conduct was not unduly restrictive. 2 5 But that possibility did not invalidate the Sherman Act as a criminal statute. Indeed, in Justice
Holmes's view the case was "very nearly disposed of" by the Court's
Waters-Pierce opinion.23 Rejection of the defendant's challenge was
further explained, however, on the ground that such a liability standard
was, in fact, quite common, both in the pre-Sherman Act common law
on restraint of trade and elsewhere:
[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on
his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong,
not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as
here; he may incur the penalty of death. "An act causing
death may be murder, manslaughter, or misadventure according to the degree of danger attending it" by common experience in the circumstances known to the actor. "The very
meaning of the fiction of implied malice in such cases at
beginning with United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), and ending with
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
State, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 179, 106 S.W. 918, 925 (1907), affd, 212 U.S. 86
(1909).
230

229 U.S. 373 (1913).

Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C § 1 (1982)).
231

23

221 U.S. 1 (1911).

233 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
23" Nash, 229 U.S. at 376.
235

See id.

236

Id. at 377.
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common law was, that a man might have to answer with his
life for consequences which he neither intended nor foresaw." "The criterion in such cases is to examine whether
common social duty would, under the circumstances, have
suggested a more circumspect conduct.

'2 3 7

Justice Holmes illustrated the operation of such principles by the example of a man unintentionally killing another by driving an automobile into a crowd. Such an act, he said, variously might be murder,
manslaughter, or less, depending on a jury's assessment of social duty,
regardless of the man's own assessment of his prudence." 8'
The import of Justice Holmes's reasoning and of the analogy he
invoked is not completely clear. Since the defendant in Nash was
charged with predatory pricing along with other misconduct, the relevant question of degree implicated in the case arguably might have
been simply the troubling issue of when vigorous competition on the
merits ends and low pricing becomes instead a prohibited threat to the
competitive process itself.23 9 But Justice Holmes seems to suggest that
Standard Oil and American Tobacco did not decree an inquiry into
overall competitive effect and declare the Sherman Act violated whenever conduct is found to be anticompetitive on balance. Rather, he
seems to say that those earlier opinions declared permissible some significant restriction of competition, as long as it was not "unduly" great
as judged by a jury's sense of "common social duty." Holmes himself
earlier had rejected competitive effect as an appropriate test for Sherman Act illegality in his dissenting opinion in Northern Securities Co.
v. United States. 240 In that case, involving the establishment of a holding company to acquire ownership of two competing interstate railroad
companies, Holmes had flatly declared that "[t]he act says nothing
about competition."24 He rejected any view that the Sherman Act decreed "the universal disintegration of society into single men, each at
war with all the rest, or even the prevention of all further combinations
287

Id. (citations omitted).

'" See id.

23 The -question of appropriate standards by which to judge claims of unlawful
predatory pricing has been much debated during the last ten years, both by courts and
scholars. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484, 493 n.12 (1986)
(noting the variety of approaches commentators and lower courts have taken to predatory pricing issues); Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1355
nn.8 & 9 (1986) (same); see generally Bradley & Hay, PredatoryPricing:Competing
Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards,66 CORNELL L. REV. 738
(1981); Hurwitz & Kovacic, JudicialAnalysis of Predation:The Emerging Trends, 35
VAND. L. REV. 63 (1982).
240 193 U.S. 197, 400-11 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 403.
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Instead, Holmes had declared that the Sherman

Act merely echoed the previously established prohibitions of the common law. Those, he said, barred only two types of arrangements: contracts with a stranger to the contractor's business, whereby the contractor's business freedom was wholly or partially restricted ("contracts in
restraint of trade"), and combinations or conspiracies intended to keep
those outside the group out of the business ("combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade").24 But, Holmes believed, the Sherman Act
did not extend to "the union of former competitors."2 44 Indeed, he said,
"It was the ferocious extreme of competition with others, not the cessa245
tion of competition among the partners, that was the evil feared.
Holmes's view of the Sherman Act expressed in his Northern Securities
dissent was to have little influence on the subsequent development of
antitrust doctrine.246 But the somewhat mixed enthusiasm for competition reflected in that opinion may help to explain Holmes's particular
articulation of the relevant Sherman Act standard and his reasoning in
rejecting the vagueness challenge made in Nash.24
242

Id. at 407.

See id. at 403-04. Holmes declared that § 2 of the Sherman Act, banning
monopolization, merely sought to make criminal the latter type of conduct when done
by a single person rather than by a group. See id. at 404. For criticism that Holmes's
account of common law doctrine was seriously distorted, see W. LETWIN, supra note 2,
at 233.
244 Northern Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 405.
243

Id.
"I See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and

245

Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 811, 814 (1965).
217 It has been suggested that the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases actually established a less vague standard of Sherman Act interpretation, one more exclusively focused on the question of whether particular conduct on balance did or did not
reduce competition in the general market and less concerned with questions of degree,
than might be suggested by the Court's discussion in Nash. See, e.g., Bork, supra note
246, at 801-05. Although, since Nash, no court has seriously questioned the Sherman
Act's constitutionality, the generality of the statute has led some modern commentators
to suggest that early vagueness objections were "not. . . without some merit" and were
rejected only through "some convoluted reasoning" by the Court. See 1 E. KiNTNER,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 5.14, at 284 (1980). Vulnerability of the Sherman Act to
such an assault has been limited over the years by an enforcement policy restricting
criminal prosecutions to types of conduct long established as unlawful under the Act,
see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 439-40 & n.15 (1978)
(describing Department of Justice enforcement policy), and by the judicial doctrine that
defendants have standing to object to a statute's vagueness only as applied to them, at
least where first amendment overbreadth considerations are not implicated. See, e.g.,
Note, supra note 222, at 102-04. Potential vagueness problems also have been mitigated by the Supreme Court's decision in Gypsum, in which the Court declared that
intent must be considered a necessary element of a criminal antitrust violation and that,
specifically, a defendant's challenged conduct must be "undertaken with knowledge of
its probable consequences and hav[e] the requisite anticompetitive effects," Gypsum,
438 U.S. at 444, or be "undertaken with the purpose of producing anticompetitive
effects . . . even if such effects [do] not come to pass." Id. at 444 n.21.
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A year later, in InternationalHarvester Co. of America v. Kentucky,24 8 Justice Holmes had occasion to explain further the Court's
holding in Nash in the course of evaluating another antitrust defendant's claim of unconstitutional vagueness. The treatment of that defendant's claim in the state court and in the United States Supreme Court
suggests a great deal about not only the constitutional but also the economic theories of the period. The relative lack of attention that has
been paid to these opinions and to the themes they suggest is notable,
for it seems to reflect a significant, more general characteristic of recent
antitrust historical writing.
At issue in InternationalHarvesterwas a liability standard established as a result of the Kentucky courts' efforts to save state antitrust
249
legislation threatened by the Supreme Court's decision in Connolly.
An 1890 Kentucky statute had prohibited collective price fixing and
output limitations.2 50 This statute remained in force despite the adoption the following year of a new state constitution that directed the general assembly
from time to time, as necessity may require, to enact such
laws as may be necessary to prevent all trusts, pools, combinations or other organizations, from combining to depreciate
below its real value any article, or to enhance the cost of any
article above its real value.2 51
Fifteen years later, in March of 1906, the state general assembly enacted a cooperative marketing act allowing farmers to pool their produce to get a better price than would be possible through individual,
234 U.S. 216 (1914).
For a discussion of Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902),
overruled in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940), see supra notes 136-56 and
accompanying text.
250 See Act of May 20, 1890, ch. 1621, 1889-1890 Ky. AcTS 143 (codified at the
time at Ky. STAT. §§ 3915-3917 (Carroll 1894)) (providing that violations could be
punished by imprisonment, by a fine of not less than $500 and not more than $5000,
the exact amount left to the jury's discretion, or by both fine and imprisonment); see
also InternationalHarvester, 234 U.S. at 220 (construing statute); American Seeding
Mach. Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Ky. 589, 592, 153 S.W. 972, 974 (1913) (same),
rev'd, 236 U.S. 660 (1915). In the course of litigation concerning the statute, the Kentucky Court of Appeals declared that each sale in violation of these sections constituted
a separate offense. Therefore, the same company could be prosecuted separately in several counties on the basis of the unlawful sales within each of those jurisdictions. The
court, however, did mitigate the potential impact of its "separate offense" interpretation
by declaring that each county would be allowed "one prosecution . . . for the period
covered by the indictment," leaving each county free to bring subsequent prosecutions if
the defendant later committed the offense again. See International Harvester Co. of
Am. v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 403, 413-14, 138 S.W. 248, 252-53 (1911) (Logan
County).
251 Ky. CONST. § 198 (1891).
248

24
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competing sales efforts. 52 That act was buttressed two years thereafter
by another statute authorizing injunctive relief and fines if a participating farmer violated a cooperative marketing agreement. 25 3 Such special
relief for farmers encountered the spectre of Connolly, however, and
soon was challenged on such equal protection grounds, as well as on
grounds of alleged conflict with the state constitutional provision just
quoted.2 54 To avoid invalidation of the state statutes, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals devised an ingenious interpretation of their meaning,
ostensibly removing their discriminatory impact in favor of farmers and
confining their operations within state constitutional bounds. But the
court's rescue of the state's antimonopoly legislation established only a
short-lived victory, for those very same rescue techniques became the
basis of the condemnation of the state legislation on due process
grounds when reviewed by the United States Supreme Court several
years later.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals conceded that discriminatory legislation aiding only farmers would be unconstitutional. 5 5 The court
noted, however, that the language of the 1906 cooperative marketing
act did not expressly declare that the statute applied only to the agricultural producers actually mentioned in the legislation. 56 Accordingly,
the court declared that the state statute would be interpreted to confer
cooperative marketing privileges equally on all persons in the state,

thus negating any possible equal protection problems.2 57
252 Act of March 21, 1906, ch. 117, 1906 Ky. AcTS 429 (codified at the time, as
amended, at Ky. STAT. § 3941a (Carroll 1908)), invalidated in InternationalHarvester, 234 U.S. at 220, 223. The Kentucky Court of Appeals declared the statute void
in Gay v. Brent, 166 Ky. 833, 849, 179 S.W. 1051, 1058 (1915).
252 Act of March 13, 1908, ch. 8, 1908 Ky. Ac-rs 38 (amending Act of March 21,
1906, supra note 252) (codified at the time in Ky. STAT. § 3941a (Carroll 1908)),
invalidated in InternationalHarvester,234 U.S. at 221, 223. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals declared this statute void in Gay, 166 Ky. at 849, 179 S.W. at 1058.
25 See, e.g., Owen County Burley Tobacco Soc'y v. Brumback, 128 Ky. 137, 14850, 107 S.W. 710, 713-14 (1908). The act also was challenged, see id. at 145, 107 S.W.
at 712-13, as a violation of § 3 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights, which provided that "no
grant of exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any...
set of men, except in consideration of public services." Ky. CONST. § 3 (1891).
255 See Owen County, 128 Ky. at 147, 107 S.W. at 713; see also Commonwealth
v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 131 Ky. 551, 571-72, 115 S.W. 703, 710 (1909)
(Hardin County), overruled, Gay, 166 Ky. at 849, 179 S.W. at 1058.
251 See Owen County, 128 Ky. at 147, 107 S.W. at 713; see also International
Harvester (Hardin County), 131 Ky. at 571-72, 115 S.W. at 709, 710.
257 InternationalHarvester (Hardin County), 131 Ky. at 571-73, 115 S.W. at
710. The court went on to declare that the same result would be reached even if such a
view of legislative intent could not be maintained. The attempted discrimination in
favor of farmers, the court reasoned, would be eliminated automaticallyby action of the
fourteenth amendment, which would not operate to void the statute granting benefits to
some but instead would extend the statute's coverage to bring the disfavored up to the
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But what, then, would be left of the state's 1890 ban on price
fixing and the state constitution's declared public policy against collusive price tampering? The Kentucky court's answer was that the cooperative marketing act did not, and constitutionally could not, permit
collective action to enhance or decrease prices without limit or in all
circumstances. Specifically, the court declared that the 1891 state constitution prohibited the legislature from authorizing collective private
action "to enhance the cost of any article, above its real value" or to
depress the price below that level.258 Thus, the cooperative marketing
legislation, as now interpreted to apply equally to all persons in the
state, would allow combinations to affect price, but only insofar as they
kept within these same guidelines. Hence, cooperative action by farmers, for example, to raise abnormally and unfairly depressed prices up
to the "real value" of their produce would be legal, whereas action to
215
raise prices above that level would not be.
State antitrust defendants quickly charged that this judicially formulated standard of liability was so vague and uncertain that it violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In response, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals explained that "real value" meant market
value "under fair competition, and under normal market conditions"26 0
and dismissed such vagueness contentions. 261 In 1914, however, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the state court and upheld the
vagueness challenge of a frequently sued state defendant, the recently
2 62
formed International Harvester Company of America.
level of the favored class. As a supporting analogy for its view of constitutional theory,
the court cited a recent United States Supreme Court case in which a West Virginia
statute making only white males eligible for jury service was extended to blacks by
force of the fourteenth amendment. See id. (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879)).
25
See Owen County, 128 Ky. at 151, 107 S.W. at 714 (emphasis added); see also
InternationalHarvester (Hardin County), 131 Ky. at 568-69, 115 S.W. at 709 (emphasis added).
'59 See Owen County, 128 Ky. at 151, 107 S.W. at 714; see also International
Harvester (Hardin County), 131 Ky. at 571, 115 S.W. at 709.
s60 International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 Ky. 564, 566, 144
S.W. 1064, 1065 (1912) (Bullitt County), rev'd, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
261 See, e.g., American Seeding Mach. Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Ky. 589, 153
S.W. 972 (1913), rev'd, 236 U.S. 660 (1915); International Harvester Co. of Am. v.
Commonwealth, 137 Ky. 668, 126 S.W. 352 (1910) (Logan County); Commonwealth
v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 131 Ky. 551, 115 S.W. 703 (1909) (Hardin
County), overruled, Gay, 166 Ky. at 849, 179 S.W. at 1058.
262 See International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
The company had been formed in 1902 through a combination of competing manufacturers of agricultural machinery. See International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 403, 406-07, 138 S.W. 248, 250 (1911) (Logan County). At least five
separate antitrust prosecutions were brought against the company in the Kentucky
courts, based on allegedly illegal sales in as many counties. See International Harvester
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The Supreme Court, per Justice Holmes, distinguished the Kentucky standard, as formulated and explained by the state court, from
the federal antitrust standard approved the prior year in Nash. 63
Under the federal standard, said Holmes, a company might be forced to
predict whether the result of its actions would be deemed an undue
restraint of trade in the eyes of a jury later examining those actions-a
matter of degree evaluated in the context of actual market conditions at
the time of the contemplated or undertaken action.2 ' But such "conditions are as permanent as anything human, and a great body of precedents on the civil side coupled with familiar practice make it comparatively easy for common sense to keep to what is safe." ' 5 In contrast,
Holmes declared, the Kentucky "normal market," real value standard
demanded a much more difficult and much more hypothetical calculation concerning market conditions both real and imagined. It required
the actor to guess at its peril, "what would have been the price in an
imaginary world,"26 a world in which the challenged "combination
had not existed and nothing else violently affecting values had occurred. 267 Value, said Holmes, is merely "the effect in exchange of the
relative social desire for compared objects expressed in terms of a common denominator."2 ' Value and price thus are determined by the relative intensity of community desire for various goods and services. But
such desires, reflected in buyers' comparative willingness to pay, are
subject to constant change as external factors shift. Thus, said Holmes,
To compel [potential antitrust defendants] to guess, on peril
Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 148 Ky. 572, 572, 147 S.W. 1199, 1199 (1912) (mem.)
(Grayson County; affirming judgment imposing $1500 fine), rev'd, 234 U.S. 216
(1914); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 Ky. 795, 796, 146
S.W. 12, 13 (1912) (Todd County; affirming judgment imposing $2500 fine), rev'd,
234 U.S. 216 (1914); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 Ky.
564, 564-65, 144 S.W. 1064, 1065 (1912) (Bullitt County; affirming judgment imposing $5000 fine), rev'd, 234 U.S. 216 (1914); International Harvester Co. of Am. v.
Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 403, 405, 138 S.W. 248, 249 (1911) (Logan County; reversing judgment imposing $500 fine); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Common-

wealth, 137 Ky. 668, 670, 126 S.W. 352, 352-53 (1910) (Logan County; reversing
judgment imposing $2200 fine); Commonwealth v. International Harvester Co. of Am.,
131 Ky. 551, 551, 115 S.W. 703, 705 (1909) (Hardin County; affirming lower court
dismissal of an indictment of International Harvester for violating Kentucky antitrust
laws), overruled, Gay v. Brent, 166 Ky. 833, 179 S.W. 1051 (1915).
"68 For a discussion of Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913), see supra
notes 230-47 and accompanying text.
2" See InternationalHarvester, 234 U.S. at 223.
265 Id. It seems clear that by his reference here to "conditions," Holmes had in
mind actual prevailing market conditions and not, as Judge Bork contends, "the principles of economics." R. BORK, supra note 2, at 75.
"I1InternationalHarvester, 234 U.S. at 222.
267 Id.
268 Id.
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of indictment, what the community would have given for
[their wares] if the continually changing conditions were
other than they are, to an uncertain extent; to divine prophetically what the reaction of only partially determinate
facts would be upon the imaginations and desires of purchas269
ers, is to exact gifts that mankind does not possess.
Accordingly, he declared the state standard unconstitutionally void for
270
vagueness.
Recent commentary groups InternationalHarvester with subsequent Supreme Court cases, in particular United States v. Cohen Grocery Co. 271 and Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 27 2 that addressed other economic regulations purportedly raising analogous vagueness issues. In its
1921 decision in Cohen Grocery, the Supreme Court held invalid under
the fifth and sixth amendments a federal criminal statute that declared
it "unlawful for any person willfully. . . to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries; to conspire, combine, agree, or arrange with any other person
(e) to exact excessive prices for any necessaries. 2 71 Six years later,
in Cline, the Court struck down Colorado antitrust legislation 4 that
exempted anticompetitive combinations where they merely sought to
sell at a "reasonable profit" goods that could not generate such a level
Id. at 223-24.
Justices McKenna and Pitney dissented without written opinion. In explaining
his opinion for the Court, Justice Holmes also repeatedly attacked the Kentucky statute
as pro-farmer legislation applied unevenly in litigation to the disadvantage of business
interests. Thus, Holmes charged, "The result seems to be that combinations of tobacco
growers are held to do no more than restore an equilibrium that has been disturbed by
a combination of buyers whereas if prices rise after a combination of manufacturers it
very nearly is presumed that the advance is above the real value and that there is a
crime." Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
The leading article on the Supreme Court's treatment of vagueness issues concludes that such concerns played an important role in the Court's decision, as did a
more general conservative economic philosophy. See Note, supra note 222, at 74 &
n.38, 75 & n.39, 77. Anthony Amsterdam, the Note's author, particularly stresses the
wider impact of economic conservatism in the Court's early vagueness opinions, declaring, "The void-for-vagueness doctrine was born in the reign of substantive due process
and throughout that epoch was successfully urged exclusively in cases involving regulatory or economic-control legislation. Vagueness contentions in free speech cases received
short shrift at that time." Id. at 74 n.38 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
26,

270

271

272

255 U.S. 81 (1921).
274 U.S. 445 (1927).

278 Cohen Grocery, 255 U.S. at 86 (citing Lever Act, ch. 53, § 4, 40 Stat. 276,
277 (1917), amended by Food Control and the District of Columbia Rents Act, ch. 80,
§ 2, 41 Stat. 297, 298 (1919)) (emphasis added).
274 Colorado Antitrust Act, ch. 161, 1913 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, invalidated in

Cline, 274 U.S. at 453-65.
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of return if otherwise marketed.2 75
Judge Bork, for example, sees all three cases as involving essentially the same type of liability standard, a standard also considered in
other early antitrust contexts and one that Judge Bork believes raises
the most fundamental questions of appropriate antitrust policy and judicial role.278 In Judge Bork's view, the statutory tests in these three
cases all embodied an approach akin to the rejected "reasonable-price"
defense to price fixing277 and "very similar to" the open-ended balancing of multiple subjective preferences and sympathies, the arbitrary mediation between the interests of consumers and producers" 8 that he asserts was advocated, for example, by Justice Brandeis in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States 7 9 and by Judge Learned Hand in
later antitrust opinions. 280 Such approaches he condemns as simply
punishing whatever acts a court or jury might choose to find unjust and
unreasonable.281
Judge Bork declares that the reason early antitrust courts "necessarily" rejected a "reasonable-price" defense for cartel behavior and instead developed a rule of per se illegality was because they realized that
what he terms a "complete consumer welfare stance"2 82 offered "the
only available firm criterion for deciding cases" other than blanket approval for all cartels. 28 3 Similarly, he explains Holmes's opinion in InternationalHarvesteras a recognition that for "a 'real value' test,...
like a reasonable-price test, there are no standards."' ' The essential
equivalence of these latter two tests in Judge Bork's mind is made
strikingly apparent two pages later in his discussion when he directly
describes InternationalHarvesteritself as a case that involved a statute
expressly requiring "so uncertain a test" as whether prices are
reasonable.
275
276
277

278
27,

280
281

285

See Cline, 274 U.S. at 456 (emphasis added).
See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 74-77.

See, e.g., id. at 24, 73, 75.

See id. at 75.
246 U.S. 231 (1918); see R. BORK, supra note 2, at 41-47, 75, 76.

See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 51-53, 75, 76.

See id. at 76 (quoting United States v. Cohen Grocery, 255 U.S. 81, 89

(1921)).

282 Judge Bork later articulates more precisely the centrality of allocative efficiency theory to his vision of such a "complete consumer welfare stance" when he
declares that the sole aim of antitrust is to enhance allocative efficiency without harming productive efficiency so severely "as to produce either no gain or a net loss in
consumer welfare." R. BORK, supra note 2, at 91. Antitrust, he says, is not appropriately concerned with questions of wealth distribution. See id. at 90.
288
284
285

Id. at 73.
Id. at 75.

Id. at 77 (adopting language from United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273

U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927)).
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Judge Bork's discussion suggests important historical questions
that he never fully addresses. If early antitrust courts "necessarily" rejected the reasonable-price defense proffered by cartel defendants, by
what process of reasoning was the Kentucky Court of Appeals able to
justify its consistent rejection of the vagueness attacks mounted against
a statutory test Judge Bork sees as essentially equivalent to the reasonable-price defense? If the act's unconstitutional uncertainty was so indisputably patent, why was Holmes's perception of the Kentucky statute not shared unanimously even among the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court?
Examination of the Kentucky cases themselves suggests that an
important part of the answer may be found in a contemporary influence on judicial thought not discussed in leading recent accounts of the
28
antitrust philosophy of early twentieth century American judges.

6

Specifically, the Kentucky opinions indicate that judges in that state
found a "normal market," "real value" standard not unduly vague in
significant part because those earlier jurists consciously or unconsciously operated within the boundaries of a still powerful overall theoretical conception of the economy within which notions of "real value"
had greater apparent certainty and tangible meaning than they have for
a judge today operating within the context of a very different model of
economic life. In addition, those same Kentucky opinions further suggest that the practicability problems necessarily posed by that state's
standard, as it actually was delineated by the state court, may have
been significantly less severe than indicated by either Justice Holmes or
Judge Bork and that the standard's condemnation in 1914 reflected in
part Holmes's implicit rejection of the overall conception of economic
life within which the test seemed most plausible.
How pervasive and how significant is the absence of modern discussion of such an influence on early judicial antitrust thinking? And
what evidence is there to support the differing interpretation proposed
here?
B.

Recent Commentary on the Development of Early Antitrust
Jurisprudence

Consider first the way in which leading recent commentary treats
the influence of pre-twentieth century economic theory in general.2 7"
Probably the two most highly acclaimed books of the last ten years
See infra notes 287-330 and accompanying text.
Earlier leading works take an approach similar to that of the recent scholarship highlighted here. See infra note 466.
286

187
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exploring the antitrust thought of late nineteenth and early twentieth
century judges are Judge Bork's landmark study, The Antitrust Paradox,28 8 published in 1978, and Thomas K. McCraw's masterful 1984
book, Prophets of Regulation,28 9 reviewing American regulatory
thought since the 1870's and setting forth a careful and detailed examination of the antitrust philosophy of Louis D. Brandeis, focusing primarily on the period before his elevation to the Supreme Court bench.
How do each of these works treat the influence of nineteenth century
theory?
Throughout his discussion of early antitrust jurisprudence, Judge
Bork deals with the impact of contemporary overarching theories of economic reality primarily by denying their existence. It is not that Judge
Bork underplays the independent power of ideas as a general matter.
Indeed, a central theme of his work is the continuing power of assertedly misguided intellectual approaches established in the formative
early decades of antitrust ideology, following passage of the Sherman
Act:
[T]he ideology remains, and its inner logic drives the antitrust enterprise-lawyers, economists, judges, and legislators-inexorably toward the conclusions implicit in the
premises. . . . In all kinds of political weather the machinery of antitrust enforcement grinds steadily on, mindlessly
reproducing both the policy triumphs and disasters of the
past. Even when public and political enthusiasm for the harassment of business is at an ebb, the enforcement bureaucracy and the residual potency of the antitrust symbol remain strong enough to prevent the law's mistakes from being
2 90
retracted.
At the very beginning of Chapter One of his study, Judge Bork relates
the value of historical inquiry into early antitrust thinking to the modem power of the approaches established in the formative years. "One of
the uses of history is to free us of a falsely imagined past," he declares,
for "[t]he less we know of how ideas actually took root and grew, the
more apt we are to accept them unquestioningly, as inevitable features
of the world in which we move."29 1 Only by such historical understanding, he urges, can we free ourselves from old misguided notions
and fully embrace modern scientific microeconomic theory, which, he
2 R.

BORK,

supra note 2.

289 T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984).

ago R. BORK, supra note 2, at 4.
29 Id. at 15.
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asserts, is the only basis for rational antitrust policy. 2 92

But if a critical task is to more truly understand the past, how
should we explain the initial establishment of the antitrust approaches
that Judge Bork finds objectionable and that he feels have had such
undeserved power ever since? Why did judges in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries follow the paths that they did? Judge
Bork suggests a number of possibilities. As noted already, he concludes
that judges rejecting a "reasonable-price" defense were driven by a fundamental need for firm standards to guide principled judicial action.293
In other instances, Judge Bork indicates, Justices established additional
important approaches because of their strong concern for the welfare of
consumers.2" 4 But, at other times, certain Justices followed less completely "pro-consumer" paths either because their personal sympathies
for the welfare of small producers or traders led them to endorse a
"political" tradeoff of consumer versus producer interests 29 5 or simply
because those Justices were confused about the facts of a case before
them or neglected to analyze the issues raised with sufficient logical
rigor. " 6 Prominent among possible influences not stressed, however, is
the continuing intellectual power of economic analyses and approaches
established prior to the 1890 passage of the Sherman Act. Judge Bork
does note one source potentially incorporating influential earlier ideas
but minimizes its independent intellectual power in early antitrust jurisprudence, concluding that early Justices either explicitly departed
from common law precedent 9 7 or covertly did so by way of creative
reinterpretation. " 8
Judge Bork's treatment of the possible influence of nineteenth century theories of the economy as a whole is even more striking than his
minimal discussion of the possible continuing impact of earlier particularized economic analyses. In a work designed in large measure to contrast the scientific, disciplined nature of the modem antitrust economic
philosophy endorsed by its author2 ' with early antitrust approaches at
variance with that philosophy, Judge Bork does not simply criticize
those differing approaches as resting on a less adequate, rigorous, or
otherwise less satisfactory overall economic theory. Rather, he contends
See, e.g., id. at 8.
'13 See, e.g., id. at 23, 27, 73-77.
'" See, e.g., id. at 22-24, 27-30, 36.
5 See, e.g., id. at 24, 25, 41, 46, 47. Judge Bork labels such a tradeoff a "political" one on the ground that, in his view, no principles exist to guide it. See id. at 24.
'" See, e.g., id. at 30, 33, 35.
iga

97 See, e.g., id. at 22-23, 36.
'95 See, e.g., id. at 27.
99 See id. at 8.
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that no guiding economic theory was available when the antitrust approaches he dislikes were first established. Thus, in speaking of such
early developments, Judge Bork explains:
Law tends to arrive at basic answers before the right
questions have been asked. Disputes that must be decided
arise before there is a theory to handle them, so that the
participants in the litigation often do not perceive the implications of a decision either way. By the time the real question is perceived, if it ever is, an answer has not only been
given but has become dogma, and it is too late.3 00
The possibility that the architects of some of the criticized early approaches might have acted as they did partly because of the guiding
influence of an overall economic theory, albeit one rather different from
Judge Bork's, receives no mention, perhaps because Judge Bork believes that an economic model substantially different from the one at
the heart of modern antitrust economics30 1 should not be dignified by
designation as a real theory. But a body of particularized ideas takes on
added power when given larger meaning because of the overall context
supplied by a unifying set of fundamental principles or by a fundamental explanatory model. For that reason, it seems appropriate to consider
and refer to such a set of unifying principles or explanatory model as a
real theory, however lacking in modern intellectual appeal, precisely
because such terminology emphasizes the heightened intellectual power
that such a body of ideas may wield.
Before exploring directly the nature of nineteenth century economic theories as thus defined and their possible influence on early
antitrust analysis, consider first the treatment of theory in the second of
the two leading studies previously cited, Thomas McCraw's Prophets
of Regulation. Professor McCraw's innovative work provocatively
probes major aspects of American regulatory thought and activity since
the 1870's through extended discussions of four important regulatory
activists302 and essays examining more general aspects of economic history and regulatory development.3 08 His book provides a more complex
300 Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
301 For a description of the underlying model central to Judge Bork's approach,
see id. at 107-15.
aa' The four individuals discussed are Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. Brandeis,
James M. Landis, and Alfred E. Kahn. See T. MCCRAW, supra note 289.
303 Professor McCraw draws on a remarkably wide range of published and unpublished materials and stresses especially what he refers to as "the new research,"
particularly the contributions of Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., in discussing late nineteenth
and early twentieth century economic developments. See id. at 74.
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and detailed picture of the influences shaping late nineteenth and early
twentieth century antitrust thinking than appears in Judge Bork's
study, and he takes a somewhat more sympathetic view of the early
theorists whose economic analyses he finds deficient.
McCraw believes that many factors have helped to shape regulatory activity over the last 100 years and highlights particularly, although by no means exclusively, the influence of certain dynamic individuals.3 '" At the same time, however, Professor McCraw, like Judge
Bork, also clearly affirms the substantial power of ideas.3 05 McCraw
moves further than Judge Bork towards a discussion of the possible
impact of late nineteenth century economic theories and explanatory
models. Yet he, too, ultimately fails to pursue the possibility that any
pervasive contemporary conceptions of the economy as a whole might
have influenced significantly either regulatory thought in general or the
specific economic analyses of the early antitrust theorist that he spotlights as the "patron saint of the whole regulatory tradition" 8 ' and the
"most influential critic of trusts during his generation,"3 0 7 Louis D.
Brandeis.
McCraw notes the frequent recurrence of certain major themes in
the thinking of late nineteenth century Americans concerned about the
rapid and dramatic economic changes occurring around them. "In the
early years of industrialization," he relates, "the trusts seemed to be
mysterious mutations, the consequences of some evil tampering with the
natural order of things.

3 0° 8

But McCraw does not go on to suggest

what power such "natural" imagery may have had; nor does he explore
whether any systematic vision of a natural order supported some Americans' condemnation of the new aberrations or offered any guidance for
remedial action. On the contrary, in noting the pervasiveness of the
sense of "unnaturalness," he stresses the paucity of cultural and intellectual resources available to help give meaning or guide response:
[T]he central assumption shared by most contemporary critics was simply that trusts were unnatural, the bastard off304 See, e.g., id. at viii (declaring that "[i]ndividual regulators dearly made an
enormous difference"); see also id. at ix, 303.
305 Thus, for example, while he stresses that ideas alone are not determinative of
concrete historical developments, see id. at 304, he quotes approvingly the assessment
offered by James Q. Wilson, declaring, in part, that an agency's actions are "importantly shaped by what its executives learned in college a decade or two earlier." Id. at
303 (quoting Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE PoLrIcs OF REGULATION
393 (J. Wilson ed. 1980)).
3o T. MCGRAW, supra note 289, at ix.
307 Id. at 82.
308 Id. at 77.
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springs of unscrupulous promoters. Without the benefit of
experience and of a [modem scientific economic] vocabulary
that could clarify important distinctions in the business
revolution-center firms compared with peripheral, productive efficiency compared with allocative, vertical integration
compared with horizontal, and so on-those observers had
only their personalsensibilities and traditional political ideologies to guide them.8 09
McGraw believes that such personal sensibilities and political viewpoints sometimes guided observers into error and unfortunate policy decisions.3 10 But the key point to note here is that McGraw does not simply assert that Americans of the period lacked a sufficiently
sophisticated and well-developed economic theory; for in a concluding
chapter, he stresses that incorrect as well as correct economic ideas have
marked power to guide understanding and action, citing for example,
the impact Brandeis's "flawed" notions of competition had on the contemporary American public."' In specifying an exhaustive, albeit short,
list of intellectual resources available to guide anxious Americans
alarmed by new economic arrangements, McGraw is not simply saying
that established economic theory offered poor or misdirected guidance,
but instead that no overall economic model or theory was available to
offer any guidance at all.
McCraw's fascinating and much more detailed exploration of the
antitrust thinking of Louis D. Brandeis ultimately reaches the same
conclusion. Repeatedly stressing the consistency with which Brandeis
condemned industrial "bigness" as unnatural 3 12 McGraw declares that
the "absence of an adequate framework of economic theory"3 did not
simply cause theoretical guidance to be limited or improperly focused.
Rather, it meant that Brandeis, like others, "had only his personal and
'31
political sensibilities to guide him. "
For decades prior to his ascension to the United States Supreme
Court, Brandeis not only commented on particular economic practices
such as resale price maintenance 81 5 but also articulated an explanatory
theory for major contemporary developments throughout the economy
50 Id. at 78 (the word "unnatural" emphasized in original, all other emphasis
added).
310 See, e.g., id. at 84, 94.
811 See id. at 304.
I1" See, e.g., id. at 104, 108, 138.
818 Id. at 108.
"14 Id. (emphasis added).
Si, See, e.g., id. at 101-05.
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as a whole."' 6 While McCraw finds Brandeis's broader perspectives
very insightful in important respects,31 " he criticizes him for not going
further and reaching a crucial insight illuminated by later researchers,
particularly modern business historians. The key point Brandeis
missed, says McCraw, was that while in all fields tighter forms of combination were attempted, their potential success ultimately depended on
the technological and managerial limitations and possibilities uniquely
inherent in each particular industry. In some industries, large, tight
combinations had tremendous potential; in others, they were bound to
fail under the pressure of competition. 8 Appalled by "bigness" and
witnessing the failures among the trusts, Brandeis "too simply" inferred that bigness was inefficient as a general matter and failed to
undertake a deeper, empirical investigation of the specific conditions
and developments in various particular industries.3 1 Positing a single
"bigness"-based explanatory model for problems throughout the economy as a whole led Brandeis into serious policy misjudgments because
it "doomed to superficiality both his diagnosis and his prescription." 32 0
"Irresistably" and repeatedly, says McCraw, such a perspective forced
Brandeis to condemn efficient new forms of large business organization
and sacrifice the interests of consumers for the sake of small business
3 21

welfare.

816 McCraw reveals, for example, how, as early as the 1890's, Brandeis set forth
an overall picture of the sequential historical evolution of four basic types of combinations, from informal cartels to full-blown mergers, described the relative merits or
problems of each type of arrangement and offered a theory to explain the historical
pattern toward tighter combinations that allowed him to assert the unnaturalness of
this development in spite of its pervasiveness. Brandeis stressed, for example, the powerful effect of certain misguided legal rules. See, e.g., id. at 95-97, 104. The larger
picture of Brandeis's theoretical view should be noted in connection with McCraw's
comments here. In particular, one should note Brandeis's persistent tendency to rely on
a small number of "artificial" influences to explain the persistence of business "bigness" despite its asserted foreignness to a believed natural economic order shaped by the
operation of natural economic laws. See infra note 375.
317 See T. McCRAw,supra note 289, at 97.
818 See, e.g., id. at 74-77, 97-99. McCraw particularly stresses the distinction between two basic types of industries, characterized by the presence, respectively, of
"center" or "peripheral" firms. Tighter forms of combination, he reports, offered tremendous opportunities in capital-intensive, technologically advanced "center" industries, such as oil, sugar refining, or steel, where substantial cost savings could be
achieved through scale economies, vertical integration, and more complex managerial
structures. Conversely, in labor-intensive "peripheral" industries, where no major scale
economies were available, larger size proved to be disadvantageous and the larger combinations that were attempted frequently fell victim to competition from new entrants.
See id. at 72-77, 97-99.
319 See id. at 99, 139, 140.
820 Id. at 141.
821 See, e.g., id. at 141. McCraw particularly points to Brandeis's condemnation
of vertical integration and approval of resale price maintenance and cartels protecting
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McGraw briefly notes in passing that contemporary Americans in
general tended toward "monocausal" explanations of the major economic changes of their period 22 and concedes that economic observers
of the time rather uniformly failed to reach the key insight that Brandeis missed.3 2 But McGraw feels that such a long-time, influential
critic and analyst of trusts as Brandeis, somehow should have done better.3 21 McCraw attributes Brandeis's failure to the strength of his political values3

25

and to a preference for effective "sloganeering" '

26

3 27

and

clever lawyer's tricks over careful analysis.
McGraw almost goes on to explore an additional factor that may
have influenced or supported the intellectual orientation of Brandeis
and his contemporaries, but ultimately McGraw stops short. In a tantalizing passage, he notes briefly that turn-of-the-century Americans lived
in a different intellectual universe than the economic analysts of the
1980's. But he raises the point simply as a reason to moderate criticism
of earlier Americans' analytical deficiencies and not as an acknowledgement that it might be illuminating to explore contemporary structures
of thought on their own terms or to consider the power such structures
might have had in their own time. McGraw cautions that in applying
the "new economic vocabulary," based on enormous research efforts by
twentieth century economics and business administration scholars,
we are something like modern astronomers studying the preCopernican theories of Aristotle or Ptolemy. That is, we are
testing the assumptions and insights of an earlier generation
of observers through the use of methods developed in a subsmall businesses. See id. at 101, 141.
82

See id. at 139. But see id. at 114 (emphasis added) (referring to the "Brandei-

sian tendency to lump all modem industrial ills together and seek one common cause
for them").
828 See id. at 101 (noting, parenthetically, that Brandeis was joined in his inability
to grasp basic economic distinctions by "most of his contemporaries"), 96-97 (noting
Brandeis's failure to note various economic effects of horizontal combinations in
"center" industries, but conceding that, in Brandeis's time, such "long-term economic
effects were difficult to foresee"). McCraw notes, however, that some perceptive, pioneering economic analysts and journalists of the period realized much more clearly that
the benefits and dangers of large-scale operation varied by industry. See id. at 139-40.
324 For example, McCraw accuses Brandeis of an "almost willful refusal to rethink the trust problem." Id. at 94. Also, McCraw marks Brandeis as a symbol for
"one of the characteristic shortcomings of the American regulatory tradition: a disinclination to persist in hard economic analysis that may lead away from strong political
preference." Id. at 142.
828 See, e.g., id. at 106, 108, 142; see also supra text accompanying note 314.
826 See T. McCRAw, supra note 289, at 94.
327 See, e.g., id. at 84, 86, 87, 94, 136, 137. McCraw finds the intensity of Brandeis's political beliefs, his characterization of large-scale business as unnatural, and his
litigator's orientation all to have been interrelated. See id. at 138.
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sequent scientific revolution to which they had no access. Although it may seem unfair to judge early twentieth century
observers by standards of economic reasoning they themselves did not fully comprehend, that price must be paid in
return for our own understanding of the trust question.3 28
But if modern economic analysts stand in relation to their turn-ofthe-century counterparts in a way analogous to the relation of modern
to earlier astronomers, might not the analogy be pursued further? If the
particular approaches and explanations of earlier astronomers were influenced substantially by the overall explanatory model of the physical
universe that they accepted, 29 might it not be worth considering
whether earlier antitrust analysts, including judges, might have been
influenced by overall explanatory models of the economic universe in
which they believed?
Antitrust historians repeatedly have noted the minimal direct role
professional economists played in the early antitrust deliberations of
Congress and the courts.330 Recognition of that fact, however, still
leaves an important question regarding the extent to which Americans
other than professional economists were concerned with or influenced
by broad explanatory theories or overall "paradigms," however simple,
prior to World War I. To suggest that early antitrust judges operated
within an intellectual near-vacuum filled only by naked political preferences and "personal sensibilities" would appear to paint a somewhat
incomplete picture, given the nature of contemporary thought in
general.
C.

Economic Theory in the Formative Era

If there have been periods in American cultural and intellectual
life when sweeping, overarching theoretical conceptions of major areas
of human thought and activity were in disfavor, the period of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries certainly was not one of
328 Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added). Although McGraw goes on to note the need to
examine "the contemporaneous view" as well as modern perspectives, see id. at 69, he
never goes on to explore larger visions of the economy as a whole as part of that "contemporaneous view."
329 See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d
ed. 1970) (the seminal work on the power of paradigms in scientific work and
development).
330 See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 200; W. LETWIN, supra note 2,
at 77; H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 120-21, 567; Lande, supra note 2, at 88-89 &
n.98; Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. Rv. 1, 3,
6 (1982), reprinted in G. STIGLER, THE ECONOMIST AS PREACHER, AND OTHER EsSAYS 41-42, 46-47 (1982).
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them.8"' Indeed, scholarly and popular fascination with grand social
and economic theory seems to have increased greatly during this period
as Americans sought fervently to find understanding and ultimate
meaning in the midst of the profound social and economic changes rapidly occurring around them. 3 2
In significant particulars, contemporary theory displayed striking
heterogeneity. Intensely felt differences were articulated by proponents
of such popular ideologies as Spencerian Social Darwinism, the Protestant Social Gospel, Andrew Carnegie's Gospel of Wealth, Henry
George's "Single Tax" doctrine, Edward Bellamy's Cooperative Utopianism, and various other forms of Christian or Marxist socialism, as
well as by followers of popular and scholarly versions of "new school"
333
economics or more traditional forms of classical economic theory.
Yet, in the midst of such diversity, contemporary American social and
economic theories often continued to share important common characteristics reflecting powerful tendencies in American intellectual thought
prior to World War I. Among the general conceptual approaches followed in this period, some remained particularly powerful outside academic circles and seem particularly likely to have colored contemporary
judicial perceptions of noncompetitive behavior and effective remedies
for it.
Perhaps the single most prominent feature of much of contemporary theory was its highly deductive character. Despite increasing academic criticism of such an orientation,3 ' scholarly and popular theo381 For important surveys of the varieties of late nineteenth and early twentieth
century social and intellectual theory, see R. BANNISTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM: SCIENCE AND MYTH IN ANGLO-AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1979); P. BOLLER,
AMERICAN THOUGHT IN TRANSITION: THE IMPACT OF EVOLUTIONARY NATURAL-

ISM, 1865-1900 (1969); H. COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND: AN INTERPRETATION
OF AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880'S (1950); M. CURTI,
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN THOUGHT (3d ed. 1964); 3 J. DORFMAN, THE EcONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1949); EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT IN
AMERICA (S. Persons ed. 1950); S. FINE, LAISSEz FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 1865-1901 (1956); T.
HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SO-

CIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY
(1977); R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. ed.

1959); E.

PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM

& THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973); M. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE
REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1976); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-

1920, at 133-63 (1967).
supra note 331, at 133-63.
See generally sources cited supra note 331.
3"On
the early twentieth century as a transitional period in American intellectual thought in general, characterized by mounting scholarly criticism of prevailing deductive, a priori orientations in legal, economic, and other social science theory, see
generally E. PURCELL, supra note 331, at 3-73.
331 See R. WIEBE,
"3
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rists continued heavily to pursue explanatory models premised on a few
fundamental underlying principles, laws, or natural processes.3 35 Thus,
for example, the deductive approach at the heart of contemporary legal
formalism 8" was paralleled by a similarly deductive approach in schol3 37
arly and popular versions of classical economics.
Nineteenth century classical economic writing itself contained significant differences in detail.3 3" But again and again, such writers displayed a common belief that economic life ultimately could and had to
be understood as arising from the operation of basic, natural economic
laws. 3 9 Indeed, many American340 scholars and popularizers believed
such natural laws to be not only real but also divinely ordained-one
aspect of an inherent order and purpose in the world established by
God. Thus, much American classical
economic writing was not only
3 1
deductive but also teleological. "
Henry Wood dramatically captured and articulated such common
sentiments in two popular books of the late nineteenth century, Natural Law in the Business World42 and The PoliticalEconomy of Natural Law.$4 3 Wood assured his readers that "Natural Law is but another name for the methods of the Creator" 3 " and declared that
"Natural Law in the economic realm is not different from that which
runs through physics, morals, mechanics, and science. It is but one of
the many subdivisions of Universal Natural Law, or the grand Unity of
335 See, e.g., id. at 133-63; see also sources cited supra note 331.
338 On legal formalism, see M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1780-1860, at 253-66 (1977); E. PURCELL, supra note 331, at 74-76; Kennedy,

Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical
Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, in 3 RES. IN LAW & Soc. 3 (1980); Nelson,
The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles ofJudicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513 (1974).
31 See P. BOLLER, supra note 331, at 71-77; S. FINE, supra note 331, at 52-56,

73; R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 331, at 144-46; Spengler, Evolutionism in American
Economics, 1800-1946, in EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT IN AMERICA 203, 211-49 (S.
Persons ed. 1950); see also J. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1954). For a cogent recent exploration of the similarities and interrelationships between legal formalism and classical economics, see Kennedy, The Role of Law in Eco-

nomic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U.L. Rxv. 939
(1985).
"I See, e.g., J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 337, at 379-750 (reviewing the major
economists and economic writings of the period 1790-1870).
339 See generally sources cited supra note 337; see also infra text accompanying
note 350.
34 In this and other ways, American classical economic theory tended to be decidedly more optimistic in outlook than much of European classical economic theory. See,
e.g., J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 337.
341 See, e.g., Spengler, supra note 337, at 212-13, 218.
34

H. WOOD, NATURAL LAW IN THE BUSINESS WORLD (1887).

"4 H. WOOD,THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL LAW (1894).
3" Id. at 19.
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Truth."85
Wood's asserted parallel to scientific theory was not an unusual
claim at the time. Classical economic writers in general repeatedly proclaimed that the natural laws that they posited were not merely colorful
metaphors or statements of bare statistical probabilities but rather were
directly analogous to the fundamental forces that physical scientists had
discovered in their fields and made classical economics a similarly scientific conception.'" As Wood explained:
The phenomena of electricity have been before the eyes
of the world for all the past centuries, but until recently
there was little systematic study of its laws. Now that these
are beginning to be grasped, it ceases to be mere uninterpreted manifestation, and becomes a tamed and beneficent
agent of utility. The world has been almost surprised to find
that Natural Law can invariably be relied upon. In the
whole illimitable cosmos, material and immaterial, there is
nothing capricious or uncertain. At first glance, there is
much that seems to happen; but it may be safely assumed,
that no event ever took place without an endless chain of
causation leading up to it, link by link.
The scope of orderly law being unlimited, it manifestly
includes every side and phase of social economics. In the economic domain, statistics, tariffs, coinage, currency, capital,
and labor have received abundant study; but all these are
only the multiform visible expressions of the working of natural law."7
Similarly, Wayland and Chapin's economics textbook, 8 the college economics textbook most widely read in later nineteenth century
America," 9 instructed students that
Political Economy is that branch of Social Science which
treats the production and applicationof wealth to the wellbeing of men in society. It is a branch of true science.
By Science, as the word is here used, we mean a Systematic arrangement of the laws which God has established, so
14

Id. at

18.

See, e.g., P.

BoLLER, supra note 331, at 71-73 (noting such proclamations
among exponents of classical economics).
47 H. WooD, THE POLIMAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL LAW 16-17 (1894).
848 F. WAYLAND, THE ELEMEmNTs OF POLrICAL ECONOMY (recast by A. Chapin

I4

1886).
"9

See R. HOFSTADTEr,

supra note 331, at 145.
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far as they have been discovered, of any department of
human knowledge.350
The text was quite explicit in specifying the key natural laws at work
in the economy, going on to declare that economic science ultimately is
based on a total of only "four fundamental laws." 5 "
Academic classical economists frequently stressed such analogies.
Thus, Reverend Julian M. Sturtevant of Illinois College35 2 declared
that the natural laws of economics were "as far removed from the control of human wills as cohesion or electricity."' ' Even Francis A.
Walker, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, first
president of the American Economic Association,'" and a theorist
whose work occupied a middle ground between classical tradition and
"new school" economics,355 maintained that "rightly viewed, perfect
competition would be seen to be the order of the economic universe, as
truly as gravity is the order of the physical universe, and to be not less
harmonious and beneficent in operation."3 56
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many economists, particularly younger scholars, began to depart substantially from
classical orthodoxy. 57 But the continuing power of classical economic
350
351

F. WAYLAND, supra note 348, at 4.
See id. at 4-6. In brief, the "four fundamental laws" stated were:

1. God has made man a creature of desires and constituted the material
world in which he lives with qualities and powers available for the gratifi-

cation of those desires...
2. For desires above the very simplest wants of the animal, man must,

by Labor,force nature to yield her hidden resources....
3. The exertion of labor establishes a right of PROPERTY in the fruits
of labor, and the idea of exclusive possession is a necessary consequence.

4. With the right of property, comes also the possibility and the right of
EXCHANGE, or the mutual transfer of possessions between man and man,

and between different communities and countries.
Id. at 4-5.

I'l See 3 J.

DORFMAN, supra note 331, at 73.
Spengler, supra note 337, at 216.
3" See H. THORETLI, supra note 2, at 120.
35 See S. FINE, supra note 331, at 73; Spengler, supra note 337, at 218-20.
3" F. WALKER, PoLrxcAL ECONOMY 263 (3d ed. 1888). Walker differed from
more orthodox classical economists partly in his view of how frequently actual market
conditions departed from the conditions that would be produced by the entirely unimpeded operation of economic laws.
1 7 See, e.g., P. BOLLER, supra note 331, at 84-93; 3 J. DORFMAN, supra note
331; S. FINE, supra note 331, at 198-251; H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 118-22;
Spengler, supra note 337, at 211-49. Some of the most important points of departure
were set forth in the statement of principles adopted upon the establishment of the
American Economic Association in 1885. In opposition to prevailing orthodoxy, the
younger economists declared in part:
153
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theory was reflected in the intensity with which "new" or "historical"
school economists repeatedly felt it necessary to attack the deductive,
natural law approach of classical theory.358 Within the economics profession, the power of older visions remained strong throughout the
years prior to the First World War. Indeed, while the American Economic Association was founded in 1885 in large part to promote the
pursuit of new theoretical directions,3 5 9 it soon moderated its tone to
attract more conservative colleagues, and conservative theorists came to
dominate the organization by the early 1890's.8a° Many prominent
scholars who began as "new school" economists later adopted significantly more traditional perspectives.3 6 1 In fact, John Bates Clark, one
of the leading early advocates of new school approaches, ultimately
3 62
gained renown as the "father" of American neoclassicism.
Even when economists and other social theorists offered explanatory models self-consciously at variance with the older deductive, often
teleological, approaches underlying the static model of classical theory,
their work frequently continued to exhibit the strong contemporary pull
of explanation in terms of fundamental natural principle or process,
even if positing a different sort of principle or process than the natural
laws of classical theory. Thus, leading new school economists such as
Richard T. Ely and Simon Nelson Patten urged a more inductive approach, stressed the potential for human activity to improve economic
conditions, and pictured the economy in much more dynamic terms
than had classical theorists.3 6 3 At the same time, however, Ely and Patten posited an inherent process of social and economic evolution at
work in the world somewhat akin to the natural process of biological
evolution illuminated by Charles Darwin, a process naturally generating a series of distinct stages of economic organization. 3 "
1. We regard the state as an agency whose positive assistance is one of
the indispensable conditions of human progress.

2. We believe that political economy as a science is still in an early
stage of its development [and] ...

we look, not so much to speculation, as

to the historical and statistical study of actual conditions of economic life
for the satisfactory accomplishment of that development.
P. BOLLER, supra note 331, at 86.
3"

In addition to the sources cited supra note 357, see E. PURcELT, supra note

331, at 18-19, 21, 61, 62 (describing the continuation of such attacks into the 1920's).
359 See P. BOu.ER, supra note 331, at 85.
810 See id. at 86; S. FINE, supra note 331, at 212-13, 215-16, 219-21.
311 See H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 121.
311 See 3 J. DORFMAN, supra note 331, at 188; see also H. THoRELLI, supra

note 2, at 312.
368 See, e.g., 3 J. DORFMAN, supra note 331, at 161-64 (on Ely), 182-88 (on
Patten).
'" Thus, Ely believed that an economy evolves through the following seven stages,
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More traditional, deductive, natural law perspectives retained even
greater strength in popular than in academic thinking. 6 5 In part, this
simply may be because intellectual perspectives learned and embraced
early in life often continue to wield substantial power decades later,
particularly for individuals relatively insulated from critiques developing within scholarly circles.3 6 Striking evidence of such "generational
lag" can be found, for example, in an episode involving William Howard Taft who, as a United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge,
wrote one of the most important early federal antitrust opinions, in the
case of United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.117 In a 1906 Yale
University lecture, Taft pointedly recalled the training he had received
at that institution in the 1870's and its continuing influence on him:
The tendency in my own case, and I think in that of most
graduates of my time, was toward the laissezfaire doctrine
that the least interference by legislation with the operation of
natural laws was, in the end, the best for the public; that the
only proper object of legislation was to free the pathway of
commerce and opportunity from the effect of everything but
competition and enlightened selfishness; and that that being
done, the Government had discharged all of its proper functions. When I graduated we looked upon the Post-office Department of the Government with great suspicion.. . . I do
not know what may be taught in this respect now, and I am
bound to say that I think these principles, which I may seem
to have spoken of in a light way, are still orthodox and still
sound, if only the application of them is not carried to such
finally reaching a cooperative Christian society: (1) hunting and fishing; (2) pastoral;
(3) agricultural; (4) handicraft; (5) industrial-competitive;-(6) industrial-concentrated;
and (7) industrial-integrated. See R. ELY, STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1903). Patten pointed to an evolutionary process by which advanced
civilizations finally had moved beyond a "pain or deficit economy" into a "pleasure or
surplus economy" in the nineteenth century. He looked forward to an even higher state
of civilization in the future that would be characterized by new forms of social control
exhibiting and fostering greater idealism, altruism, and cooperation. See S. PATTEN,
THE NEW BASIS OF CIVILIZATION 9-10, 25-27, 178-81 (1907). Robert Wiebe describes particularly well the continuing commonalities among both classical thinkers
and their detractors in chapter six of his book, The Search for Order. See R. WIEBE,
supra note 331, at 133-63.
365 See H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 109 n.1, 315.
11' See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 331, at 49 (describing the continuing
power of Herbert Spencer's ideas among older Americans into the early twentieth century). The dissenting views of new school economists reportedly had relatively little
impact on popular imagination prior to World War I. See H. THORELLI, supra note 2,
at 120-21.
367 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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an extreme as really to interfere with the public welfare.3 68
This is not to argue that large numbers of nonacademic Americans
in this period were classical economic thinkers imbued with the details
of orthodox theory. That certainly was not the case. What is suggested
is that conceptual approaches to contemporary social and economic
problems were influenced significantly by a pervasive faith in the reality of fundamental natural laws or processes; by a widespread belief
that valid, scientific theory characteristically took the form of theoretical
models explaining major areas of natural or human activity on the basis of only a few such fundamental laws, principles, or processes; and
finally, by popular acceptance of many, if not all, of the main features
of traditional economic theory itself.
Some contemporary Americans were substantially less affected by
the operation of such influences than were others at the time. Moreover, even when all three factors operated powerfully, they still left
room for tremendous diversity in theoretical analysis and remedial response. Yet, continued firm belief in natural law or process, grand theory, and traditional economic understandings tended to encourage adherence to approaches more closely in harmony with them and to
discourage acceptance of perspectives calling them seriously into doubt.
Consider, for example, the similarities often evident in otherwise
widely divergent contemporary analyses of the rise of the "trusts."
Some observers acclaimed or accepted the new, more concentrated economic pattern as simply the natural product of a progressive evolutionary process unfolding over time. Some of these observers were pleased
by the new development and felt no need for alarm. Thus, John D.
Rockefeller spoke for many American businessmen 6 9 when he explained the rise of big business as "merely a survival of the fittest,...
the working out of a law of nature and a law of God.13 7 0 Andrew

Carnegie concurred, describing economic concentration as simply "an
evolution from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous, and

. .

clearly

another step in the upward path of development." 7 1 As such, it was
not to be impeded by the efforts of man: "Oh, these grand, immutable,
all-wise laws of natural forces, how perfectly they work if human legisW. TAFT, FouR ASPEcTS OF Civic DUTY 11-12 (1906).
"' For extended discussion of the social and economic theories embraced by
American businessmen in this period, see A. THIMM, BUSINESS IDEOLOGIES IN THE
REFORM-PROGRFSSIVE ERA, 1880-1914 (1976); see also S. FINE, supra note 331, at
3"

96-125.
871

W.
A.

GHENT, OuR BENEVOLENT FEUDALISM 29 (1902).
CARNEGIE,

Popular Illusions About Trusts, in

AND OTHER TIMELY ESSAYS 80 (1933).

THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH
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lators would only let them alone! But no, they must be tinkering. 3 72
Other Americans also accepted heightened concentration as the inevitable product of a natural process but nevertheless decried the behavior of the men in charge of the giant combinations and called for nationalization-ownership by the people at large-or increased
government regulation as the natural political development for this natural new stage of economic organization. 7 3 In part, such a stance reflected many Americans' mixed reactions to the rise of the new combinations in general. While acknowledging apparent new productive
efficiencies, these Americans continued to fear the "trusts'" power for
economic and political abuse.3 7'
Such tensions also appear to be reflected in the mixed explanatory
models embraced by an increasingly important number of observers.
Instead of declaring that "bigness" was either the glorious product of
natural process or an alarming perversion of it-the Carnegie and
Brandeisian "poles" of natural law analysis, respectively 37 -these ob-

I'l

A.

CARNEGIE, TRIUMPHANT DEMOCRACY OR FIFTY YEAiS' MARCH OF THE

48 (1886).
173 See, e.g., Andrews, The Economic Law of Monopoly, 26 J. Soc. Sci. 1, 12
(1890); Andrews, The Trusts According to Official Investigations, 3 Q.J. ECON. 117,
150 (1889); Hatfield, The Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. POL. EcON. 1 (1899);
Jenks, CapitalisticMonopolies and Their Relation to the State, 9 POL. Sci. Q. 486,
504-09 (1894); Seligman, Railway Tariffs and the Interstate Commerce Law. II., 2
POL. ScI. Q. 369, 373-74 (1887).
17" See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 192.
As noted previously, see supra note 316, Brandeis continually relied on a small
number of "artificial" influences to explain the prevalence of business "bigness" in
spite of its asserted foreignness to a believed natural economic order shaped by the
operation of natural laws. Captivated by a vision of eternal, small-scale capitalism, he
declared, "There are no natural monopolies today in the industrial world." L. BRANDEIS, Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition?, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 105 (0. Frankel ed. 1934) [hereinafter
PAPERS]. He explained:
REPUBLIC

It will be found that wherever competition has been suppressed it has
been due either to resort to ruthless processes, or by improper use of inordinate wealth and power. The attempt to dismember existing illegal trusts
is not, therefore, an attempt to interfere in any way with the naturallaw
of business. It is an endeavor to restore health by removing a cancer from
the body industrial. It is not an attempt to create competition artificially,
but it is the removing of the obstacle to competition.
L. BRANDEIS, Competition, in PAPERS, supra, at 115-16 (emphasis added). Similarly,
he declared, "[E]xperience has . . . taught us that competition is never suppressed by
the greater efficiency of one concern. It is suppressed either by agreement to form a
monopoly or by those excesses of competition which are designed to crush a rival." L.
BRANDEIS, The Solution of the Trust Problem, in PAPERS, supra, at 131.
Such firm confidence in the operation and product of natural law also supported
faith in the efficacy of conduct-oriented antitrust action:
[N]o monopoly in private industry in America has yet been attained by
efficiency alone. No business has been so superior to its competitors in the
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servers created an alternative picture out of key elements of contemporary thought. Still holding that much "bigness" was the unexceptionable product of natural economic evolution, these analysts declared that
much was also the abnormal product of artificial privilege or
connivance.87

6

Whatever resemblance such contemporary distinctions between
"natural" and "artificial" combinations may or may not have borne to
the fundamental contrasts between "center" and "peripheral" industries stressed by Professor McCraw37 7 or other aspects of modern economic analysis, such distinctions did allow anxious Americans of the
period who still believed in beneficent natural order or principle to
maintain that belief in the face of a significant amount of seemingly
contradictory evidence. The sources of the artificial intrusion responsible for such disturbing abnormal growths simply had to be identified
and be dealt with, and natural forces again could be seen playing their
normal determining role.
The need to explain the rise and persistence of increasing numbers
of powerful combinations was particularly acute for those Americans
who held on to a relatively static equilibrium model of the economy in
which large enterprises with power to affect price had little or no natural place. This problem was faced early by classical economic theorists
3 78
whose analyses were premised on just such a theoretical conception.
Antistatist commentators influenced by such views often responded either by declaring that artificial government privilege, for example tariff
and patent policy, was responsible for abnormal trust intrusion into the
system, 7 9 or by asserting that normal competitive processes still could
processes of manufacture or of distribution as to enable it to control the
market solely by reason of its superiority. There is nothing in our industrial history to indicate that there is any need whatever to limit the natural
growth of a business in order to preserve competition. We may emphatically declare: "Give fair play to efficiency."

Diagnosis shows monopoly to be an artificial,not a natural, product. Competition, therefore, may be preserved by preventing that course of
conduct by which in the past monopolies have been established.
L. BRANDEIS, Competition, in PAPERS, supra, at 114-15, 123-24 (emphasis added).
876

See R. ELY, MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS 87-88 (1912); R. ELY, PROBLEMS

OF

TO-DAY: A DISCUSSION OF PROTECTIVE TARIFFS, TAXATION, AND MONOPOLIES 201

(3d ed. 1888); W. LETWIN, supra note 2, at 71-77; W. WILSON, THE NE W FREEDOM
101-10 (1913).
37 See supra note 318.
878 See H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 116.
71 See, e.g., Civic FEDERATION OF. CHICAGO, CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON
TRUSTS 166-71 (1900) (speech by Lawson Purdy at the conference, which took place
September 13-16, 1899) ("[T]he combinations not protected by an iniquitous tariff are
few in number. Of some four hundred trusts enumerated in the Commercial Year
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be counted on to produce a state of natural economic equilibrium, even
in concentrated industries, through the substantial power of potential
competition acting to restrain big business behavior.380
Other observers, striving to maintain belief in the "naturalness" of
a small-scale capitalist economy in the face of increasing economic concentration, took a less hostile view of governmental corrective action.
Declaring concerted combination, predation, and discrimination abnormal and indeed immoral forms of the pursuit of self-interest and deeming them responsible for the disturbing distortions in the natural economic order, they called for direct action to prohibit and punish such
behavior. Antitrust action against the aberrant conduct artificially creating "bigness" was what the times demanded and what was needed to
restore the natural order, in the view of Americans embracing this vi381
sion of economic life.
But an important historical question regarding early antitrust development remains. What, if any, indication is there that contemporary
theory actually influenced judicial reasoning in early antitrust cases?
D.

International Harvester and the Real Value Test

Consider again InternationalHarvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 82 the opinion recently highlighted as an important early case
invalidating on due process grounds an antitrust standard declared to
have been equivalent to a reasonable-price defense for price fixing. 8 3
How did the judges of the Kentucky Court of Appeals understand and
explain the antitrust standard that they articulated and their rejection
of vagueness objections to it? Did such early antitrust analysts believe a
normal market, real value test was simply an invitation for a standardless case-by-case determination of an arbitrary reasonable price according to a judge or jury's gut sense of fairness?
Such a characterization was indeed urged by lawyers for International Harvester. They had good reason to hope that the Kentucky high
court would strike down a "reasonable-price" standard, for that court
previously had done precisely that in a case considering a state statute
forbidding any railroad to charge "more than a just and reasonable rate
Book, more than two thirds are directly affected by the tariff, and there are very few
which do not get some tariff assistance, directly or indirectly.").

"0 See, e.g., Giddings, The Persistenceof Competition, 2 POL. Sci. Q. 62, 65-67

(1887); see also infra text accompanying notes 405-06 (comments of Henry Wood).
81 As previously indicated, Louis Brandeis was a preeminent exponent of this
point of view. See, e.g., supra note 375.
2 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
U3 See supra text accompanying notes 248-85.
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of toll."' " The Kentucky court clearly had understood and declared
that such a "reasonable rate" test actually set "no standard whatever
. . . by which the carrier may regulate its conduct. '3 85 The court had
declared that such a statute contemplated a standard "erected by a jury
• . .that. . . must be as variable and uncertain as the views of different juries may suggest, and as to which nothing can be known until
after the commission of the crime." 88 The Kentucky Court of Appeals
quoted and strongly reaffirmed these statements in its 1909 opinion in
Commonwealth v. International Harvester Co., 38 7 but it found them
wholly inapplicable to the Kentucky antitrust standard. "There is a
marked difference," the court declared, "between the qualities of the
'real value' of an article and 'reasonable compensation' for a service.
The latter may depend alone upon the opinion of the trier of fact; the
former is itself a fact susceptible of proof and exact ascertainment."3 88
How could the Kentucky judges have believed that?
Consider the state of contemporary theory with regard to price or
value. A good indication of both traditional orthodoxy and evolving
scholarly critiques of it can be gleaned, for example, from the work of
perhaps the most eminent American economist of the pre-war period,
John Bates Clark. In his 1899 book, The Distribution of Wealth: A
Theory of Wages, Interest and Profits,89 Clark detailed and critiqued
the classical economic view of commodity value. A major theme of the
work was the need to understand real world economics as the combined
product of powerful, fundamental, natural law "static" forces complemented by the operation of various "dynamic" forces, and a large portion of the work was devoted to an exploration of the virtues and limitations of traditional value theory from precisely this perspective. The
traditional theory that Clark noted was the theory of "natural" or
"normal" prices.39 0
Such "natural" or "normal" prices were the levels to which rates
naturally and relentlessly were thought to be pushed by the force of
competition,3 91 levels just corresponding to production cost and hence
I" See Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 132, 35 S.W. 129
(1896) (invalidating Ky. STAT. § 816 (Carroll 1894)).
885 Id. at 137, 35 S.W. at 130.
386 Id.
"' 131 Ky. 551, 574-75, 115 S.W. 703, 711 (1909) (Hardin County), overruled,
Gay v. Brent, 166 Ky. 833, 849, 179 S.W. 1051, 1058 (1915).
Id. at 575, 115 S.W. at 711.
J. CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF WAGES, INTEREST AND PROFITS (1899) [hereinafter J. CLARK, DISTRIBuTioN].

See id. at 16.
...See id. at 16, 77.
3"I
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not allowing any excess profit."9 2 Thus, for example, Wayland and
Chapin's college textbook informed students that in addition to temporary market values affected by changes in demand and supply,
"[t]hings have also a permanent, or as it may be called, a Natural
Value, to which the market value, after every variation, always tends to
return; and the oscillations compensate for one another, so that on the
average, commodities exchange at about their natural value." ' Similarly, the text explained that "[w]hen left free from artificial interference, demand and supply rush towards an equilibrium; and the condition of stable equilibrium is that things exchange for each other
according to the cost of production, or as some express it, according to
39 4

their natural value.1

Clark believed that such a conception of natural or normal prices
was basically sound 9 5 and that static forces determining such prices
were not only powerful but decidedly dominant.3 96 Clark and other dissenting scholars, however, differed from more traditional theorists in
their view of the frequency with which actual market prices corresponded with natural or normal prices, believing traditional theorists
3 97
underestimated the power and impact of various dynamic factors.
One "dynamic" force that otherwise differing theorists generally acknowledged to be an important cause of departures from natural or
normal price was private monopoly or combination.
As noted above, 398 antistatist observers influenced by static classical theory often tended to minimize the impact of the artificial intrusion
of monopoly, asserting that its influence on normal price could only be
temporary given the power of the natural law of competition. Henry
Wood's discussion was a fairly typical, if particularly striking, expression of such sentiments. Although Wood expressed greater alarm over
legislative than private interference with the market, 99 he devoted substantial attention to the latter as well, making plain his moral condemnation of all anticompetitive combinations seeking to raise prices to ab"' See id. at 16-17, 78-79. Clark stressed that such natural competitive prices not
only guaranteed the absence of excess profit but also assured "[equal products everywhere per unit of labor and equal products per unit of capital," id. at 18, and led to
equalized earnings per unit of capital or of labor, see id. at 17.
3
F. WAYLAND, supra note 348, at 268-69.
3" Id. at 14-15. The "artificial interference" referred to at this point in the text
was monopoly, illustrated by an earlier Dutch monopoly of the pepper trade. See id. at
14.
a" See J. CLARK, DISTRIBUTION, supra note 389, at 78.
s See id. at 30, 67.
317See S. FINE, supra note 331, at 198-251.
398 See supra text accompanying notes 379-80.

3"

See H. WOOD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL LAW 28 (1894).
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normal levels. 00° Wood declared that while trust combinations might be
undertaken to pursue beneficial, productive efficiencies, "in accord with
Natural Law," the "great majority" of trusts were not of that sort and
401
sought primarily to establish "abnormal values" for their product.
Nonetheless, existing public alarm4 2 over anticompetitive combinations
was exaggerated, because such private efforts typically failed. Even
where momentarily triumphant they could not long persist. 40 3 "Whenever such combinations have temporarily succeeded," Wood explained,
"the result has been brought about by peculiar conditions, and in a
forcible manner, before Natural Law had time to assert itself. It was
like lifting a heavy weight in spite of gravitation. ' 40 4 Any such artificial
price alteration necessarily would be short-lived, and the public accordingly need have little concern. "Consumers are safe because the most
powerful combination can bolster up abnormal values only temporarily.
Unseen and untiring forces are fighting against it. Demand falls off
and competitive production is stimulated on every side."' 4 5 For Wood,
the political implication of this optimistic conception of a self-correcting
natural order was clear: "Natural Law punishes its offenders without
40 8
the aid of courts or judges.1
Yet, as the years went by, events seemed to belie Wood's confident
faith in the evanescence of economic combination and concentration,
and other observers perceived greater power in the intrusive force of
artificial monopoly. One such observer was John Bates Clark. In his
1899 work, The Distributionof Wealth,""7 Clark discussed not only the
traditional theory of natural value but also the extent to which real
world and theoretical prices coincided and the salient reasons for existing discrepancies between the two. Clark explained, "A natural price
is a competitive price. It can be realized only when competition goes on
in ideal perfection-and that is nowhere. It is approximated, however,
whenever prices are neither adjusted by a government nor vitiated by a
monopoly. '40 8 In a subsequent work, Essentials of Economic Theory, 4°0
400

See id. at 61.

401

Id. at 62-63.
See id. at 29.
See id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29.

402
403

404

401 Id. at 64. Thus, said Wood, no combination can "violate Natural Law with
impunity. If the transgression be of great magnitude the inevitable punishment will be
in proportion. Retribution is inherent. The economic, no less than the physical law of
gravitation is never suspended." Id. at 71.
406 Id. at 66.

40'7 J. CLARK,

supra note 389.

408

Id. at 77.

409

J. CLARK, EssENTIALS OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1907) [hereinafter J. CLARK,

ESSENTIALS].
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Clark reiterated such views, referring to monopoly as the chief "positive perversion" of the natural static economic forces tending to produce
normal prices in the absence of dynamic influence.41 0
Clark declared that classical theorists were on the right track in
their conception of natural prices but had heroically ignored dynamic
forces to concentrate on an idealized world in which only static forces
prevailed.4 " Theirs was "an imperfect, rather than an incorrect, theory. '"" In the real world, however, the simultaneous influence of dynamic forces was not a rarity but the usual situation."1" Nonetheless,
Clark believed that the dynamic influences could be isolated and treated
separately from the basic static forces:
In the markets of all parts of the world where competition rules the standards about which prices fluctuate are set
by static forces, and the fluctuations are accounted for by dynamic ones. Actual prices are now above the standards and
now below them, as a pendulum is now on one side of an
imaginary vertical line and now on the other. This vertical
line coincides with the position that the pendulum would
hold, if it were under the influence of static forces only. The
oscillations are due to dynamic forces; and these can be measured, if we first know the nature of the static forces and the
position to which, if they were acting alone, they would
bring the pendulum. The oscillations of prices about the natural standards can be accounted for only by a like method of
study ....
Static forces set the standards, and dynamic
forces produce the variations.41 4
Moreover, at least by 1907, Clark had come to believe that, once identified, the "dynamic force" of monopoly could be checked effectively
wherever it appeared by the power of law. "In a country in which law
held complete sway," he declared, "all objectionable monopolies would
be held in repression. 41 5
But what, if any, theory did the judges of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals have in mind when they articulated their distinctive test for
price fixing? What did "real value" mean to those early antitrust analysts? Examination of the majority opinion in Commonwealth v. Inter-

414

Id. at viii.
See J. CLARK, DISTRIBUTION, supra note 389, at 69.
Id. at 78.
See id.
Id. at 32.

415

J. CLARK, EssENTrALS, supra note 409, at viii; see J. CLARK, THE CONTROL

410
411

412
413

OF TRusTs (1901).
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nationalHarvesterCo.416 reveals that "real value" was simply another
phrase for the "natural value" or "normal value" of contemporary economic theory.
The Kentucky judges recognized that real world markets fluctuated and that evidence of market conditions offered in litigation might
vary, but they firmly asserted that the legal standard in question, the
"real value" test, was not itself uncertain and that that was the relevant
constitutional issue.4 17 Such a standard had a clear meaning, and its
application depended not on subjective preference but on determination
of external, objective, pre-existing fact.418 "Real value" was simply "the
market value" 41 9 or, more precisely, market value adjusted for the influence of intrusive forces:
[S]upply, demand, and competition are the principal factors
in regulating prices. Where the conditions are natural, the
open market would show the real value of any commodity.
Where they are not natural, where either supply, demand,
or competition are eliminated, or so controlled as to prevent
its operation upon the market, then the commodity may or
may not realize its real value ...
When the law endeavors to maintain the real value of
an article, it has in contemplation the value of the thing as
sold under ordinary, normal conditions, unaffected by any
combination of producers or dealers whose object is to create
an abnormal condition in that market.4 20
Such "normal" or "real" value, said the court majority, could be
established in litigation by evidence of facts "acted upon every day in
the commercial affairs of the world. '4 2 ' Specifically, "[w]hat the state
of a market was immediately before an act, how it was affected by that
act, the quantity of the commodity within reach of the market, the normal-that is, the usual-demand for it, are all facts susceptible of
422
proof."
411 131 Ky. 551, 115 S.W. 703 (1909) (Hardin County), overruled in Gay v.
Brent, 166 Ky. 833, 849, 179 S.W. 1051, 1058 (1915).
418

See id. at 576, 115 S.W. at 711.
See id. at 577-78, 115 S.W. at 712.

419

Id. at 576, 115 S.W. at 711.

420

Id. at 576-77, 115 S.W. at 711-12.

417

Id. at 577, 115 S.W. at 712.
Id. Moreover, the judges declared the standard in question was not a new one
in law, citing Wharton's treatise on criminal law to the effect that the common law had
made indictable the engrossing or absorption of "any particular necessary staple or
constituent of life so as to impoverish and distress the mass of the community for the
purpose of extorting, by terror or other coercive means, prices greatly above the real
421

422
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The Kentucky high court repeatedly reaffirmed its 1909 analysis42 and spelled out in greater detail the practical application of the
"real value" test in a series of opinions prior to the 1914 United States
Supreme Court invalidation of the Kentucky standard. 42 The Kenvalue." See id. at 578, 115 S.W. at 712 (citing 2 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 1851 (10th ed. 1896)).
Adoption and use of contemporary "normal" or "natural" value theory certainly
did not mean such theory could not be flexibly refined to reflect local agrarian needs
and sentiments. Thus, although cooperative arrangements among farmers were not at
issue in the case before it, the court nonetheless went on to explain how collective
reductions in producer output would not necessarily violate Kentucky antitrust standards or community welfare:
[Olversupply would reduce the selling value to a level below the normal.
If a concerted action of producers resulted in only a normal supply of a
commodity reaching the markets, the normal demand would maintain normal prices. Such action is necessary, or at least seems wise both as it affects the producer and the general public. Violent depressions of a market
that result in heavy losses are hurtful to everybody, because they tend to
disturb the natural equilibrium of business, and reflect harmfully, or are
likely to, upon every other branch of commerce. The general public can
not be benefited by disaster to any legitimate business. Conditions that are
stable, assuring, and reasonably profitable are best for everybody.
Id. at 576-77, 115 S.W. at 711.
Three judges dissented. These judges had a rather different view of the possible
meaning of the state antitrust standard and of the level of certainty provided by the
theory embraced by the majority. They declared that "real value" could be defined in
various ways; for example, as production cost plus "reasonable" profit and return on
investment or as the actual "worth of the article to the consumer." Id. at 586-87, 115
S.W. at 714-15. But any such standards would be impermissibly indefinite, and invocation of the normal value theory, they declared, did not eliminate the difficulty:
To say that the expression means the market value of the article when not
affected by abnormal conditions is only to add to the confusion; for what
are abnormal conditions, and who is to judge whether the conditions are
abnormal? The market value of an article may be determined with some
certainty, but what its market value will be under other conditions than
those that exist, is speculation pure and simple.
Id. at 587, 115 S.W. at 715.
"I"See, e.g., American Seeding Mach. Co. v Commonwealth, 152 Ky. 589, 592,
153 S.W. 972, 974 (1913), rev'd, 236 U.S. 660 (1915); International Harvester Co. of
Am. v. Commonwealth, 148 Ky. 572, 147 S.W. 1199 (1912) (mem.) (Grayson County
case), rev'd, 234 U.S. 216 (1914); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 Ky. 795, 796, 146 S.W. 12, 13 (1912) (Todd County case), rev'd, 234
U.S. 216 (1914); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 Ky. 564,
565-67, 144 S.W. 1064, 1065-66 (1912) (Bullitt County case), rev'd, 234 U.S. 216
(1914); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 403, 410, 138
S.W. 248, 251-52 (1911) (Logan County case); Collins v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky.
564, 569-70, 133 S.W. 233, 235 (1911), rev'd, 234 U.S. 634 (1914); International
Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 137 Ky. 668, 671, 126 S.W. 352, 353 (1910)
(Logan County case).
424 No dissents are noted in any of these later Kentucky cases, and, in one of
them, the opinion of the court was written by Judge Lassing, one of the three judges
who dissented in the 1909 InternationalHarvester case. See American Seeding Mach.
Co., 152 Ky. at 589, 153 S.W. at 973. In his opinion for the court in this case, Judge
Lassing voiced no uneasiness concerning the "real value" test, either in general or as
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tucky court expressly acknowledged that a variety of factors continually
operated to affect market prices, noting particularly the influence of
altered raw material and labor costs, transportation improvements and
rate changes, competing product development, shifts in the "sources of
supply and demand,"4 2 and variations in the expense of sale. 428 Nevertheless, the Kentucky jurists believed that in the absence of "such abnormalities as panics, widespread strikes, wars, and such, the conditions may be said to be normal.'

42

'

They further believed that under

such normal conditions the force of competition and "the so-called 'law
of supply and demand,'" if unimpeded, could be "depended on to regulate the price" and maintain rates at or near the natural or real value
28
where price was not abnormally inflated above cost.'

Practical application of the "real value" test embodying these understandings required initial clarification of two basic procedural issues:
first, the standard of proof of requisite anticompetitive purpose and,
second, the burden of proof that price in fact had shifted away from the
competitive, real value level and that it had done so as a result of the
defendant's actions rather than because of various other changes that
simultaneously might have affected market conditions. As an appropriate standard of requisite criminal intent, the Kentucky court adopted a
test quite similar to the Sherman Act standard articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in its 1978 opinion in United States v.
United States Gypsum Co.' 29 The Kentucky court declared that, under

the Kentucky act,
[w]here the design of the poolers is to so enhance the value of
their product, or where, whatever their design, such is the
natural effect of their action, and such as was necessarily
foreseen because of its obviousness, the offense is completed.
A party is presumed to have intended a result which is the
43 0
logical and usual outcome of his willful act.
applied in the case before him.

426 See International Harvester (Logan County), 137 Ky. at 677, 126 S.W. at
354; InternationalHarvester (Bullitt County), 147 Ky. at 566, 144 S.W. at 1065.
426 See International Harvester (Logan County), 144 Ky. at 410, 138 S.W. at
252.
",7 InternationalHarvester (Logan County), 137 Ky. at 677, 126 S.W. at 355.
428 See id. The court recognized, however, that natural prices necessarily would be
sufficiently high not only to cover the cost of labor and raw materials but also to provide a "living profit" to the producers, because otherwise, "save in exceptional callings,
they would not [engage] in the business where there was a choice left [to] them to
engage in some other." Id. at 678, 126 S.W. at 355.
429 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
411 International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 137 Ky. 668, 674, 126
S.W. 352, 354 (1910) (Logan County); accord International Harvester Co. of Am. v.
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The Kentucky high court judges considered the state standard as
so interpreted to be equally applicable to both loose and tight combinations, exhibiting a common contemporary suspicion of both cartels and
full-blown horizontal mergers. Thus, the court declared that the requisite anticompetitive purpose would be demonstrated where the circumstances showed that competitors combined
for the purpose of selling the product of their respective factories or establishments, and thereafter the machinery or article was sold by a central agency or corporation owning or
representing the various plants at a price fixed by it, or by
its constituent parts. When the formation of the trust or
combination is thus shown, it will be presumed to have been
organized for the purpose of fixing, controlling and regulat43 1
ing prices.
The International Harvester Company of America, of course, was itself
a combination of former competitors who had come together through a
43 2
horizontal merger.
The court next addressed the burden of proof that the defendants'
actions had increased prices above the competitive, cost-covering "real"
or "natural" value level. The court recognized not only that many factors simultaneously might influence market prices but also that evidence as to some such factors, for example, changes in production costs
and selling expenses, particularly costs incurred in out-of-state factories, often would be much more readily available to a defendant than to
the commonwealth. 433 Accordingly, the court rejected any idea that the
prosecution would have to "establish the existence or nonexistence of
all the conditions naturally affecting market values of the article in
Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 403, 405, 409, 138 S.W. 248, 249, 251 (1911) (Logan
County). As noted supra note 247, the Court in Gypsum held that in Sherman Act
prosecutions, the government must show that the defendant's action was "undertaken
with knowledge of its probable consequences and ha[d] the requisite anticompetitive
effects," Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 444, or was "undertaken with the purpose of producing
anticompetitive effects . . . even if such effects did not come to pass." Id. at 444 n.21.
481 InternationalHarvester (Logan County), 144 Ky. at 409, 138 S.W. at 251;
ef supra text accompanying note 401 (comments of Henry Wood).
"" See International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 Ky. 564, 56768, 144 S.W. 1064, 1066 (1912) (Bullitt County), rev'd, 234 U.S. 216 (1914). The
merged firm reportedly accounted for almost 85% of national harvester and reaper
sales. On*this and other aspects of International Harvester's early history, see A.
CHANDLER, THE VIsiBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN

BUSINESS 409 (1977).
4" See InternationalHarvester (Logan County), 144 Ky. at 410, 138 S.W. at

580

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 135:495

question,-,before it can be said to have sustained its charge[]" 43 4 Instead, the court held:
when the Commonwealth has shown by evidence and legal
presumption the combination to fix, control and regulate
prices, .. evidence of an advance in prices by the combination under substantially the same market conditions that existed before the advance is sufficient to sustain a verdict of
guilty in the absence of evidence that the advance was justified by changed market conditions or a corresponding increase in the cost of production.4 5
Thus, the state need only "show that the general conditions affecting
the market of that commodity were normal and that but for the combination complained of the competition would have been fair; that is, natural and usual. '' 486 Once shown, "the burden would shift to the defense
to show such exceptional conditions affecting the particular commodity
as naturally tended to produce the increase in market price which the
43
prosecution had proved.) 7
In short, the judicially formulated real value standard, which in
these passages so strikingly appears to echo contemporary "natural
value" theory, was a test that applied to both cartel and post-merger
pricing. In essence, the standard established a price-fixing prohibition
incorporating a cost or market justification defense and a requirement
that the state show substantial constancy or "normalcy" in general
market conditions at the time of the defendant's price change.
However sound or misguided one finds the Kentucky approach, it
seems apparent that it called for quite a different type of decisionmaking than entirely open-ended judge or jury subjectivity. This can be
seen, for example, in the pattern and nature of state antitrust appellate
deliberation. The relevant Kentucky Court of Appeals opinions in the
years prior to Justice Holmes's condemnation of the "real value" test
did not consist of subjective pronouncements on reasonableness. Instead,
these opinions were reviews of fairly detailed cost and market data introduced in half a dozen prosecutions under the real value standard,
reviews seeking to determine whether such objective evidence either
convincingly established a prima facie case or effectively rebutted one
4" International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 137 Ky. 668, 677, 126
S.W. 352, 355 (1910) (Logan County).
...International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 403, 411, 138
S.W. 248, 252 (1911) (Logan County).
438 International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 137 Ky. 668,
678, 126
S.W. 352, 355 (1910) (Logan County).
437 Id. at 678-79, 126 S.W. at 355.
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under the general standards just described." 8
These opinions indicate more than simply the general character of
the decisionmaking undertaken in the Kentucky courts. They also indicate that the appellate judges' more detailed analysis of the economic
importance of specific types of evidence was apparently affected significantly by the same contemporary theoretical orientation reflected in the
initial establishment of the real value test and in the court's general
explanation of its operation. This is suggested particularly in the treatment of an issue that probably arose only because of the real value
test's application to post-merger pricing, an issue not likely to have
arisen as long as the court considered only cartel activity. How should
the court treat merger activity that simultaneously reduced costs while
raising prices? Indeed, how should the court react if the defendant's
activity created a gap between costs and price even though it did not
raise price above the level that would have prevailed in the absence of
the merger?
It is useful to compare the Kentucky jurists' analysis with the current scholarly debate over appropriate merger policy. Present-day antitrust scholars disagree as to both the appropriate standards for judging
the legality of mergers and the practicability of using particular standards in actual litigation. 3 9 Much of the dispute arises because of the
widespread belief that mergers frequently produce simultaneously both
cost-saving productive efficiencies and an increase in market power potentially generating the distributional and allocative harms of increased
prices and reduced output. Some scholars today urge a balancing of
efficiency gains and losses and would permit mergers where proven aggregate cost savings are greater than the allocative efficiency "deadweight loss" resulting from a post-merger output reduction, even
though the merger leads to an increase in market power and in prices
'I See American Seeding Mach. Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Ky. 589, 596-600,
153 S.W. 972, 976-78 (1913), rev'd, 236 U.S. 660 (1915); International Harvester Co.
of Am. v. Commonwealth, 148 Ky. 572, 573, 147 S.W. 1199, 1199 (1912) (mem.)
(Grayson County), rev'd, 234 U.S. 216 (1914); International Harvester Co. of Am. v.
Commonwealth, 147 Ky. 795, 798-800, 146 S.W. 12, 14-15 (1912) (Todd County),
rev'd, 234 U.S. 216 (1914); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth,
147 Ky. 564, 567-73, 144 S.W. 1064, 1066-68 (1912) (Bullitt County), rev'd, 234 U.S.
216 (1914); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 403, 40612, 138 S.W. 248, 250-52 (1911) (Logan County); International Harvester Co. of Am.
v. Commonwealth, 137 Ky. 668, 674-78, 680-81, 126 S.W. 352, 354-56 (1910) (Logan
County). Guilty verdicts and fines were affirmed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
the first four opinions listed. Guilty verdicts were overturned by the Kentucky high
court in the last two cases listed.
'39 For a good short introduction to the debate, see H. HOVENKAMP, supra note
162, at § 11.2.
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charged to consumers. 440 Scholars have debated the factors that appropriately, as a matter of theory, would have to be considered in any such
balancing, and many have raised grave doubts regarding the feasibility
of proving efficiencies in litigation.44' As a matter of basic policy or
perceived legislative intent, other analysts reject any approach that
would balance efficiency gains and losses without considering a
merger's potential impact on prices. Some of these commentators even
suggest that congressional intent might be read to require a merger policy rejecting an "efficiencies defense" unless the cost savings would be
sufficiently great to insure that post-merger prices would remain at or
below pre-merger rates, despite any increase in market power resulting
from the merger. 44 ' No leading scholars, however, currently condemn
mergers that reduce costs while leaving prices and output both unchanged and unthreatened. It appears, however, that prior to World
War I the Kentucky Court of Appeals adopted a position similar to
such a disfavored view and seemingly did so, at least in significant part,
because of the power of a "natural" or "real" value orientation.
In a series of opinions, the Kentucky court analyzed the evidentiary record established in each of the several prosecutions challenging
International Harvester's post-merger pricing and the single prosecution challenging the post-merger activity of the American Seeding Machine Company. The court reiterated that a post-merger price change
was not by itself a sufficient basis for liability, because the cost-equating real value level necessarily shifted as changes occurred, for example, in labor and material costs."48 Much of the court's appellate review
consisted of an evaluation of the evidence introduced by both defendants
and the state in an effort to demonstrate that relevant costs either had
or had not risen sufficiently to account entirely for whatever price increases had taken place. 444 In analyzing the evidence submitted, the
440 See, e.g., Williamson, "Economies" as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Trade-Offs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18, 21-23 (1968); Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 704-09 (1977).
441 See, e.g., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112
(1976).
441 See, e.g., Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerationsin Merger Enforcement,
71 CALF. L. REv. 1580, 1631-34, 1646, 1693-95 (1983). Fisher and Lande, however,
do not themselves adopt this reading of legislative intent, believing that "Congress
would have permitted some tradeoff between wealth transfers and efficiency effects."
Id. at 1647; cf. H. HOVEN KAmP, supra note 162, at 298-99 (declaring that a merger
rule that considered efficiency gains but permitted "an actual output reduction and an
actual price increase for consumers ....
would undoubtedly be politically
unacceptable").
411 See, e.g., International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 Ky. 564,
565-66, 144 S.W. 1064, 1065 (1912) (Bullitt County), rev'd, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
'"' See cases cited supra note 438.
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court repeatedly made it clear that it was essential to consider not only
contemporaneous increases in labor and material costs but also any simultaneous cost savings made possible by the merger.44 5 Natural economic behavior required more than simply adherence to the price levels
that would have prevailed with higher market costs but no merger. It
also required compliance with price levels set as unimpeded natural
law would set them, at the actual cost-equating real value level. Thus,
a defendant's post-merger sales at the prices that would have been set
by open competition in the absence of merger would be lawful if no
demonstrable cost savings were achieved but would constitute a criminal offense if the merger simultaneously reduced production or selling
expenses.
In the prosecution brought against International Harvester for
sales in Todd County, the court explained such reasoning in the following particularly succinct terms:
The cost of putting an article on the market and selling it is
entitled to as much consideration as the cost of its manufacture in determining the price at which the article should be
sold. In other words, if there was an increase of $5 in the
cost of manufacturing an article, and a decrease of $5 in the
sale of it after it was manufactured, it is apparent that the
increased cost of manufacture would not add anything to the
real cost of the article to the manufacturer; and, so, in ascertaining whether or not an article is sold above or below its
real value, the cost of sale as well as the cost of manufacture
is to be taken into consideration ....
"' See American Seeding Mach. Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Ky. 589, 598-600,
153 S.W. 972, 977 (1913) (marketing cost savings, reductions in per unit production
costs achieved through centralization, standardization, new plant construction), rev'd,
236 U.S. 660 (1915); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 Ky.
795, 798-99, 146 S.W. 12, 14 (1912) (Todd County) (reduced selling expenses), rev'd,

234 U.S. 216 (1914); InternationalHarvester (Bullitt County), 147 Ky. at 568-71,
144 S.W. at 1066-67 (reduced selling expenses, reduced material costs through
purchase from subsidiary steel plant, reduced cost of expert machine repairers on retainer); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 403, 408-410,
138 S.W. 248, 250-51 (1911) (Logan County) (reduced expenses of sale and of money
collection).
446 InternationalHarvester (Todd County), 147 Ky. at 799, 146 S.W. at 14. The
savings referred to by the court in this passage were savings in the cost of sale specifically attributable to the merger itself, in particular a reduction in the number of sales
personnel from the number employed when the several merged companies had been
independent competitors. The Kentucky court's general refusal to allow increases in the
market price of needed inputs to be considered in calculating the output's real value,
unless merger-produced cost savings were considered simultaneously, also was noted by
Justice Holmes in the Supreme Court's 1914 International Harvester decision. See
International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 222 (1914) (noting that

584

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 135:495

Proof of genuine savings became a reason supporting criminal punishment under the antitrust statute because, in such an event, the defendant, through horizontal combination, artificially would have established
and taken advantage of an enlarged gap between the firm's actual costs
and its prices. Such a gap did not simply produce popularly resented
"excess," noncompetitive profits.44 It also violated the predicted relationship at the heart of the natural or normal value theory embraced in
the Kentucky real value test. And whatever additional concerns may
have influenced the court, it was on this latter basis that the Kentucky
judges actually explained their willingness to punish post-merger sales
in instances in which price, while not raised above the levels that would
have prevailed in the absence of merger, had not been lowered to the
full extent made possible by the new savings. 4 8
E. Justice Holmes and the Real Value Test
Why did Justice Holmes reject the Kentucky real value test? Certainly, his justification was not that he deemed it necessarily equivalent
to a reasonable-price standard. Never once in his 1914 opinion for the
Court 4 49 did he suggest any such parallel. Instead, as previously noted,

Holmes justified his invalidation of the Kentucky approach on the distinctly different ground that, in his view, given the variety of factors
constantly operating to affect market rates, it would be unmanageably
difficult for potential antitrust defendants to predict what price would
prevail in the absence of their own price-setting efforts."4 0 Yet, as actually applied, the Kentucky standard did not necessarily require prediction or proof of the particular price that otherwise might have prevailed
"in order to reach what is called the real value, a price from which all effects of the
combination are to be eliminated, the plaintiff in error is told that it cannot avail itself

of the rise in materials because it was able to get them cheaper through one of the
subsidiary companies of the combination, and that the saving through the combination
more than offset all the rise in cost").
4 See American Seeding Mach. Co., 152 Ky. at 599, 153 S.W. at 977.
448 See supra note 446 & accompanying text. In comparing the Kentucky court's
analysis with modern merger policy discussion, it is important to keep in mind that the
latter primarily addresses the propriety of injunctive relief. The early Kentucky analysts, on the other hand, were considering the imposition of fines or imprisonment
under a statute that did not authorize injunctions. See InternationalHarvester (Logan
County), 144 Ky. at 413-14, 138 S.W. at 253. Nevertheless, the practical potential
impact of the Kentucky court's reasoning presumably would have been to make merger
at least substantially less attractive in many cases, if not literally to prohibit it. The
allure of increased earnings through new post-merger savings not fully reflected in new
price reductions would be lessened by the potential liability of up to $5000 per violation, particularly since each sale not at real value was declared to be a separate offense.

See supra note 250.
449 International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
450 See supra text accompanying notes 264-70.
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under normal conditions, but only prediction or proof that the defendant's activity would or did cause some variation from it. And the Kentucky court clearly indicated that defendants could rebut any prima facie case the state might establish by showing that their prices were netcost justified, that is, taking into account both increases and decreases in
firm expenses in the relevant time period. Such refinements, whether or
not inevitably dictating a final result different from the one reached by
Holmes, at least seem to suggest that the manageability problems posed
may not have been quite as insuperable as he suggested. 51
Why might Holmes and a majority of the United States Supreme
Court have perceived such a higher degree of vagueness in the real
value test than did the Kentucky jurists or, apparently, Justices McKenna and Pitney, who dissented without written opinion? As previously mentioned, 45 2 it is possible that a part of the answer may be

found in a difference in political perspective, reflected in Justice
Holmes's open accusations that the Kentucky antitrust standard had
been applied unevenly to penalize business conduct not intrinsically different from the farmer activity that the state courts had tolerated. 45 3
But it also seems possible that in significant part Holmes and the Kentucky jurists may have differed in their perception of the definiteness
and intelligibility of a normal market, real value standard because of
the different overall conceptions of economic life with which they began
their respective analyses.
If high court judges in Kentucky still believed that, despite constant activity, sufficient natural, beneficent stability inhered in the economy to allow practical isolation, identification, and correction of specific
dynamic intrusions artificially creating abnormal deviations from normal market conditions, Holmes's view of social and economic life in
general pointed in a decidedly different direction. Indeed, long before
451 It should be recalled that forms of analysis somewhat similar to those required
under the Kentucky tests or feared by Justice Holmes long have been employed and
tolerated in other antitrust contexts. For example, the calculation of actual versus hypothetical prices rejected by Holmes is in fact commonly undertaken, at least after the
fact, in the course of litigation whenever a private Sherman Act plaintiff seeks to establish the amount by which the defendant's price fixing increased prices, a necessary
predicate to proof of damages if not to proof of liability. While it is, of course, fundamentally important that this context is one to which only less demanding due process
requirements apply than those that apply to criminal prosecutions, it nonetheless provides a comparison worth noting. Recall also the Robinson-Patman context, in which
cost justification for prices charged is a well-known and long established means of rebuttal by which defendants are invited to respond to a prima facie case established
under the federal price discrimination statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
41 See supra note 270.
411 See International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 220-21
(1914).
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1914, Holmes had developed and articulated a view of the world that
seemingly rejected the basic beliefs underlying the Kentucky approach
in nearly every major respect; with regard to natural law, the extent to
which order and harmony normally or naturally characterized the
world, the appropriate understanding and treatment of industrial combination, and the importance of competition itself.454
Rejecting natural law conceptions within legal thought as well as
outside it, Holmes attacked "jurists who believe in natural law" as unjustifiably being "in that naive state of mind that accepts what has been
familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something that
must be accepted by all men everywhere."" 55 Embracing a "Social Darwinist" ideology, 450 he emphasized not inherent natural harmonies or
stability in social and economic life but instead the centrality of neverceasing struggle, picturing social and economic relations at any particular instant as reflecting not so much an intrinsic natural order as a
momentary and potentially unstable balance among contending powers.457 Indeed, in discussing economic relations, he went so far as to
"

Important explorations of the thought of Justice Holmes include P. BOLLER,

supra note 331, at 148-74; G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 48-56 (1977);

M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 1870-1882
(1963); S. KONEFSKY, THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS: A STUDY IN THE
INFLUENCE OF IDEAS (1956); M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE
HOLMES (1943); H. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES & UTILITARIAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1984); Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as Legal and Social Science,
10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 719 (1982); Touster, Holmes a Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law and Legal Theory, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 673 (1982); Tushnet, The Logic of
Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court, 63 VA. L. REV.
975 (1977); Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 CALIF. L.
REV. 343 (1984); White, Looking at Holmes in the Mirror,4 LAW & HIST. REV. 439

(1986).
"55 Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918), reprinted in O.W.
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310, 312 (1920).
456 For discussion of Holmes's thought in these respects as a variant of Social
Darwinism, see P. BOLLER, supra note 331, at 153-57; M. HOWE, supra note 454, at
43-50, 57-58, 173, 252; Gordon, supra note 454, at 739-41; Vetter, supra note 454, at

362-367.
""' Thus, for example, in a well-known passage, Holmes declared:
The struggle for life . . . does not stop in the ascending scale with the

monkeys, but is equally the law of human existence. Outside of legislation
this is undeniable. It is mitigated by sympathy, prudence, and all the social and moral qualities. But in the last resort a man rightly prefers his
own interest to that of his neighbors. And this is as true in legislation as in
any other form of corporate action .... [W]hatever body may possess the
supreme power for the moment is certain to have interests inconsistent
with others which have competed unsuccessfully. The more powerful interests must be more or less reflected in legislation; which, like every other
device of man or beast, must tend in the long run to aid the survival of the

fittest.
Summary of Events: The Gas-Stokers' Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 582, 583 (1873); see also
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propose substitution of the phrase "free struggle for life" in place of the
more familiar but assertedly equivalent term "free competition" in referring to the ongoing battles between labor and capital.45
Holmes's understanding of economic combination was very much
related to this general view of life as struggle. While still a Justice of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Holmes already had concluded that the new collective enterprises appearing with ever-increasing frequency could not appropriately be viewed as a peculiar temporary aberration but were, in fact, new, fitter forms of economic
organization evolving out of the economic struggle for survival. As such,
he believed it would be not only ill-conceived but quixotic to attempt to
suppress them. Thus, in his famous 1896 dissent in Vegelahn v.
Guntner,'459 Holmes declared:
[I]t is plain from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most superficial reading of industrial history,
that free competition means combination, and that the organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever
increasing might and scope of combination. It seems to me
futile to set our faces against this tendency. Whether beneficial on the whole, as I think it, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms of society, and even the
fundamental conditions of life, are to be changed. 6 °
Holmes's acceptance of combination was so strong, and his departure
from conceptions of price naturally driven to desirable cost-equating
levels through competition so marked, that at one point he even publicly questioned whether monopolistic pricing really was less socially
justifiable than competitive pricing. In his 1911 dissent in the leading
resale price maintenance case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 46 1 while he assumed that the manufacturer's stipuO.W. HoLMES,

THE COMMON LAW

38 (M. Howe ed. 1963).

[A]t the bottom of all private relations, however tempered by sympathy
and all the social feelings, is a justifiable self-preference. If a man is on a
plank in the deep sea which will only float one, and a stranger lays hold
of it, he will thrust him off if he can. When the state finds itself in a
similar position, it does the same thing.
Id. On such themes in Holmes's thinking, see P. BoLLER, supra note 331; G. GILMORE, supra note 454; Gordon, supra note 454; Touster, supra note 454.
458 See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106-07, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
459

Id.

Id. at 108, 44 N.E. at 1081. For additional favorable comments by Holmes on
the powerful economic interests of his time, see O.W. HOLMEs, Economic Elements, in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 455, at 279-82.
460

461

220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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lated resale prices in fact had been reasonable,46 2 he addressed larger
economic policy issues as follows:
I think that, at least, it is safe to say that the most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground for interference is
very clear. What then is the ground upon which we interfere
in the present case? . . . Perhaps it may be assumed to be
the interest of the consumers and the public. On that point I
confess that I am in a minority as to larger issues than are
concerned here. I think that we greatly exaggerate the value
and importance to the public of competition in the production or distribution of an article (here it is only distribution),
as fixing a fair price. What really fixes that is the competition of conflicting desires. We, none of us, can have as much
as we want of all the things that we want. Therefore, we
have to choose. As soon as the price of something that we
want goes above the point at which we are willing to give up
other things to have that, we cease to buy it and buy something else. Of course, I am speaking of things that we can get
along without. There may be necessaries that sooner or later
must be dealt with like short rations in a shipwreck, but they
are not Dr. Miles's medicines. With regard to things like the
latter it seems to me that the point of most profitable returns
marks the equilibrium of social desires and determines the
fair price in the only sense in which I can find meaning in
those words.4 63
It seems not entirely implausible to suggest that the Kentucky normal market, real value approach was particularly likely to be viewed
with at least somewhat heightened initial skepticism when reviewed by
a jurist like Holmes, who found combination both desirable and inevitable, the value of competition questionable, natural law mythical, and
belief in characteristic stability and calm sharply at variance with social
and economic reality.'"
461 See
468

id. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 411-12 (emphasis added).

464 To highlight such basic differences between the economic visions of Holmes
and the Kentucky jurists is not to deny that, at least once, Holmes himself employed
one of the same phrases that the state court judges used. In his 1921 dissent in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), in which the Supreme Court upheld injunctive relief restricting information exchange activity that was
found to be in violation of the Sherman Act, Holmes argued that the activity in which
the defendants participated should be permitted as a means of improving the functioning of the market. See id. at 412-13 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The activity, Holmes
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F. Antitrust Historians and Contemporary Theory
It remains to be asked why leading accounts of early antitrust development do not pursue the possible influence of contemporary economic philosophy. For at least the last 150 years, important social and
economic theorists in America rather consistently have proclaimed that
their own theories were more truly scientific than those of their predecessors. While such claims often have rested to an important extent on
genuine advances in scholarly achievement and sophistication, historians also have noted the symbolic and strategic significance of such declarations, pointing out the potential power and prestige of the imprimatur of "science" in American culture.4 5 In the light of the cases and
interpretations discussed above, it would appear that at least some leading antitrust and regulatory writers carry the American tradition a step
further and assert not only that modern theory is more scientific than
the theoretical approaches taken, for example, by early antitrust judges,
but also that the world of antitrust jurisprudence had no guiding theory
466
at all until their own was born.
argued, helped both buyers and sellers to obtain more complete market information and
hence to make more intelligent market decisions. See id. at 412. In explaining the general difference between bad cartel activity and the activity engaged in by defendants in
the instant case, Holmes wrote, "A combination in unreasonable restraint of trade imports an attempt to override normal market conditions. An attempt to conform to them
seems to me the most reasonable thing in the world." Id. Given both the context of this
particular case and of Holmes's thought in general, however, it is highly unlikely that
this single-sentence reference to "normal market conditions" signified any endorsement
of particular economic theories employing the phrase, particularly the "normal" or
"natural" value theory reflected in the Kentucky approach, which he had rejected seven
years earlier as an unacceptably indefinite standard for criminal liability. In his American Column & Lumber dissent, Holmes made no direct or indirect allusion to International Harvester or to any potential significance of the phrase "normal market conditions" beyond the limited meaning for which he apparently employed it. Rather than
announcing a new reconsideration of basic theory, Holmes appears to have been making only a very general point about the believed innocent consistency of the defendants'
activity with ordinary market activity and circumstances.
465 See, e.g., M. HoRwrrz, supra note 336, at 257-58; P. MILLF, THE LIFE OF
THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 156-64 (1965);
E. PuRCELL, supra note 331, at 16-17, 27-28; R. WIEBE, supra note 331, at 147.
4" Although leading discussions of early antitrust jurisprudence published prior to
the works of Judge Bork and Professor McCraw do not so explicitly deny the possibility that such jurisprudence may have been influenced significantly by the general economic theory of the time, they are similar in that they do not pursue such possibilities
when analyzing the early antitrust cases, even though they elsewhere, in separate sections, sometimes do describe the state of contemporary social and economic theory. See
W. LETWIN, supra note 2; H. THORELLI, supra note 2. Denial or disregard of the
possible shaping influence of general economic theory on early antitrust jurisprudence
remains a general interpretative norm in antitrust commentary, even in important.work
exploring the impact of changing economic models on more recent antitrust develop-

ment. See Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian
Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1560 (1984) (declaring that "[niot
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Such an orientation appears to affect significantly such writers'
historical analyses, influencing both the choice of avenues pursued and
the treatment of the historical evidence examined. In addressing the
history of early antitrust jurisprudence, such writers seem to view the
world through historical lenses able to detect the presence of theory
only if it corresponds to a theory they themselves find sound. Aspects of
the historical record not so corresponding apparently come to be relegated to the historical dustbin of mere unsystematic political or personal rambling.
As already noted, such tendencies seem particularly striking in the
landmark works of Professor McCraw and Judge Bork. Professor McCraw undertakes a careful, detailed, new examination of the antitrust
thought of Louis Brandeis, zeroing in on Brandeis's persistent tendency
to make sweeping interpretative declarations applying across the economy as a whole, and he relates this tendency to Brandeis's assertion of
a fundamental economic pattern explainable in terms of basic, universal
principle. 467 Yet, McCraw sees no influence of contemporary theory in
this, but only political preference, personal sensibility, and a litigator's
strategic mentality,"6 despite the striking similarities of much of Brandeis's economic vision to powerful tendencies in contemporary thought
in general. 6 9 McCraw notes the frequency with which Americans of
the period spoke of particular economic developments as "unnatural"
but does not pursue the possibility that, for any significant number of
observers, such conceptions might have been part of any larger systematic theory of economic life.'7 0
Judge Bork says even less regarding the contemporary significance
of such terminology. Indeed, he never even notes its presence in the
InternationalHarvester litigation whose centrality he stresses. At one
point elsewhere in his text,7 1 Judge Bork does mention briefly an apparent preoccupation with unnatural or abnormal economic behavior in
the different context of Chief Justice White's famous opinion for the
Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.47 2 But recognition of such a judicial preoccupation in that case does not prompt him
to consider whether White's reasoning might have reflected any broader
theoretical tendencies of the time. Citing this aspect of White's opinion
until the antitrust synthesis of the 1940s fused Populist ideology with oligopoly learning did economic models define legal norms").
46 See supra text accompanying notes 312-27.
48 See supra text accompanying notes 325-27.
469 See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
470 See supra text accompanying notes 306-09, 328-29.
471 See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 38.
4- 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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chiefly to point out its "capacity for mischief,' 47'3 Judge Bork makes no
mention of broader natural law or natural process perspectives in contemporary economic thought. Instead, he merely dismisses White's reference to unnatural or abnormal economic conduct as analogous to attempted twentieth century legal distinctions between natural and
unnatural, or normal and abnormal sex.' 7 '
An even more striking treatment of contemporary theory is apparent in his analysis of the early void-for-vagueness cases. Identifying InternationalHarvester as litigation raising fundamental historical and
75
modem questions of appropriate antitrust policy and judicial role,'
Judge Bork stares straight at the Kentucky "real value" standard and
finds nothing there at all. Since it does not match his own notions of
"real" theory, Judge Bork concludes that such a standard must have
constituted an intellectual near-void incorporating only purely subjective notions of "reasonable value."'4 8 The possibility that it might
prove instructive to examine how the contemporary proponents of the
"real value" test actually explained its meaning seems not to have occurred to him.
Determined to draw a moral from early antitrust history, Judge
Bork highlights InternationalHarvester as early precedent indicating
the policy and analytic errors judges commit when they have no theory
to guide them, and throughout his work he calls for firm, exclusive
adherence to the logic of basic microeconomic theory as the only safe
and scientific antidote for policy error.47 7 Yet InternationalHarvester
473 R. BORK,
474 See id.

supra note 2, at 38.

See supra text accompanying notes 221, 276-85.
See supra text accompanying notes 277-85.
47 In calling for such an exclusive focus, see, e.g., R. BORK,supra note 2, at 69,
71, 81, Judge Bork heavily stresses the scientific character of basic microeconomic theory, see, e.g., id. at 8, .90-91, but he rejects specific dependence on the often conflicting,
more detailed empirical and theoretical work of professional economists themselves. See,
e.g., id. at 109-15, 117-18, 123-33. He warns that
475
476

[t]he layman is likely to think that economic theory is what any economist
theorizes, but of course it is not. If it were, we should have to believe that
there are dozens or hundreds of mutually incompatible versions of economic theory, each as good as any other.
..IT]he
[
judge, legislator, or lawyer cannot simply take the word of
an economist in dealing with antitrust, for the economists will certainly
disagree.
Id. at 117-18. While warning that simple economic models can be seriously misused,
see, e.g., id. at 92, 95, 108, and conceding that errors readily can be made in their
application, see, e.g., 117-18, 123, Judge Bork nonetheless retains great faith in the
manageability, appropriateness, and power of the careful, deductive application of basic
economic principles, several of which he declares "derive from an aspect of the market
system that often has been expressed in the analogy to the Darwinian theory of natural
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itself appears to be litigation in which the jurists criticized by both Justice Holmes and Judge Bork took the path that they did, not because
they knew nothing of contemporary theory but rather in significant
part because they adhered so firmly to a contemporary economic theory
they found congenial and that seemed to offer a scientific, if largely
deductive, guide to the real world complexity around them.4 8 So understood, however, International Harvester would seem to suggest a
cautioning moral somewhat different from the one Judge Bork asserts
on the basis of his very different reading of the case, a moral with
potentially somewhat different implications if translated into the intellectual context of present day policy formulation.
CONCLUSION

For three decades following the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, state antitrust efforts constituted a practically and symbolically
substantial response to late nineteenth and early twentieth century
problems of industrial combination, collusion, and predation as well as
an important complement to public and private litigation under federal
antitrust law. If the magnitude and relative significance of state antimonopoly activity rapidly declined after World War I, it was not for
want of substantial judicial support for such efforts during the pre-war
decades of American economic transformation. Federal and state judges
did condemn some applications of state power and certain state approaches. But, while important, such decisions were atypical. In the
overwhelming majority of cases, Populist and Progressive Era courts
firmly rejected the various commerce clause, equal protection, and due
process challenges repeatedly raised against state antitrust enforcement
selection and physical evolution." Id. at 118. Thus, he declares:
The economic models involved are essential to all antitrust analysis, but
they are simple and require no previous acquaintance with economics to
be comprehended. Indeed . . .it is only the fact that the simple ideas of
economics are powerful and entirely adequate to this field that makes it
conceivable for the law to frame and implement useful policy.
Id. at 90. Describing the nature of the judicial reasoning required in this process, he
explains, "Basic economic theory is an intensely logical subject, and much of it consists
of a drawing out of the implications of a few empirically supported postulates." Id. at
117. The fact that such an approach may give others pause, Judge Bork declares, does
not cause him to doubt its superiority:
It makes some people uneasy to have to rely entirely upon theory to
infer the nature of a reality that is not directly observed. Yet I am convinced both that the theory is good enough to make the task doable and,
equally important, that there is no other possible way to proceed.
Id. at 122.
478 See supra text accompanying notes 416-48.
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and left state authorities considerable room in which to develop and
implement antitrust policy.
Examination of the judicial analyses written in response to such
challenges not only further illuminates the broader contours of late
nineteenth and early twentieth century constitutional theory; it also
provides striking indications of the influence of contemporary economic
theory in the early development of antitrust and antitrust-related jurisprudence. Accordingly, such examination appears to call into question
leading accounts of antitrust history, which proclaim the absence of
such an influence. In this connection, the ill-fated approach taken by
the Kentucky jurists who adopted and refined the "real value" test for
price-fixing condemnation seems particularly revealing of aspects of
both early and modern understanding. Rather than demonstrating the
operation of only an open-ended subjective populism, such early cases
instead appear to display dramatically the impact of general economic
theory and simultaneously to demonstrate its potential for encouraging
the adoption of analyses that, while faithful to one generation's economic vision, could subsequently be found not only faulty, but practically unintelligible, by a later generation of antitrust analysts influenced by a very different vision of the nature of economic reality.

